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Parties And Patronage: A Comparative Analysis Of The Indian Case, Charles Robert Hankla
Parties And Patronage: A Comparative Analysis Of The Indian Case, Charles Robert Hankla
Political Science Faculty Publications
What political factors influence the allocation of economic patronage in democracies? Answering this question is vital to improving our knowledge of how states and markets interact. In this paper, I argue that changing levels of party centralization can drive important changes in the allocation of state largess. When governing parties are centralized, national party leaders will control sources of patronage, targeting benefits to particularly influential regions and industries. By contrast, when governing parties are decentralized, influential sub-national party leaders will advocate for their constituents, allocating patronage evenly through a national logroll. I find evidence for these relationships by comparing India's …
Party Strength And International Trade: A Cross National Analysis, Charles Robert Hankla
Party Strength And International Trade: A Cross National Analysis, Charles Robert Hankla
Political Science Faculty Publications
We know from observation that some democracies intervene deeply in their domestic economies while others adopt a more laissez faire approach. Can we explain these differences solely with ideology, or are other political influences also at work? I argue in this paper that elected leaders sometimes opt for hefty economic regulation purely to generate sources of patronage that can be used to maintain their political positions. Leaders are most tempted to take this approach, I contend, when their political parties are not stably linked to sources of electoral support. Unstably linked governing parties will tend to have very short time …
Party Linkages And Economic Policy: An Examination Of Indira Gandhi’S India, Charles R. Hankla
Party Linkages And Economic Policy: An Examination Of Indira Gandhi’S India, Charles R. Hankla
Political Science Faculty Publications
We know from observation that some democracies intervene deeply in their domestic economies while others adopt a more laissez faire approach. Can we explain these differences solely with ideology, or are other political influences also at work? I argue in this paper that elected leaders sometimes opt for hefty economic regulation purely to generate sources of patronage that can be used to maintain their political positions. Leaders are most tempted to take this approach, I contend, when their political parties are not stably linked to sources of electoral support. Unstably linked governing parties will tend to have very short time …