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The Effects Of Domestic Legal Institutions On International Trade Flows, Yu Wang
The Effects Of Domestic Legal Institutions On International Trade Flows, Yu Wang
ExpressO
The effects of institutions on international trade relations are of theoretical and practical interest. By following the research perspective that interprets institutions as the “rules of the game”, I suggest and study three domestic legal institutions---tenure system for judges, precedent law, and judicial review that supposedly have significant effects on international trade flows. My empirical tests show that both precedent law and judicial review have independent effects on bilateral trade volume while the proposed independent effect of tenured judge is unsupported. Moreover, my empirical evidences suggest that precedent law introduces its effect in a monadic fashion while judicial review (measured …
Discrimination At Will: Job Security Protections And Equal Employment Opportunity In Conflict, Julie C. Suk
Discrimination At Will: Job Security Protections And Equal Employment Opportunity In Conflict, Julie C. Suk
ExpressO
The conventional wisdom amongst scholars and advocates of employment discrimination law is that the success of Title VII is significantly hampered by the enduring doctrine of employment at will. As long as employers have broad discretion to fire employees for any reason, no reason, or a bad reason, employers can easily get away with terminating or refusing to promote racial minorities and women as long as some credible nondiscriminatory reason, such as personal animosity, can be presented. This account feeds the widely accepted view that employment at will and the goals of Title VII, namely equal employment opportunity, are at …
Controlling Family Shareholders In Developing Countries: Anchoring Relational Exchange, Ronald J. Gilson
Controlling Family Shareholders In Developing Countries: Anchoring Relational Exchange, Ronald J. Gilson
ExpressO
The Law and Finance account of the ubiquity of controlling shareholders in developing markets is based on conditions in the capital market: poor shareholder protection law prevents controlling shareholders from parting with control out of fear of exploitation by a new controlling shareholder who acquires a controlling position in the market. This explanation, however, does not address why we observe any minority shareholders in such markets, or why controlling shareholders in developing markets are most often family-based. This paper looks at the impact of “bad law” on shareholder distribution in a very different way. Developing countries typically provide not only …