Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Digital Commons Network

Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Articles 1 - 2 of 2

Full-Text Articles in Entire DC Network

Noneconomic Objectives, Global Value Chains And International Cooperation, Bernard M. Hoekman, Petros C. Mavroidis, Douglas R. Nelson Jan 2023

Noneconomic Objectives, Global Value Chains And International Cooperation, Bernard M. Hoekman, Petros C. Mavroidis, Douglas R. Nelson

Faculty Scholarship

Systemic conflicts increasingly affect the global value chains (GVCs) underpinning globalization by creating policy uncertainty and politicizing trade and investment decisions. Unilateral policies to attain competitiveness and noneconomic objectives (NEOs), including national security, create incentives for international cooperation to attenuate policy spillovers. Recent initiatives seeking to do so are organized around supply chain governance and need not be anchored in trade agreements. Whether such cooperation is feasible and can be designed to be effective in realizing NEOs is unclear. Plurilateral GVC-centered cooperation offers a potential path for states to pursue NEOs and reduce policy uncertainty for international business. Research offers …


The Geopolitics Of Strategic Stability: Looking Beyond Cold Warriors And Nuclear Weapons, C. Dale Walton, Colin S. Gray Feb 2013

The Geopolitics Of Strategic Stability: Looking Beyond Cold Warriors And Nuclear Weapons, C. Dale Walton, Colin S. Gray

Faculty Scholarship

“Strategic stability” is a much-used, but under-analyzed, term. Before launching into any discussion of strategic stability in this century, it is necessary first to ask what we actually mean by strategic stability. Game theorists endeavor to define the phrase in very precise mathematical terms, but even among these specialists there is no settled agreement on its proper definition.1 In policy debates, meanwhile, the term is used very loosely to describe anything from rough parity in the sizes of nuclear arsenals to the perceived unlikelihood of an acute political crisis.