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Brief Of Law Professors David D. Cole Et Al. As Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner (Geneva-Enforceability), Hamdan V. Rumsfield, No. 05-184 (U.S. Jan. 6, 2006), David Cole, Julie R. O'Sullivan, Carlos Manuel Vázquez
Brief Of Law Professors David D. Cole Et Al. As Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner (Geneva-Enforceability), Hamdan V. Rumsfield, No. 05-184 (U.S. Jan. 6, 2006), David Cole, Julie R. O'Sullivan, Carlos Manuel Vázquez
U.S. Supreme Court Briefs
No abstract provided.
Referring To Foreign Law In Constitutional Interpretation: An Episode In The Culture Wars, Mark V. Tushnet
Referring To Foreign Law In Constitutional Interpretation: An Episode In The Culture Wars, Mark V. Tushnet
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
As Judge Messitte's essay demonstrates, recent references in Supreme Court decisions to non-U.S. legal materials have generated a great deal of controversy. Those who make such references say that doing so is no big deal. I have called the controversy a tempest in a teapot. My topic here is the disjuncture between the perception on one side that something important and troubling has happened - or, as I will argue, may be about to happen - and the perception on the other that there is nothing to be concerned about. After describing in Section I the practice that has given …
"A Decent Respect To The Opinions Of Mankind": Referring To Foreign Law To Express American Nationhood, Mark V. Tushnet
"A Decent Respect To The Opinions Of Mankind": Referring To Foreign Law To Express American Nationhood, Mark V. Tushnet
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
Why might a court refer to non-U.S. law? Justice Stephen Breyer's pragmatic defense of the practice is probably the most widely known, as are its defects. Here, I want to sketch a counterintuitive explanation for the practice. Referring to non-U.S. law in Supreme Court opinions might be a way in which Supreme Court Justices participate in the dissemination of a distinctively American self-understanding. By this I do not mean that Justices who refer to non-U.S. law necessarily endorse the (reasonable) interpretive theory that the U.S. Constitution instantiates universally true propositions of political morality. Rather, I mean that references to non-U.S. …
When Is Knowing Less Better Than Knowing More? Unpacking The Controversy Over Supreme Court Reference To Non-U.S. Law, Mark V. Tushnet
When Is Knowing Less Better Than Knowing More? Unpacking The Controversy Over Supreme Court Reference To Non-U.S. Law, Mark V. Tushnet
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
My goal in this Essay is simply to lay out the criticisms of the use of non-U.S. law in constitutional interpretation, so as to identify what might be correct (not much, in the end) in those criticisms. I discuss criticisms based on theories of interpretation, on the claim that reference to non-U.S. law is merely decoration playing no role in generating outcomes, on the role the Constitution has in expressing distinctively American values, and on the proposition that judges are unlikely to do a good job in understanding - and therefore in referring to - non-U.S. law. This last "quality-control" …
Popular Constitutionalism As Political Law, Mark V. Tushnet
Popular Constitutionalism As Political Law, Mark V. Tushnet
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
This Article addresses some of the critical reviews of ‘The People Themselves’, focusing on how they respond to the proposition, which I believe to be correct and made in ‘The People Themselves’, that constitutional law is a distinctive or special kind of law. I call that kind of law political law. Both parts of the formulation are equally important. Constitutional law is law, what is sometimes described as "hard" law. As law, it sometimes induces decision-makers to make decisions that are inconsistent with their "pure" preferences, that is, those they would hold in the absence of law. My aim is …
It's A Bird, It's A Plane, No, It's Super Precedent: A Response To Faber And Gerhardt, Randy E. Barnett
It's A Bird, It's A Plane, No, It's Super Precedent: A Response To Faber And Gerhardt, Randy E. Barnett
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
The normative case for originalism is based, in large measure, on the superiority of the enacted text over the opinions of members of the government whom it is supposed to govern and limit-including members of the Supreme Court. The author does not see how an originalist can accept that the Supreme Court could change the meaning of the text from what it meant as enacted and still remain an originalist. In other words, once it becomes appropriate for the Supreme Court to discard original meaning and the original meaning of the text is thereby reduced to a factor among many …
Political Power And Judicial Power: Some Observations On Their Relation, Mark V. Tushnet
Political Power And Judicial Power: Some Observations On Their Relation, Mark V. Tushnet
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
This Essay summarizes and perhaps extends slightly some important recent work, mostly by political scientists, on the structural relation between the array of political power in a nation's nonjudicial branch or branches and the way in which judicial review is exercised in relatively stable democracies. Robert Dahl's classic article identified one such relation. According to Dahl, "[e]xcept for short-lived transitional periods when the old alliance is disintegrating and the new one is struggling to take control of political institutions, the Supreme Court is inevitably a part of the dominant national alliance." What, though, if there is no "dominant" national political …
Weak-Form Judicial Review And "Core" Civil Liberties, Mark V. Tushnet
Weak-Form Judicial Review And "Core" Civil Liberties, Mark V. Tushnet
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
In this Essay, I want to unearth some subordinated strands in the Rehnquist Court's free speech jurisprudence. For example, the Rehnquist Court allowed Congress to regulate campaign finance in ways subject to credible First Amendment objections, and to impose obligations on cable television systems that would almost certainly be unconstitutional were they imposed on newspapers. These decisions, I suggest, do not rest simply on the kind of deference to legislative judgment that fits comfortably into a system of strong-form review. Rather, they represent what I call a managerial model of the First Amendment, which accords legislatures a large role in …
Constitutional Culture Or Ordinary Politics: A Reply To Reva Siegel, Robin West
Constitutional Culture Or Ordinary Politics: A Reply To Reva Siegel, Robin West
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
Reva Siegel's lecture, ‘Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional Change: The Case of the de Facto ERA,’ explores the interaction between the courts and social movements in creating constitutional meaning. In the primary part of this response I focus my comments on Siegel's three major contributions: First, the historical explanation of the source of the Court's authority in the development of the so-called de facto ERA; second, the articulation of a general, jurisprudential thesis regarding social contestation as a source of constitutional authority apart from text, history, and principle; and third, the quasi-sociological descriptive account of the form social …
Beyond Coercion: Justice Kennedy's Aversion To Animus, Steven Goldberg
Beyond Coercion: Justice Kennedy's Aversion To Animus, Steven Goldberg
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
In evaluating the constitutionality of religious displays, Justice Kennedy adheres to the coercion test. A crèche on the courthouse steps is acceptable because it does not coerce anyone to support or participate in a religious exercise. He rejects the endorsement test, which asks whether the display makes reasonable nonadherents feel like outsiders, finding it to be “flawed in its fundamentals and unworkable in practice.” Yet in the free exercise context, Kennedy has focused on whether a community shows hostility to minority faiths, and his opinions in Romer and Lawrence stress that legislatures acted unconstitutionally in showing animus to gays. Suppose …
Constitutions As "Living Trees"? Comparative Constitutional Law And Interpretive Metaphors, Vicki C. Jackson
Constitutions As "Living Trees"? Comparative Constitutional Law And Interpretive Metaphors, Vicki C. Jackson
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
Part I below explores the interpretive approaches of three other high national courts that have engaged in constitutional review over a long period of time, identifying two respects in which they may bear on this debate. First, their jurisprudence relies on interpretive approaches that depend on multiple sources and forms of argument-what some call an "eclectic" method, and others might call common law constitutionalism. Second, the jurisprudence of other significant national courts acknowledges the possibility that interpretive understandings will change. Indeed, in those countries with continuity of rights-protecting constitutional regimes and with high courts vested with the power of judicial …