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Articles 1 - 12 of 12
Full-Text Articles in Entire DC Network
Justice And Fairness In The Dictator Game, Karl Schurter, Bart J. Wilson
Justice And Fairness In The Dictator Game, Karl Schurter, Bart J. Wilson
Economics Faculty Articles and Research
This article uses a laboratory experiment to examine the question of whether justice and fairness are different motivational forces in the dictator game. "Justice" and "fairness" are often used interchangeably because their meanings and usages are so closely linked, despite their distinct connotations. Using four different treatments, our experimental design investigates the subtle differences between the two social concepts to explicate generosity in the dictator game. The results indicate that justice, not fairness, legitimizes property rights in the dictator game.
The Alliance Formation Puzzle And Capacity Constraints, Kai A. Konrad, Dan Kovenock
The Alliance Formation Puzzle And Capacity Constraints, Kai A. Konrad, Dan Kovenock
Economics Faculty Articles and Research
The formation of an alliance in conflict situations is known to suffer from a collective action problem and from the potential of internal conflict. We show that budget constraints of an intermediate size can overcome this strong disadvantage and explain the formation of alliances.
Competition For Fdi With Vintage Investment And Agglomeration Advantages, Kai A. Konrad, Dan Kovenock
Competition For Fdi With Vintage Investment And Agglomeration Advantages, Kai A. Konrad, Dan Kovenock
Economics Faculty Articles and Research
Countries compete for new FDI investment, whereas stocks of FDI generate agglomeration benefits and are potentially subject to extortionary taxation. We study the interaction between these aspects in a simple vintage capital framework with discrete time and an infinite horizon, focussing on Markov perfect equilibrium. We show that the equilibrium taxation destabilizes agglomeration advantages. The agglomeration advantage is valuable, but is exploited in the short run. The tax revenue in the equilibrium is substantial, and higher on “old” FDI than on “new” FDI, even though countries are not allowed to use discriminatory taxation. If countries can provide fiscal incentives for …
Public Spending On Education And The Incentives For Student Achievement, William Blankenau, Gabriele Camera
Public Spending On Education And The Incentives For Student Achievement, William Blankenau, Gabriele Camera
Economics Faculty Articles and Research
We build a model where homogeneous workers can accumulate human capital by investing in education. Schools combine public resources and individual effort to generate productive skills. If skills are imperfectly compensated, then in equilibrium students may under-invest in effort. We examine the effect on human capital accumulation of three basic education finance policies. Increased tuition subsidies may not be beneficial because they increase enrollment but they may lower the incentives for student achievement, hence the skill level. Policies directed at enhancing the productivity of education or making degrees more informative are more successful at improving educational outcomes.
Monetary Equilibrium And The Differentiability Of The Value Function, C. D. Aliprantis, Gabriele Camera, F. Ruscitti
Monetary Equilibrium And The Differentiability Of The Value Function, C. D. Aliprantis, Gabriele Camera, F. Ruscitti
Economics Faculty Articles and Research
In this study we offer a new approach to proving the differentiability of the value function, which complements and extends the literature on dynamic programming. This result is then applied to the analysis of equilibrium in the recent class of monetary economies developed in [Lagos, R., Wright, R., 2005. A unified framework for monetary theory and policy analysis. journal of Political Economy 113, 463-484]. For this type of environments we demonstrate that the value function is differentiable and this guarantees that the marginal value of money balances is well defined.
Review Of Frances Dinkelspiel's Towers Of Gold: How One Jewish Immigrant Named Isaias Hellman Created California, Lynne Doti
Economics Faculty Articles and Research
A review of "Towers of Gold: How One Jewish Immigrant Named Isaias Hellman Created California."
A Correspondence-Theoretic Approach To Dynamic Optimization, C. D. Aliprantis, Gabriele Camera
A Correspondence-Theoretic Approach To Dynamic Optimization, C. D. Aliprantis, Gabriele Camera
Economics Faculty Articles and Research
This paper introduces a method of optimization in infinite-horizon economies based on the theory of correspondences. The proposed approach allow us to study time-separable and non-time-separable dynamic economic models without resorting to fixed point theorems or transversality conditions. When our technique is applied to the standard time-separable model it provides an alternative and straightforward way to derive the common recursive formulation of these models by means of Bellman equations.
Price Dispersion With Directed Search, Gabriele Camera, Cemil Selcuk
Price Dispersion With Directed Search, Gabriele Camera, Cemil Selcuk
Economics Faculty Articles and Research
We present a model that generates empirically plausible price distributions in directed search equilibrium. There are many identical buyers and many identical capacity-constrained sellers who post prices. These prices can be renegotiated to some degree and the outcome depends on the number of buyers who want to purchase the good. In equilibrium all sellers post the same price, demand is randomly distributed, and there is sale price dispersion. Prices and distributions depend on market tightness and on the properties of renegotiation outcomes. In a labor market context, the model generates a strong empirical prediction. If workers can renegotiate the posted …
Cooperation Among Strangers Under The Shadow Of The Future, Gabriele Camera, M. Casari
Cooperation Among Strangers Under The Shadow Of The Future, Gabriele Camera, M. Casari
Economics Faculty Articles and Research
We study the emergence of norms of cooperation in experimental economies populated by strangers interacting indefinitely. Can these economies achieve full efficiency even without formal enforcement institutions? Which institutions for monitoring and enforcement facilitate cooperation? Finally, what classes of strategies do subjects employ? We find that, first, cooperation can be sustained even in anonymous settings; second, some type of monitoring and punishment institutions significantly promote cooperation; and, third, subjects mostly employ strategies that are selective in punishment.
Social Insurance, Commitment, And The Origin Of Law: Interest Bans In Early Christianity, Jared Rubin
Social Insurance, Commitment, And The Origin Of Law: Interest Bans In Early Christianity, Jared Rubin
Economics Faculty Articles and Research
Despite the historical importance of ideology-based, economically inhibitive laws, we know little about the economic factors underlying their origin. This paper accounts for the historical emergence of one such law: the Christian ban on taking interest--a doctrine that shaped the evolution of numerous financial contracts and related organizational forms. A game-theoretic analysis and historical evidence suggest that the Church's commitment to providing social insurance for its poorest constituents encouraged risky borrowing, which the Church attempted to limit by banning interest. The analysis highlights the applicability of the rational choice framework to seemingly irrational actions and laws, the role of nonmonetary …
Financial Sophistication And The Distribution Of The Welfare Cost Of Inflation, P. Boel, Gabriele Camera
Financial Sophistication And The Distribution Of The Welfare Cost Of Inflation, P. Boel, Gabriele Camera
Economics Faculty Articles and Research
The welfare cost of anticipated inflation is quantified in a calibrated model of the U.S. economy that exhibits tractable equilibrium dispersion in wealth and earnings. inflation does not generate large losses in societal welfare, yet its impact varies noticeably across segments of society depending also on the financial sophistication of the economy. If money is the only asset, then inflation mostly hurts the wealthier and more productive agents, while those poorer and less productive may even benefit from inflation. The converse holds in a more sophisticated financial environment where agents can insure against consumption risk with assets other than money.
Exchange And Specialisation As A Discovery Process, Sean Crockett, Vernon L. Smith, Bart J. Wilson
Exchange And Specialisation As A Discovery Process, Sean Crockett, Vernon L. Smith, Bart J. Wilson
Economics Faculty Articles and Research
In this article we study the performance of an economy that can support specialisation if the participants develop and follow some system of exchange. We define a closed economy in which the participants must discover the ability to exchange, implement it, and ascertain what they are comparatively advantaged in producing. Many of our participants demonstrate the ability to find comparative advantage, capture gains from trade and effectively choose production that is consistent with the choices of others. We explore various treatments to provide insight into the conditions that foster the growth of specialisation and exchange within this weak institutional framework.