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Experimental Persuasion, Ian Ball, José-Antonio Espín-Sánchez
Experimental Persuasion, Ian Ball, José-Antonio Espín-Sánchez
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
We introduce experimental persuasion between Sender and Receiver. Sender chooses an experiment to perform from a feasible set of experiments. Receiver observes the realization of this experiment and chooses an action. We characterize optimal persuasion in this baseline regime and in an alternative regime in which Sender can commit to garble the outcome of the experiment. Our model includes Bayesian persuasion as the special case in which every experiment is feasible; however, our analysis does not require concavification. Since we focus on experiments rather than beliefs, we can accommodate general preferences including costly experiments and non-Bayesian inference.
Information Markets And Nonmarkets, Dirk Bergemann, Marco Ottaviani
Information Markets And Nonmarkets, Dirk Bergemann, Marco Ottaviani
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
As large amounts of data become available and can be communicated more easily and processed more e¤ectively, information has come to play a central role for economic activity and welfare in our age. This essay overviews contributions to the industrial organization of information markets and nonmarkets, while attempting to maintain a balance between foundational frameworks and more recent developments. We start by reviewing mechanism-design approaches to modeling the trade of information. We then cover ratings, predictions, and recommender systems. We turn to forecasting contests, prediction markets, and other institutions designed for collecting and aggregating information from decentralized participants. Finally, we …