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Articles 1 - 28 of 28
Full-Text Articles in Entire DC Network
Criminal Enforcement Of Section 2 Of The Sherman Act: An Empirical Assessment, Daniel A. Crane
Criminal Enforcement Of Section 2 Of The Sherman Act: An Empirical Assessment, Daniel A. Crane
Law & Economics Working Papers
The Biden Justice Department has announced that it may begin to bring criminal monopolization cases under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, a practice that the Department has not employed in almost half a century. The Department's leadership has justified this idea by asserting that it used to be common practice for the Antitrust Division to bring such cases. This Article presents the findings of an empirical study of all of the Justice Department's antitrust case filings. It finds that the Justice Depart brought 175 criminal monopolization cases between 1903 and 1977, but that only 20 of these involved unilateral …
A Case For Higher Corporate Tax Rates, Edward G. Fox, Zachary D. Liscow
A Case For Higher Corporate Tax Rates, Edward G. Fox, Zachary D. Liscow
Law & Economics Working Papers
In this report, Fox and Liscow argue that, while conventional wisdom holds that we should lower taxes on corporations because of international competition, two recent changes militate in favor of higher corporate taxes, which would close the deficit, fund social programs, and reduce inequality. First, changes in tax law have increasingly targeted the corporate tax at economic “rents,” the supersized returns that businesses receive when they enjoy advantages like market power. Because taxing rents is progressive and does little to harm economic activity, a higher rate is justified. Second, shifts in the American economy have allowed companies to earn more …
Antitrust's Unconventional Politics, Daniel A. Crane
Antitrust's Unconventional Politics, Daniel A. Crane
Articles
Antitrust law stands at its most fluid and negotiable moment in a generation. The bipartisan consensus that antitrust should solely focus on economic efficiency and consumer welfare has quite suddenly come under attack from prominent voices calling for a dramatically enhanced role for antitrust law in mediating a variety of social, economic, and political friction points, including employment, wealth inequality, data privacy and security, and democratic values. To the bewilderment of many observers, the ascendant pressures for antitrust reforms are flowing from both wings of the political spectrum, throwing into confusion a conventional understanding that pro-antitrust sentiment tacked left and …
State-Action Immunity And Section 5 Of The Ftc Act, Daniel A. Crane, Adam Hester
State-Action Immunity And Section 5 Of The Ftc Act, Daniel A. Crane, Adam Hester
Michigan Law Review
The state-action immunity doctrine of Parker v. Brown immunizes anticompetitive state regulations from preemption by federal antitrust law so long as the state takes conspicuous ownership of its anticompetitive policy. In its 1943 Parker decision, the Supreme Court justified this doctrine, observing that no evidence of a congressional will to preempt state law appears in the Sherman Act’s legislative history or context. In addition, commentators generally assume that the New Deal court was anxious to avoid re-entangling the federal judiciary in Lochner-style substantive due process analysis. The Supreme Court has observed, without deciding, that the Federal Trade Commission might …
Economic Law, Inequality, And Hidden Hierarchies On The Eu Internal Market, Damjan Kukovec
Economic Law, Inequality, And Hidden Hierarchies On The Eu Internal Market, Damjan Kukovec
Michigan Journal of International Law
This Article has several aims. First, the aim is to show the continuing importance and relevance of antitrust and international trade lawyers in countering the concentration of power in the hands of the few or in some geographic areas of the world, if some of the assumptions of antitrust and trade are adjusted. Second, the goal is to articulate a particular analysis from the perspective of the (European) periphery. As the recent Euro crises and the near exit of Greece from the Union show, the European prospect of development for all has not arrived. This Article will articulate the privilege …
The New Road To Serfdom: The Curse Of Bigness And The Failure Of Antitrust, Carl T. Bogus
The New Road To Serfdom: The Curse Of Bigness And The Failure Of Antitrust, Carl T. Bogus
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
This Article argues for a paradigm shift in modern antitrust policy. Rather than being concerned exclusively with consumer welfare, antitrust law should also be concerned with consolidated corporate power. Regulators and courts should consider the social and political, as well as the economic, consequences of corporate mergers. The vision that antitrust must be a key tool for limiting consolidated corporate power has a venerable legacy, extending back to the origins of antitrust law in early seventeenth century England, running throughout American history, and influencing the enactment of U.S. antitrust laws. However, the Chicago School’s view that antitrust law should be …
Standing In The Way Of The Ftaia: Exceptional Applications Of Illinois Brick, Jennifer Fischell
Standing In The Way Of The Ftaia: Exceptional Applications Of Illinois Brick, Jennifer Fischell
Michigan Law Review
In 1982, Congress enacted the Foreign Antitrust Trade Improvements Act (FTAIA) to resolve uncertainties about the international reach and effect of U.S. antitrust laws. Unfortunately, the FTAIA has provided more questions than answers. It has been ten years since the Supreme Court most recently interpreted the FTAIA, and crucial questions and circuit splits abound. One of these questions is how to understand the convergence of the direct purchaser rule (frequently referred to as the Illinois Brick doctrine) and the FTAIA. Under the direct purchaser rule, only those who purchase directly from antitrust violators are typically permitted to sue under section …
Section 5 And The Innovation Curve, Daniel A. Crane
Section 5 And The Innovation Curve, Daniel A. Crane
Book Chapters
the ftc’s authority to use Section 5 of the FTC Act to reach anticompetitive conduct that would not be illegal under the Sherman or Clayton Acts has been much discussed in recent years, particularly in conjunction with the FTC’s enforcement action against Intel. As of this writing, a Section 5 action against Google seems imminent.
Bargaining Over Loyalty, Daniel A. Crane
Bargaining Over Loyalty, Daniel A. Crane
Articles
Contracts between suppliers and customers frequently contain provisions rewarding the customer for exhibiting loyalty to the seller. For example, suppliers may offer customers preferential pricing for buying a specified percentage of their requirements from the supplier or buying minimum numbers of products across multiple product lines. Such loyalty-inducing contracts have come under attack on antitrust grounds because of their potential to foreclose competitors or soften competition by enabling tacit collusion among suppliers. This Article defends loyalty inducement as a commercial practice. Although it can be anticompetitive under some circumstances, rewarding loyal customers is usually procompetitive and price reducing. The two …
Antitrust Rulemaking As A Solution To Abuse On The Standard-Setting Process, Adam Speegle
Antitrust Rulemaking As A Solution To Abuse On The Standard-Setting Process, Adam Speegle
Michigan Law Review
While many recognize the critical role that technology plays in modern life, few appreciate the role that standards play in contributing to its success. Devices as prevalent as the modern laptop computer for example, may be governed by over 500 interoperability standards, regulating everything from the USB drive to the memory chip. To facilitate adoption of such standards, firms are increasingly turning to standard-setting organizations. These organizations consist of members of an industry who agree to abide by the organization's bylaws, which typically regard topics such as patent disclosure and reasonable licensing. Problems arise, however, when members violate these bylaws …
Tying And Consumer Harm, Daniel A. Crane
Tying And Consumer Harm, Daniel A. Crane
Articles
Brantley raises important issues of law, economics, and policy about tying arrangements. Under current legal principles, Brantley was on solid ground in distinguishing between anticompetitive ties and those that might harm consumer interests without impairing competition. As a matter of economics, the court was also right to reject the claim that the cable programmers forced consumers to pay for programs the customers didn’t want. The hardest question is a policy one - whether antitrust law should ever condemn the exploitation of market power in ways that extract surplus from consumers but do not create or enlarge market power. I shall …
A Neo-Chicago Perspective On Antitrust Institutions, Daniel A. Crane
A Neo-Chicago Perspective On Antitrust Institutions, Daniel A. Crane
Articles
It has long been fashionable to categorize antitrust by its "schools." From the Sherman Act's passage to World War II, there were (at least) neo-classical marginalism, populism, progressivism, associationalism, business commonwealthism, and Brandeisianism. From World War II to the present, we have seen (at least, and without counting the European Ordo-Liberals) PaleoHarvard structuralism, the Chicago School, Neo-Harvard institutionalism, and Post -Chicagoans. So why not Neo-Chicago? I am already on record as suggesting the possible emergence of such a school, so it is too late for me to dismiss the entire "schools" conversation as window-dressing. This Symposium is dedicated to defining …
Has The Obama Justice Department Reinvigorated Antitrust Enforcement?, Daniel A. Crane
Has The Obama Justice Department Reinvigorated Antitrust Enforcement?, Daniel A. Crane
Articles
The Justice Department’s recently filed antitrust case against Apple and several major book publishers over e-book pricing, which comes on the heels of the Justice Department’s successful challenge to the proposed merger of AT&T and T-Mobile, has contributed to the perception that the Obama Administration is reinvigorating antitrust enforcement from its recent stupor. As a candidate for President, then-Senator Obama criticized the Bush Administration as having the “weakest record of antitrust enforcement of any administration in the last half century” and vowed to step up enforcement. Early in the Obama Administration, Justice Department officials furthered this perception by withdrawing the …
Plus Factors And Agreement In Antitrust Law, William E. Kovacic, Robert C. Marshall, Leslie M. Marx, Halbert L. White
Plus Factors And Agreement In Antitrust Law, William E. Kovacic, Robert C. Marshall, Leslie M. Marx, Halbert L. White
Michigan Law Review
Plus factors are economic actions and outcomes, above and beyond parallel conduct by oligopolistic firms, that are largely inconsistent with unilateral conduct but largely consistent with explicitly coordinated action. Possible plus factors are typically enumerated without any attempt to distinguish them in terms of a meaningful economic categorization or in terms of their probative strength for inferring collusion. In this Article, we provide a taxonomy for plus factors as well as a methodology for ranking plus factors in terms of their strength for inferring explicit collusion, the strongest of which are referred to as "super plus factors."
Reflections On Section 5 Of The Ftc Act And The Ftc’S Case Against Intel, Daniel A. Crane
Reflections On Section 5 Of The Ftc Act And The Ftc’S Case Against Intel, Daniel A. Crane
Law & Economics Working Papers
This paper explores the policy implications of the FTC's decision to file its enforcement action against Intel under Section 5 of the FTC Act and declare that it has the power to go further under Section 5's "unfair competition" prong than it could under Section 2 of the Sherman Act. It argues that Intel is an inappropriate case for the Commission to make a bid for Section 5 independence since none of the Commission's institutional advantages over Article III courts justifies a departure from ordinary Section 2 norms in this case. Indeed, the Intel case has the potential to set …
Reflections On Section 5 Of The Ftc Act And The Ftc's Case Against Intel, Daniel A. Crane
Reflections On Section 5 Of The Ftc Act And The Ftc's Case Against Intel, Daniel A. Crane
Articles
The Federal Trade Commission’s (“FTC’s”) unprecedented enforcement action against Intel raises profound issues concerning the scope of the FTC’s powers to give a construction to Section 5 of the FTC Act that goes beyond the substantive reach of the Sherman Act. While I have urged the FTC to assert such independence from the Sherman Act, this is the wrong case to make a break. Indeed, if anything, Intel poses a risk of seriously setting back the development of an independent Section 5 power by provoking a hostile appellate court to rebuke the FTC’s effort and cabin the FTC’s powers in …
Optimizing Private Antitrust Enforcement, Daniel A. Crane
Optimizing Private Antitrust Enforcement, Daniel A. Crane
Articles
Private litigation is the predominant means of antitrust enforcement in the United States. Other jurisdictions around the world are increasingly implementing private enforcement models. Private enforcement is usually justified on either compensation or deterrence grounds. While the choice between these two goals matters, private litigation is not very effective at advancing either one. Compensation fails because the true economic victims of most antitrust violations are usually downstream consumers who are too numerous and remote to locate and compensate. Deterrence is ineffective because the time lag between the planning of the violation and the legal judgment day is usually so long …
Bargaining In The Shadow Of Rate-Setting Courts, Daniel A. Crane
Bargaining In The Shadow Of Rate-Setting Courts, Daniel A. Crane
Articles
Judges will tell you that they are comparatively poor rate regulators. The specialized, technical competence and supervisory capacity that public utilities commissions enjoy are usually absent from judicial chambers. Nonetheless, when granting antitrust remedies-particularly remedies for monopolistic abuse of intellectual property-courts sometimes purport to act as rate regulators for the licensing or sale of the defendant's assets. At the outset, we should distinguish between two forms ofjudicial rate setting. In one form, a court (or the FTC in its adjudicative capacity) grants a compulsory license and sets a specific rate as part of a final judgment or an order. The …
Obama's Antitrust Agenda, Daniel A. Crane
Obama's Antitrust Agenda, Daniel A. Crane
Articles
Antitrust law is back in vogue. After years in the wilderness, antitrust enforcement has reemerged as a hot topic in Washington and in the legal academy. In one heady week inMay of 2009, a frontpage story in the New York Times reported the dramatic decision of Christine Varney —theObama administration’s new AntitrustDivision head—to jettison the entire report onmonopolization offenses released by the Bush JusticeDepartment just eightmonths earlier. In a speech before the Center for American Progress, Varney announced that the Justice Department is “committed to aggressively pursuing enforcement of Section 2 of the Sherman Act.” As if to prove that …
Telecommunications In Transition: Unbundling, Reintegration, And Competition, David J. Teece
Telecommunications In Transition: Unbundling, Reintegration, And Competition, David J. Teece
Michigan Telecommunications & Technology Law Review
The world economy is experiencing a technological revolution, fueled by rapid advances in microelectronics, optics, and computer science, that in the 1990s and beyond will dramatically change the way people everywhere communicate, learn, and access information and entertainment. This technological revolution has been underway for about a decade. The emergence of a fully-interactive communications network, sometimes referred to as the "Information Superhighway," is now upon us. This highway, made possible by fiber optics and the convergence of several different technologies, is capable of delivering a plethora of new interactive entertainment, informational, and instructional services that are powerful and user-friendly. The …
Competition And Antitrust Law In Central Europe: Poland, The Czech Republic, Slovakia, And Hungary, Carolyn Brezezinski
Competition And Antitrust Law In Central Europe: Poland, The Czech Republic, Slovakia, And Hungary, Carolyn Brezezinski
Michigan Journal of International Law
First, this article briefly introduces the antimonopoly laws and competition authorities created in the four post-communist Central European countries of Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary. Second, this article outlines the obligations and harmonization programs of the competition authorities under the Europe Agreements recently signed by each country. Third, this article assesses the role and importance of the antimonopoly laws and competition authorities in the post-socialist economic reforms currently underway. Fourth, this article describes proposals to amend the antimonopoly laws based on the initial period of their implementation. Finally, this article attempts to assess the post-reform role of both …
Bringing Down Private Trade Barriers- An Assessment Of The United States' Unilateral Options: Section 301 Of The 1974 Trade Act And Extraterritorial Applications Of U.S. Antitrust Law, Aubry D. Smith
Michigan Journal of International Law
This note examines how the antitrust and trade law options operate, with the two-fold purpose of providing some idea of their potential effectiveness and also suggesting what limitations, if any, should be placed on their use. Parts I and II analyze the mechanics of applying the antitrust and Section 301 remedies to eliminate foreign trade-restrictive business practices. In light of this discussion of how the two processes work, Part III considers whether they are likely to get out of control and suggests how they ought to be restrained. Part III finds that Section 301 is subject to a number of …
The Joint Enterprise: Collaboration Between The Public And Private Sectors, Howard Anawalt, Karen Robbins
The Joint Enterprise: Collaboration Between The Public And Private Sectors, Howard Anawalt, Karen Robbins
Michigan Journal of International Law
This article first outlines the structures of the joint and tripartite enterprises. It then addresses two legal concerns facing an operational enterprise, the potential tort liability of enterprise participants and antitrust restrictions. Tort liability is a threshold concern of any joint venture or partnership, and antitrust law is a basic constraint on the operations of any business. The article proceeds to show that the problems they pose for a joint enterprise can be minimized or avoided. In the third part of the article the authors demonstrate the special utility of the joint enterprise.
Doctrines And Problems Relating To U.S. Control Of Transnational Corporate Concentration, Douglas E. Rosenthal, Stuart E. Benson, Lisa Chiles
Doctrines And Problems Relating To U.S. Control Of Transnational Corporate Concentration, Douglas E. Rosenthal, Stuart E. Benson, Lisa Chiles
Michigan Journal of International Law
It is the principal thesis of this article that important recent case decisions in U.S. antitrust law reflect just this conflict over the extent to which intraindustry (horizontal) concentration is economically harmful. We are at a point where the future direction of the law is difficult to discern. Until there is greater U.S. policy agreement, and consistency within U.S. law itself, it is unlikely that any common transnational response will emerge to even horizontal corporate concentration. Ironically, it may not be possible to clarify U.S. antitrust law as long as the underlying policy conflict remains so sharp. For the present, …
Canadian Merger Policy And Its International Implications, Eric K. Gressman
Canadian Merger Policy And Its International Implications, Eric K. Gressman
Michigan Journal of International Law
The implications of Canadian merger policy are of deep concern to U.S. and other foreign investors who have invested or are considering investing in Canada. U.S. interests own 60 percent of Canada's manufacturing industry. In 1978, approximately 250 mergers in Canada involved a foreign-owned or foreign-controlled buyer (usually U.S.). Therefore, it is not surprising that Canada's merger policy is no less important to the decisions of foreign investors in Canada than the Justice Department's policies are to domestic investors in the United States. At the same time, the Canadian government and public are concerned with their merger policy as a …
Appendix 1: Foreign Monopoly And Merger Law
Appendix 1: Foreign Monopoly And Merger Law
Michigan Journal of International Law
This Appendix consists of brief descriptions of the monopoly and merger laws of several nations. These descriptions are not intended to provide a complete statement of any one nation's antitrust statutes and case law. Rather, they are included in this volume to permit the reader to observe the widely divergent approaches to the regulation of economic concentration. These summaries may not contain the latest case law developments or statutory amendments. It is hoped, however, that they provide a sound starting point for investigation of the regulatory regimes of the nations included in this collection.
Annotated Bibliography
Michigan Journal of International Law
Corporate concentration of both a national and transnational character is one of the more oblique topics in antitrust literature. Books and articles in the area tend to focus on narrow aspects of this issue, or on the regulatory efforts of particular countries and international organizations. The annotations which follow highlight some of the leading writings on industrial concentration.
The Standard Oil Decision: The Rule Of Reason, Horace Lafayette Wilgus
The Standard Oil Decision: The Rule Of Reason, Horace Lafayette Wilgus
Articles
After twenty-one years the Sherman Anti Trust Act has been applied to the typical combination restraining interstate commerce, which that act was designed to prevent.