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Transnational Corporate Governance Codes: Lessons From Regulating Related Party Transactions In Hong Kong And Singapore, Christopher C. H. Chen, Wai Yee Wan
Transnational Corporate Governance Codes: Lessons From Regulating Related Party Transactions In Hong Kong And Singapore, Christopher C. H. Chen, Wai Yee Wan
Research Collection Yong Pung How School Of Law
Many jurisdictions around the world, includingAsia, have corporate governance codes largely based on the transnational codedrafted by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).The core ideas underpinning the OECD’s principles of corporate governance are boardindependence and proper management of conflicts of interest. These ideas, drawnfrom the Anglo-American model of corporate governance, are designed to protectcompanies and their shareholders. However, the question remains as to whether atransnational corporate governance code is always appropriate and effective, particularlywhen the kinds of companies listed on the stock exchange significantly differfrom the Anglo-American model. In this article, we examine Hong Kong andSingapore, two Asian …
Public And Private Enforcement Of Corporate And Securities Laws: An Empirical Comparison Of Hong Kong And Singapore, Wai Yee Wan, Christopher C. H. Chen, Say H. Goo
Public And Private Enforcement Of Corporate And Securities Laws: An Empirical Comparison Of Hong Kong And Singapore, Wai Yee Wan, Christopher C. H. Chen, Say H. Goo
Research Collection Yong Pung How School Of Law
Current scholarship emphasises the correlation between enforcement of corporate and securities laws and strong capital markets. Yet, the issue of how private and public enforcement may achieve the objectives of compensation and optimal deterrence remains controversial. While enforcement strategies have been studied extensively in the US and the UK, comparatively less attention is placed on Asia, where concentrated shareholdings are the norm. This study fills the gap by focusing on Hong Kong and Singapore, two leading international financial centres in Asia. Post Asian financial crisis of 1997, Hong Kong and Singapore have changed their laws to strengthen the private enforcement …
Enforcing Public Takeover Regulation: Reconciling Public And Private Interests, Wai Yee Wan
Enforcing Public Takeover Regulation: Reconciling Public And Private Interests, Wai Yee Wan
Research Collection Yong Pung How School Of Law
Takeover regulation in the UK, Hong Kong and Singaporerelies on takeover codes and takeover panels. However, parties aggrieved by thedecisions of the panels may sometimes challenge them in the courts, giving riseto the potential of overlapping jurisdictions. The problem is compounded by twofactors: the enforcement of the takeover codes can have substantiveimplications on the parties’ ability to enforce their rights in courts, and takeoverpanels and courts assess matters differently. This article argues that thereneeds to be a clearer delineation between the potentially overlappingjurisdictions of the takeover panels and the courts.
A One-Size-Fits-All Approach To Corporate Governance Codes And Compliance By Smaller Listed Firms: An Examination Of Companies Listed In Hong Kong And Singapore, Christopher C. H. Chen
A One-Size-Fits-All Approach To Corporate Governance Codes And Compliance By Smaller Listed Firms: An Examination Of Companies Listed In Hong Kong And Singapore, Christopher C. H. Chen
Research Collection Yong Pung How School Of Law
This article examines the impact of a one-size-fits-all corporate governance code on smaller listed firms, which should have fewer resources to hire more qualified independent directors for their boards and board committees. After examining data from a sample of companies listed in Hong Kong and Singapore, we find some limited support for these resources-based arguments. While smaller firms do not necessarily have a lower proportion of board members who are independent directors, some evidence suggests that smaller firms do pay less to independent directors and that these directors have to serve on multiple board committees. Although many larger firms also …
Hostile Takeover Regimes In Asia: A Comparative Approach, Umakanth Varottil, Wai Yee Wan
Hostile Takeover Regimes In Asia: A Comparative Approach, Umakanth Varottil, Wai Yee Wan
Research Collection Yong Pung How School Of Law
The market for corporate control is animportant corporate governance mechanism for the discipline of corporatemanagers. However, the process and substance of the regulation of hostiletakeovers differs remarkably among various jurisdictions. Existing andinfluential scholarship has focused on the differences in regulation between UnitedStates (US) and the United Kingdom (UK), with the explanations being founded ininterest group politics. Influential as it is, the question is whether thetheory can be extended outside of the US and the UK, particularly to theirlegal transplants in Asia? In the last few decades, many of the Asianjurisdictions have drawn heavily from the US and the UK when …