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A Stackelberg Game Model Of Trade In Renewable Resources With Competitive Sellers, Amitrajeet A. Batabyal, Hamid Beladi
A Stackelberg Game Model Of Trade In Renewable Resources With Competitive Sellers, Amitrajeet A. Batabyal, Hamid Beladi
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We model international trade in renewable resources between a single buyer and competitive sellers as a Stackelberg differential game. The buyer uses unit and ad valorem tariffs to indirectly encourage conservation of the renewable resource under study. First, we show that the efficacy of these trade policy instruments in promoting conservation depends fundamentally on whether harvesting costs are stock dependent or independent. When harvesting costs are stock independent, the optimal open loop tariffs are dynamically consistent. In contrast, when harvesting costs are stock dependent, the optimal open loop tariffs are dynamically inconsistent. Second, we point out that whether the terminal …