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Michael D. Gilbert

Law and Economics

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A Theory Of Direct Democracy And The Single Subject Rule, Robert D. Cooter, Michael D. Gilbert Apr 2010

A Theory Of Direct Democracy And The Single Subject Rule, Robert D. Cooter, Michael D. Gilbert

Michael D. Gilbert

Citizens in many states use direct democracy to make laws on everything from soda bottles and horse meat to affirmative action and same-sex marriage. Does direct democracy save citizens from corrupt legislators, or does it enfeeble competent representatives and empower an ignorant crowd? These ideological extremes often collide in court over a state constitutional provision—the single subject rule—that limits ballot initiatives to one “subject.” Opponents can invalidate an initiative by convincing a court that it contains two subjects (say, marriage and domestic partnerships), while proponents can prevail by showing that it contains only one (say, same-sex unions). Despite hundreds of …


Less Can Be More: Conflicting Ballot Proposals And The Highest Vote Rule, Michael D. Gilbert, Joshua M. Levine Jun 2009

Less Can Be More: Conflicting Ballot Proposals And The Highest Vote Rule, Michael D. Gilbert, Joshua M. Levine

Michael D. Gilbert

This paper examines conflicting ballot proposals—two or more measures that run contrary to one another and that citizens vote on in the same election. Sometimes a majority votes in favor of more than one conflicting proposal, generating a legal impasse that courts resolve by applying the “highest vote rule.” The rule upholds the proposal that received the greatest number of affirmative votes and invalidates all competing proposals, even though they also garnered majority support. Using spatial models, we show that the proposal receiving the most votes is not systematically closest to the median voter’s ideal point, and consequently the rule …


Single Subject Rules And The Legislative Process, Michael D. Gilbert Oct 2006

Single Subject Rules And The Legislative Process, Michael D. Gilbert

Michael D. Gilbert

Despite generating thousands of cases on important public issues, the single subject rule remains a source of uncertainty and inconsistency. The root of the problem lies in the inability to define the term "subject" using legal doctrine. This paper reexamines the single subject rule through the lens of public choice theory and finds that its purposes are wrongheaded. Logrolling is not necessarily harmful, and improving political transparency requires legislative compromises to be packaged together rather than spread across multiple acts. Riding is not a form of logrolling but an analytically distinct and more threatening practice. This analysis yields a precise, …