Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
- Discipline
-
- Social and Behavioral Sciences (396)
- Public Affairs, Public Policy and Public Administration (380)
- Economics (373)
- Economic Policy (355)
- Business (303)
-
- Finance and Financial Management (288)
- Policy Design, Analysis, and Evaluation (250)
- Public Administration (236)
- Macroeconomics (216)
- Economic History (206)
- Policy History, Theory, and Methods (196)
- Finance (165)
- Public Policy (148)
- Growth and Development (71)
- Law (59)
- Banking and Finance Law (49)
- Political Economy (41)
- Public Affairs (36)
- Public Economics (31)
- Corporate Finance (28)
- International Economics (28)
- Political Science (23)
- Administrative Law (21)
- Bankruptcy Law (16)
- International Relations (15)
- Other Public Affairs, Public Policy and Public Administration (11)
- Insurance (10)
- Organizational Behavior and Theory (10)
- Sociology (9)
- Work, Economy and Organizations (9)
- Keyword
-
- Global Financial Crisis (89)
- Federal Reserve (32)
- Liquidity (26)
- Market liquidity (24)
- Restructuring (22)
-
- Capital injection (17)
- TARP (17)
- Capital injections (16)
- ECB (15)
- Global Financial Crisis (GFC) (15)
- Reserve requirements (15)
- Resolution (15)
- Lehman Brothers (14)
- 2008 (13)
- Account guarantees (13)
- Bank of England (13)
- Broad-based emergency liquidity (13)
- Chrysler (13)
- Asset management companies (12)
- General Motors (12)
- Hungary (12)
- Wholesale funding (12)
- AIG (11)
- Blanket guarantee (11)
- Broad-based (11)
- Commercial paper (11)
- Derivatives (11)
- FDIC (11)
- Liquidity rules (11)
- Nonperforming loans (11)
- Publication Year
Articles 1 - 30 of 474
Full-Text Articles in Entire DC Network
Lessons Learned: Andrew Williams, Mercedes Cardona
Lessons Learned: Andrew Williams, Mercedes Cardona
Journal of Financial Crises
Andrew Williams was deputy assistant secretary for public affairs at the US Department of the Treasury and served as spokesman for Secretary Timothy Geithner in 2009–10. Williams was previously vice president of media relations and public affairs at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) in 2007–09, when Geithner was its president. During his time at Treasury, Williams was part of several initiatives to improve communications with the public, including the first briefing for economics and financial bloggers in 2009. This Lessons Learned summary is based on an interview with Williams on March 26, 2021.
Lessons Learned: Til Schuermann, Mercedes Cardona
Lessons Learned: Til Schuermann, Mercedes Cardona
Journal of Financial Crises
Til Schuermann joined the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) in 2001 and held several positions during his tenure, including senior vice president and head of Financial Intermediation in Research and head of Credit Risk in Bank Supervision. In spring 2009, he played a leadership role in the design and execution of the “bank stress test” and the subsequent Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review (CCAR) programs. After leaving the FRBNY in March 2011, he became a partner at management consulting firm Oliver Wyman, where he has led stress testing for more than 25 banks and financial institutions. He participated …
Lessons Learned: Júlia Király, Matthew A. Lieber
Lessons Learned: Júlia Király, Matthew A. Lieber
Journal of Financial Crises
Júlia Király was deputy governor of the National Bank of Hungary (Magyar Nemzeti Bank, or MNB) from 2007 to 2013. A financial economist serving on MNB’s advisory board in the 1990s, Király helped formulate and adapt Western banking frameworks for Hungary’s economic transition away from socialism. As deputy governor, she oversaw Hungary’s emergency response to the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). A professor of finance at the International Business School Budapest, Király is the author of Hungary and Other Emerging EU Countries in the Financial Storm, published in 2020. This Lessons Learned is based on an interview with Király on June …
Lessons Learned: Péter Ákos Bod, Matthew A. Lieber
Lessons Learned: Péter Ákos Bod, Matthew A. Lieber
Journal of Financial Crises
During Hungary’s transition from socialism from 1990 to 1994, Péter Ákos Bod served as minister of industry and trade and then for three years as governor of the National Bank of Hungary (Magyar Nemzeti Bank, or MNB). Following his public sector career in Hungary, Bod served as a director of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Currently, he is a professor at Corvinus University in Budapest in the department of economic policy. This Lesson Learned is based on an interview with Bod on April 26, 2022.
Lessons Learned: Ádám Banai, Matthew A. Lieber
Lessons Learned: Ádám Banai, Matthew A. Lieber
Journal of Financial Crises
During the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), Ádám Banai served first as an analyst in the National Bank of Hungary (Magyar Nemzeti Bank, or MNB), where he helped the bank develop and implement a macroprudential framework for financial stability. Since 2020, he has served as MNB’s executive director of monetary policy instruments, financial stability, and foreign reserve management. This Lessons Learned is based on an interview with Banai conducted on April 18, 2023.
Lessons Learned: Ádám Balog, Matthew A. Lieber
Lessons Learned: Ádám Balog, Matthew A. Lieber
Journal of Financial Crises
From 2013 to 2016, Ádám Balog was deputy governor of the National Bank of Hungary (Magyar Nemzeti Bank, or MNB) and a member of the Monetary Council. During the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), Hungary was unable to finance its external debt and negotiated a three-party agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European Union. In this interview, Balog describes the conditions in Hungary before the crisis and the challenges and decisions that he worked on during its aftermath. This Lessons Learned summary is based on an interview with Balog held on February 1, 2022.
United Kingdom: Dunfermline Building Society Restructuring, 2009, Anmol Makhija
United Kingdom: Dunfermline Building Society Restructuring, 2009, Anmol Makhija
Journal of Financial Crises
During the Global Financial Crisis of 2007–2009 (GFC), Dunfermline Building Society—Scotland’s largest building society by assets—faced significant impairments on its commercial mortgages. Rumors about Dunfermline’s financial troubles created a loss of confidence and led to depositor withdrawals. On March 28, 2009, the Financial Services Authority (FSA) determined that Dunfermline was likely to fail to meet its threshold conditions for operating as a deposit taker. This triggered the Special Resolution Regime, which was the new framework for resolving failed financial institutions adopted in the UK in response to the GFC. On March 30, 2009, the Bank of England (BoE) split Dunfermline …
Switzerland: Ubs Restructuring, 2008, Anmol Makhija
Switzerland: Ubs Restructuring, 2008, Anmol Makhija
Journal of Financial Crises
UBS incurred write-downs totaling USD 50 billion during the Global Financial Crisis, mostly on exposures to securities linked to US subprime mortgages. On October 16, 2008, the Swiss National Bank (SNB) announced that it would set up a special purpose vehicle, StabFund, to purchase up to USD 60 billion of troubled assets from UBS. The Swiss government also subscribed to 6 billion Swiss francs (CHF; USD 5.3 billion) of mandatory convertible notes (MCNs) issued by UBS. Between December 2008 and April 2009, UBS transferred USD 38.7 billion in assets and contingent liabilities to StabFund in three tranches. In August 2009, …
Spain: Banco Popular Restructuring, 2017, Carey K. Mott
Spain: Banco Popular Restructuring, 2017, Carey K. Mott
Journal of Financial Crises
On Friday, June 2, and Monday, June 5, 2017, Banco Popular Español, S.A., experienced a depositor run. Emergency liquidity assistance from Spain’s central bank proved insufficient to meet the bank’s liquidity needs. On June 6, Popular informed the European Central Bank that it was likely to fail, triggering the European Union’s Single Resolution Mechanism. That evening, the Single Resolution Board (SRB) initiated a sale of Popular’s business to one of Spain’s largest banks, Santander Group S.A., provided that Santander raise or inject enough capital to meet regulatory requirements and provide liquidity to manage further outflows. The sale involved the write-down …
Spain: Bfa-Bankia Group Restructuring, 2012, Lakshimi Swaminathan
Spain: Bfa-Bankia Group Restructuring, 2012, Lakshimi Swaminathan
Journal of Financial Crises
In 2010 and 2011, seven troubled savings banks (cajas) merged to form Banco Financiero y de Ahorros, S.A. (BFA), which the government capitalized with EUR 4.5 billion (USD 5.9 billion) in convertible securities, and BFA’s commercial banking subsidiary, Bankia (BFA, together with Bankia, was referred to as the BFA-Bankia Group). As a double-dip recession extended BFA-Bankia Group’s expected credit losses in Spain’s real estate market in 2012, third-party stress tests determined that the Group was deeply insolvent. On November 27, 2012, Fondo de Reestructuración Ordenada Bancaria (FROB), Spain’s newly established national resolution authority, and the Bank of Spain (BoS) approved …
Portugal: Banco Espírito Santo Restructuring, 2014, Salil Gupta
Portugal: Banco Espírito Santo Restructuring, 2014, Salil Gupta
Journal of Financial Crises
Banco Espírito Santo (BES) was the second-largest private bank in Portugal in 2014, with assets of EUR 80 billion (USD 81 billion). A capital increase of EUR 1.1 billion to the BES was concluded on market terms in June 2014. In July 2014, BES breached minimum capital requirements and reported a EUR 3.6 billion loss owing to improper loans made to the nonfinancial arm of the Espírito Santo (ES) group. The Bank of Portugal (BOP) adopted a resolution measure for BES on August 3, 2014, to safeguard financial stability by protecting all depositors and ensuring continuation of operating activities of …
Luxembourg: Kaupthing Bank Luxembourg Restructuring, 2008, Ayodeji George
Luxembourg: Kaupthing Bank Luxembourg Restructuring, 2008, Ayodeji George
Journal of Financial Crises
The nationalization of Iceland’s Kaupthing Bank hf on October 9, 2008, caused a situation of cross-default and a depositor run at its subsidiary, Kaupthing Bank Luxembourg S.A. (KBL). A cross-default entitles creditors to request immediate execution of their claims. KBL responded on the same day by requesting and receiving a suspension of payments regime (including depositors) from a Luxembourg court, which also appointed administrators. The administrators placed KBL’s operations for sale later that month, receiving a bid from a private fund, Blackfish Capital, which crafted a restructuring plan that creditors approved on June 5, 2009. The restructuring plan, carried out …
Netherlands: Sns Reaal Restructuring, 2013, Ayodeji George
Netherlands: Sns Reaal Restructuring, 2013, Ayodeji George
Journal of Financial Crises
In February 2013, the Dutch minister of finance nationalized SNS Reaal, a financial conglomerate that was primarily composed of SNS Bank and Reaal Insurance, after the firm proved unable to remedy a large capital deficit caused by losses in the real estate portfolio of SNS Bank. Alongside the nationalization, the minister of finance announced a EUR 3.7 billion (USD 5 billion) rescue package that included a capital injection and significant restructuring. The goals of the restructuring plan were to isolate the real estate portfolio in a “bad bank” and to sell the insurance subsidiary. The state transferred shareholding responsibilities to …
Latvia: Parex Bank Restructuring, 2008, Bailey Decker
Latvia: Parex Bank Restructuring, 2008, Bailey Decker
Journal of Financial Crises
Heading into the Global Financial Crisis, JSC Parex banka was Latvia’s second-largest bank in terms of assets, comprising 13.8% of total assets in the Latvian banking sector. In autumn 2008, Parex faced a capital shortfall due to massive credit and market losses in addition to increasing liquidity problems and deposit runs of 240 million Latvian lats (USD 428.6 million). Parex had two senior syndicated loans maturing in February and June 2009, totaling EUR 775 million (USD 992 million), or nearly one-sixth of the bank’s total liabilities. Latvian authorities doubted that Parex would be able to pay back, extend, or replace …
Italy: Restructuring Of Four Banks, 2015, Salil Gupta
Italy: Restructuring Of Four Banks, 2015, Salil Gupta
Journal of Financial Crises
The Italian government and Bank of Italy (BoI) presented a collective plan to resolve the crisis at four regional banks in Italy in November 2015, to safeguard the local economies in which these small and medium-size banks were located. The four banks had suffered from low or negative equity capital due to losses in loans to small and medium enterprises and retail clients and were placed under special administration between 2013 and 2015, with unsuccessful attempts to raise private capital. Italian regulators split each bank into a bridge or new bank, comprising all the good assets and liabilities of the …
Iceland: Landsbanki Restructuring, 2008, Ayodeji George
Iceland: Landsbanki Restructuring, 2008, Ayodeji George
Journal of Financial Crises
Iceland’s three largest banks—Landsbanki, Kaupthing, and Glitnir—grew rapidly in the 2000s and failed amid depositor runs when they lost access to foreign funding markets at the onset of the Global Financial Crisis. On October 6, 2008, the Icelandic Parliament passed the Emergency Act, and authorities quickly used their new powers to nationalize the three banks. The Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs (Ministry of Finance) created new versions of the three banks to hold the old banks’ performing domestic assets and all insured domestic deposits, and the prime minister assured all domestic depositors that they would be protected. Nonperforming domestic …
Hungary: Magyar Külkereskedelmi Bank Restructuring, 2014, Lakshimi Swaminathan
Hungary: Magyar Külkereskedelmi Bank Restructuring, 2014, Lakshimi Swaminathan
Journal of Financial Crises
In September 2014, the Hungarian state acquired Magyar Külkereskedelmi Bank (MKB), the country’s fifth-largest foreign-owned commercial bank, from Bayerische Landesbank (BayernLB) of Germany, at a depressed price. Before the sale, BayernLB recapitalized MKB by waiving its outstanding claims on the bank. The European Union had required BayernLB to sell MKB by the end of 2016 as a condition for its approval of the official support BayernLB received during the Global Financial Crisis of 2007–09. But the Hungarian central bank, Magyar Nemzeti Bank (MNB), remained concerned about the risk of further losses in MKB’s commercial and residential real estate loan portfolio. …
Greece: Ate Bank Restructuring, 2012, Stella Schaefer-Brown
Greece: Ate Bank Restructuring, 2012, Stella Schaefer-Brown
Journal of Financial Crises
The Agricultural Bank of Greece (ATE Bank) faced serious difficulties throughout 2008, 2009, and 2010. In 2011 and 2012, ATE Bank’s capital situation deteriorated further because of its exposure to the Greek sovereign debt crisis and the 50% haircut of privately held Greek bonds. In March 2012, the Bank of Greece conducted a viability assessment of ATE Bank and submitted a report to the Greek authorities recommending the resolution of ATE Bank through the purchase and assumption of specific assets and liabilities by another bank and the resolution of remaining nonperforming assets and liabilities through a bad bank. This assessment …
Greece: Piraeus Bank Restructuring, 2015, Stella Schaefer-Brown
Greece: Piraeus Bank Restructuring, 2015, Stella Schaefer-Brown
Journal of Financial Crises
In 2015, Greece began the open-bank recapitalization of Piraeus Bank (the Bank), which continued over an extended period. Concurrently, Greek authorities and Piraeus Bank formulated a restructuring plan. The restructuring and recapitalization of Piraeus Bank used funds that the European Stability Mechanism provided as part of the country’s third economic adjustment program since its sovereign debt crisis began in 2010. In October 2015, a supervisory asset quality review and stress test identified a capital shortfall of EUR 4.66 billion at Piraeus Bank due to Greek sovereign debt and other troubled credit exposures. The following month, the Bank raised EUR 1.94 …
Denmark: Roskilde Bank Restructuring, 2008, Bailey Decker
Denmark: Roskilde Bank Restructuring, 2008, Bailey Decker
Journal of Financial Crises
Roskilde Bank A/S was the eighth-largest bank in Denmark at the time of the Global Financial Crisis, with 43 billion Danish kroner (DKK; USD 9.1 billion) in consolidated assets as of March 2008. Roskilde had considerable exposure to real estate and construction markets, prompting ratings downgrades and larger write-downs than expected. On July 10, 2008, Roskilde asked for liquidity assistance from the Danish central bank, Danmarks Nationalbank (DNB). DNB and the banking sector group, Private Contingency Association (PCA), announced emergency liquidity assistance in the form of an unlimited credit facility to Roskilde on July 10, 2008, conditioned on Roskilde’s full …
Denmark: Andelskassen J.A.K. Slagelse Restructuring, 2015, Lakshimi Swaminathan
Denmark: Andelskassen J.A.K. Slagelse Restructuring, 2015, Lakshimi Swaminathan
Journal of Financial Crises
Andelskassen J.A.K. Slagelse was a small Danish cooperative bank with fewer than 4,000 depositors in 2015. Late that year, owing to years of corporate misgovernance and concentrated exposures to large borrowers, Andelskassen found itself on the brink of insolvency. On October 5, 2015, the Danish Financial Supervisory Authority (DFSA) notified the country’s resolution authority, the Financial Stability Company (FSC), that Andelskassen could not meet its solvency requirement and that its resolution was in the public interest. Consequently, the FSC took over the bank, wrote down all relevant capital instruments to zero, imposed losses on uninsured depositors and other creditors, and …
Cyprus: Laiki Bank And Bank Of Cyprus Restructuring, 2013, Stella Schaefer-Brown
Cyprus: Laiki Bank And Bank Of Cyprus Restructuring, 2013, Stella Schaefer-Brown
Journal of Financial Crises
In 2011, Cyprus’s second-largest bank, Marfin Popular Bank—later renamed Cyprus Popular Bank but commonly known as Laiki Bank—lost billions of euros on Greek government securities when the European Union decided to haircut Greek government bonds. This damaged Laiki Bank’s equity and shut its access to market liquidity. In late 2011, supervisors estimated the bank’s capital shortfall at EUR 3.1 billion. As Laiki Bank faced severe liquidity problems from depositor withdrawals, the Central Bank of Cyprus (CBC) began to extend emergency liquidity assistance (ELA) to the bank in October 2011. In January 2012, the bank submitted a recovery plan to the …
Belgium: Fortis Group Restructuring, 2008, Ayodeji George
Belgium: Fortis Group Restructuring, 2008, Ayodeji George
Journal of Financial Crises
Fortis Group, a financial conglomerate with subsidiaries in Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg, faced share price deterioration and a depositor run as the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) intensified in September 2008. On September 29, the three governments announced a EUR 11.2 billion bailout package that would allow the Fortis Group to continue operating with recapitalized subsidiaries. As part of that deal, Belgium contributed a EUR 4.7 billion capital injection to the Belgian subsidiary, Fortis Bank Belgium (FBB), which held both the group’s Belgian bank and its main Dutch and Luxembourgish banking activities. However, the cross-border cooperation fractured after the failure …
Belgium, France, Luxembourg: Dexia Group Restructuring, 2011, Ayodeji George
Belgium, France, Luxembourg: Dexia Group Restructuring, 2011, Ayodeji George
Journal of Financial Crises
Dexia Group (Dexia, or the Group), a banking and insurance conglomerate, was the world’s largest municipal lender in 2008, with major operations in Belgium, France, and Luxembourg. Heavy exposure to the US housing market at the onset of the Global Financial Crisis caused EUR 3.3 billion in losses, and Dexia faced runs from Belgian and Luxembourgish depositors in late September 2008. On September 30, 2008, authorities announced a EUR 6.4 billion (eventually EUR 6 billion) public and quasi-private capital injection for Dexia to remain adequately capitalized amid market distress. The European Commission (EC) approved the Group’s transformation plan on February …
Austria: Heta Asset Resolution Restructuring, 2015, Bailey Decker, Eming Shyu
Austria: Heta Asset Resolution Restructuring, 2015, Bailey Decker, Eming Shyu
Journal of Financial Crises
Hypo Alpe Adria (HAA) was Austria’s sixth-largest bank by assets at the time of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2007–2009. HAA pursued a growth strategy in southeastern Europe in the years preceding the GFC—emboldened liability guarantee from the Austrian state of Carinthia—which proved troublesome for HAA’s loan portfolio and led to large write-downs in autumn 2008. From December 2008 to April 2014, Austria provided EUR 5.8 billion in total capital injections—during which time the government nationalized HAA. Per European Commission (EC) authorization of State Aid, Austria had to submit a restructuring plan, which the EC approved in September 2013. …
Survey Of Resolution And Restructuring In Europe: Pre- And Post-Brrd, Christian M. Mcnamara, Carey K. Mott, Salil Gupta, Greg Feldberg, Andrew Metrick
Survey Of Resolution And Restructuring In Europe: Pre- And Post-Brrd, Christian M. Mcnamara, Carey K. Mott, Salil Gupta, Greg Feldberg, Andrew Metrick
Journal of Financial Crises
This paper surveys 19 case studies of bank resolutions and restructurings across 15 Key Design Decisions. It focuses on interventions that occurred in Europe both in the years leading up to the adoption of the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) in 2014 (when many jurisdictions were constrained by a lack of legal authority) and in the years after the BRRD was in place. The main themes that emerge are: (a) the need for resolution and restructuring to eliminate uncertainty about an institution’s solvency by closing it, recapitalizing it, or merging it with a healthier institution; (b) the importance of …
Lessons Learned: Eric Rosengren, Steven Kelly
Lessons Learned: Eric Rosengren, Steven Kelly
Journal of Financial Crises
Eric Rosengren began working at the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston in 1985 and ultimately served as its president and CEO from 2007 to 2021, including during the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and the COVID-19 crisis. He met with the Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) to share insights related to the Federal Reserve’s crisis responses—particularly those during the pandemic. This Lessons Learned is based on an interview conducted with Rosengren on February 6, 2023
Lessons Learned: John Oros, Mary Anne Chute Lynch, Rosalind Z. Wiggins
Lessons Learned: John Oros, Mary Anne Chute Lynch, Rosalind Z. Wiggins
Journal of Financial Crises
John Oros was managing director at the private investment firm J.C. Flowers & Co. (JCF) during the Global Financial Crisis of 2007–2009 (GFC); he is now an operating partner at the firm. In the fall of 2008, Oros worked as a senior member of the JCF team on projects involving Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, and American International Group [AIG], as these firms were negotiating with lending banks, investment companies, and federal regulators to avoid collapse. Earlier in his career, Oros served as chairman of the Federal Savings and Loan Council from 1987 to 1989, during the savings and loan (S&L) …
Lessons Learned: Zoltan Pozsar, Sandra Ward
Lessons Learned: Zoltan Pozsar, Sandra Ward
Journal of Financial Crises
While working as a senior trader and analyst with the Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s Markets Group in 2008–11, Zoltan Pozsar became intrigued by the existence of a “shadow banking system” involving securitized assets. He dedicated himself to understanding the linkages of the then obscure and overlooked asset-backed securities (ABS) market and the role it played in keeping markets liquid and functioning. Pozsar’s research laid the groundwork for the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility, or TALF, which was instrumental in restarting the flow of credit during the Global Financial Crisis. This “Lessons Learned” is based on an interview with …
Lessons Learned: William B. English, Sandra Ward
Lessons Learned: William B. English, Sandra Ward
Journal of Financial Crises
Bill English, a longtime veteran of the Federal Reserve Board, served as deputy director of the Division of Monetary Affairs from 2008 to 2010, a position that put him close to many of the critical decisions made in response to fast-moving developments at the height of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and the subsequent recession. In 2010, he was elevated to the post of director of the division and secretary to the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC). Since 2016, he has been at the Yale School of Management, where he now is the Eugene F. Williams, Jr., Professor of the …