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Employee Ownership And Moral Hazard: How Broad-Based Equity Sharing Can Lower Agency Costs And Reduce Inequality, Colin Clinton Hudson Jan 2021

Employee Ownership And Moral Hazard: How Broad-Based Equity Sharing Can Lower Agency Costs And Reduce Inequality, Colin Clinton Hudson

Electronic Theses and Dissertations

Providing incentives to top managers by offering equity has become the norm; this practice, however, does not hold for all levels of employees. After tax incentives for employee ownership were introduced through the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, there has been little legislative support to encourage companies to implement broad-based equity sharing programs. Moreover, decades of neoliberal policies have incentivized the pursuit of short-term profits and speculation, which contribute to economic instability and explain the growing gap between productivity and real wages observed since the late 1970s. Developments in the literature contend that employee ownership aligns the goals …


Perpetual Motion Machines: Esops Don’T Pay For Themselves, Andrew Stumpff Morrison May 2018

Perpetual Motion Machines: Esops Don’T Pay For Themselves, Andrew Stumpff Morrison

Law & Economics Working Papers

In this article, Stumpff addresses policy issues regarding employee stock ownership plans and demonstrates how some claims in support of ESOPS aren’t supported by the math.


Pensions And Passivity, Gregory S. Alexander Dec 2014

Pensions And Passivity, Gregory S. Alexander

Gregory S Alexander

This article discusses how modem fiduciary law has extended equity's tradition of constructing ownership as passive through the corporate pension system. It examines how the corporate pension system as a mode of owning pooled capital is a new stage of passive ownership. This stage creates a different aspect of the familiar problem of separating control from beneficial ownership. Berle and Means argued that the problem that the separation of control from ownership created was economic. The interests of managers and shareholders in the modern corporation diverge, and, they argued, this divergence diminishes the overall efficiency of the modern economy, dominated …


Binary Economics And The Case For Broader Ownership, Robert Ashford Jan 2008

Binary Economics And The Case For Broader Ownership, Robert Ashford

College of Law - Faculty Scholarship

Binary economics simultaneously offers a paradigm for understanding economic efficiency, growth, and justice that is foundationally distinct from classical, neoclassical, Keynesian, and socialist economics. First proposed by Louis Kelso, binary economics also offers a prescription for establishing a more inclusive, competitive and democratic private property system, one that universalizes the right to acquire capital with the earnings of capital. Focusing on an important anomaly left unexplained or poorly explained classical, neoclassical, and Keynesian economics (i.e., the persistence of unutilized productive capacity in a context in which markets are supposedly becoming more efficient) and left unremedied by any approach yet applied, …


Binary Economics: The Economic Theory That Gave Rise To Esops, Robert Ashford Jan 2007

Binary Economics: The Economic Theory That Gave Rise To Esops, Robert Ashford

College of Law - Faculty Scholarship

Many people know about Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs) which, along with profit-sharing and pension plans, are treated as deferred compensation plans under Section 401 and related sections of the Internal Revenue Code. ESOPs have been established by thousands of American corporations, including some of the largest, and cover millions of employees. There is a national trade association (The ESOP Association), that is now celebrating its 50th year in existence, and other organizations established to support employee ownership, including the Ohio Center for Employee Ownership that first published this article in its publication entitled Owners At Work (2006/2007) Most people …


Why (Only) Esops?, Robert C. Hockett Oct 2006

Why (Only) Esops?, Robert C. Hockett

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.


Reverse Monitoring: On The Hidden Role Of Employee Stock Ownership Plans, Sharon Hannes Aug 2006

Reverse Monitoring: On The Hidden Role Of Employee Stock Ownership Plans, Sharon Hannes

ExpressO

This paper develops a new understanding of equity-based compensation schemes, such as employee stock option plans. Current literature views such schemes as a measure aimed at motivating the recipient employees to work harder for the firm. Under such a view, this remuneration method either complements or substitutes other measures used to monitor the performance of the recipient employees. In contrast, this paper proposes that the recipient employee be viewed as the potential monitor of other employees and that stock options (or similar types of compensation) motivate her to fulfill this task. This view has many applications and can shed light …


Capital Democratization, Robert Ashford Jan 2005

Capital Democratization, Robert Ashford

College of Law - Faculty Scholarship

Although, the ideas underlying binary economics were first published in 1958 (Kelso and Adler), the many books and papers that discuss the subject, with the exception of Kane (2000) and Kurland (2001), do not utilize conventional economics language. To facilitate the teaching of binary economics in beginning and intermediate college courses in economics and business, the paper explains some major microeconomic and macroeconomic fundamentals of binary economics by utilizing conventional neo-classical economic models. It then compares the theoretical results reached in a non-binary economic environment to those that may be reached in a binary one. The most important result from …


Esop's Fables: Leveraged Esops And Their Effect On Managerial Slack, Employer Risk And Motivation In The Public Corporation, Hunter C. Blum Jan 1997

Esop's Fables: Leveraged Esops And Their Effect On Managerial Slack, Employer Risk And Motivation In The Public Corporation, Hunter C. Blum

University of Richmond Law Review

Shareholder rights and their influence on corporate governance have become an increasingly important topic in corporate law. The recent wave of corporate downsizing in the early 1990's has disturbed our collective equilibrium. Many now challenge the basic corporate law tenet that the directors hold a fiduciary duty to the shareholders only and the traditional idea that the proper corporate goal is shareholder wealth maximiza- tion.


Pensions And Passivity, Gregory S. Alexander Jan 1993

Pensions And Passivity, Gregory S. Alexander

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

This article discusses how modem fiduciary law has extended equity's tradition of constructing ownership as passive through the corporate pension system. It examines how the corporate pension system as a mode of owning pooled capital is a new stage of passive ownership. This stage creates a different aspect of the familiar problem of separating control from beneficial ownership. Berle and Means argued that the problem that the separation of control from ownership created was economic. The interests of managers and shareholders in the modern corporation diverge, and, they argued, this divergence diminishes the overall efficiency of the modern economy, dominated …