Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
- Discipline
Articles 1 - 5 of 5
Full-Text Articles in Entire DC Network
Asymmetry And Symmetry Of Acts And Omissions In Punishment, Norms, And Judged Causality, Toby Handfield, John Thrasher, Andrew Corcoran, Shaun Nichols
Asymmetry And Symmetry Of Acts And Omissions In Punishment, Norms, And Judged Causality, Toby Handfield, John Thrasher, Andrew Corcoran, Shaun Nichols
Philosophy Faculty Articles and Research
Harmful acts are punished more often and more harshly than harmful omissions. This asymmetry has variously been ascribed to differences in how individuals perceive the causal responsibility of acts versus omissions and to social norms that tend to proscribe acts more frequently than omissions. This paper examines both of these hypotheses, in conjunction with a new hypothesis: that acts are punished more than omissions because it is usually more efficient to do so. In typical settings, harms occur as a result of relatively few harmful actions, but many individuals may have had the opportunity to prevent or rectify the harm. …
Gender, Punishment, And Cooperation: Men Hurt Others To Advance Their Interests, Terence C. Burnham
Gender, Punishment, And Cooperation: Men Hurt Others To Advance Their Interests, Terence C. Burnham
ESI Working Papers
A laboratory experiment that reports on gender, cooperation, and punishment in two repeated public goods game using high-powered punishment. In a repeated public goods game with punishment, no statistically significant differences between men and women are reported. In a modified game that adds an explicit payoff for relative performance, men punish more than women, men obtain higher rank, and punishment by males decreases payoffs for both men and for women. These results contribute to the debate about the origins and maintenance of cooperation.
Public Goods With Punishment & Payment For Relative Rank, Terence C. Burnham
Public Goods With Punishment & Payment For Relative Rank, Terence C. Burnham
ESI Working Papers
A laboratory experiment designed to investigate the role of relative performance-based payoffs on cooperation in the context of punishment. Subjects play a repeated public goods game with high-powered punishment (50:1) and additional payoffs based on relative performance. Contributions to the public good are nearly maximal. Punishment levels are substantial, higher than the same game without relative rank payoffs, and sufficiently high that total payoffs are negative. The group would make much more money in the same setting without punishment. This study contributes to investigation of the role of altruism in human cooperation.
Public Goods With High-Powered Punishment: High Cooperation And Low Efficiency, Terence C. Burnham
Public Goods With High-Powered Punishment: High Cooperation And Low Efficiency, Terence C. Burnham
ESI Publications
A laboratory experiment where human subjects play a repeated public goods game with high-powered punishment technology (50:1). Results on three attributes are similar to lower-powered punishment settings (e.g., 3:1): Subjects contribute almost 100 % to the public good, punishment rates are low (under 10 % of maximum), and punishment is directed more toward low contributors. In contrast to lower-powered punishment settings, however, subjects earn less money than they would have in the same setting without punishment. These results contribute to the debate about the origins and maintenance of cooperation.
Cognitive Systems For Revenge And Forgiveness, Michael E. Mccullough, Robert Kurzban, Benjamin A. Tabak
Cognitive Systems For Revenge And Forgiveness, Michael E. Mccullough, Robert Kurzban, Benjamin A. Tabak
ESI Publications
Minimizing the costs that others impose upon oneself and upon those in whom one has a fitness stake, such as kin and allies, is a key adaptive problem for many organisms. Our ancestors regularly faced such adaptive problems (including homicide, bodily harm, theft, mate poaching, cuckoldry, reputational damage, sexual aggression, and the infliction of these costs on one's offspring, mates, coalition partners, or friends). One solution to this problem is to impose retaliatory costs on an aggressor so that the aggressor and other observers will lower their estimates of the net benefits to be gained from exploiting the retaliator in …