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On Modeling Voluntary Contributions To Public Goods, James Cox, Vjollca Sadiraj
On Modeling Voluntary Contributions To Public Goods, James Cox, Vjollca Sadiraj
ExCEN Working Papers
This paper addresses four ìstylized factsî that summarize data from experimental studies of voluntary contributions to provision of public goods. Theoretical propositions and testable hypotheses for voluntary contributions are derived from two models of social preferences, the inequity aversion model and the egocentric other-regarding preferences model. We Önd that the egocentric other-regarding preferences model with classical regularity properties can better account for the stylized facts than the inequity aversion model with non-classical properties.
Pay One Or Pay All: Random Selection Of One Choice For Payment, Susan Laury
Pay One Or Pay All: Random Selection Of One Choice For Payment, Susan Laury
ExCEN Working Papers
It has become increasingly common in economics experiments to elicit a series of choices from participants, and then pay for only one, selected at random, after all have been made. This allows the researcher to observe a large number of individual decisions, and to increase payoffs for each decision since only one of them will be used for payment. It has not been demonstrated, however, whether subjects behave as if each of these choices involves the stated payoffs, or if subjects scale-down payoffs to account for the random selection that is made. This paper reports an experiment that tests this …
Implications Of Trust, Fear, And Reciprocity For Modeling Economic Behavior, James Cox, Klarita Sadiraj, Vjollca Sadiraj
Implications Of Trust, Fear, And Reciprocity For Modeling Economic Behavior, James Cox, Klarita Sadiraj, Vjollca Sadiraj
ExCEN Working Papers
This paper reports three experiments with triadic or dyadic designs. The experiments include the moonlighting game in which first-mover actions can elicit positively or negatively reciprocal reactions from second movers. First movers can be motivated by trust in positive reciprocity or fear of negative reciprocity, in addition to unconditional other-regarding preferences. Second movers can be motivated by unconditional other-regarding preferences as well as positive or negative reciprocity. The experimental designs include control treatments that discriminate among actions with alternative motivations. Data from our three experiments and a fourth one are used to explore methodological questions, including the effects on behavioral …
Altruism Spillovers: Are Behaviors In Context-Free Experiments Predictive Of Altruism Toward A Naturally Occurring Public Good?, Susan Laury, Laura Taylor
Altruism Spillovers: Are Behaviors In Context-Free Experiments Predictive Of Altruism Toward A Naturally Occurring Public Good?, Susan Laury, Laura Taylor
ExCEN Working Papers
This paper addresses the external validity of experiments investigating the characteristics of altruism in the voluntary provision of public goods. We conduct two related experiments that allow us to examine whether individuals who act more altruistically in the context-free environment are also more likely to act altruistically toward a naturally-occurring public good. We find that laboratory behavior can be predictive of contributions toward naturally-occurring goods, but not in a uniform way. In fact, parametric measures of altruism do a poor job of predicting which subjects are most likely to contribute to a naturally-occurring public good.
Direct Tests Of Models Of Social Preferences And A New Model, James Cox, Vjollca Sadiraj
Direct Tests Of Models Of Social Preferences And A New Model, James Cox, Vjollca Sadiraj
ExCEN Working Papers
Departures from “economic man” behavior in many games in which fairness is a salient characteristic are now well documented in the experimental economics literature. These data have inspired development of new models of social preferences incorporating inequality aversion and quasi-maximin preferences. We report experiments that provide direct tests of these social preference models. Data from the experiments motivate a new model of egocentric altruism. The model rationalizes data from our direct test experiments and data from experiments with proposer competition and responder competition. We discuss generalizations of the egocentric altruism model that incorporate agents’ intentions and thus provide a unified …