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Cornell Law Faculty Working Papers

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2009

Japan

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Placeholders: Engaging The Hayekian Critique Of Financial Regulation, Annelise Riles Oct 2009

Placeholders: Engaging The Hayekian Critique Of Financial Regulation, Annelise Riles

Cornell Law Faculty Working Papers

Since Friedrich Hayek, debates about the proper relationship between the state and the market, and about the optimal design of regulatory institutions, often turn on assumptions about the workings of legal expertise — and in particular about the difference between public expertise (bureaucratic knowledge) and private expertise (private law). Hayek’s central argument, adopted uncritically by a wide array of policy-makers and academics across the political spectrum, is a temporal one: bureaucratic reasoning is inherently one step behind the market, and hence effective market planning is impossible. In contrast, Hayek argues, private ordering is superior because it is of the moment, …