Digital Commons Network^™

Holmes' Failure, Louise Weinberg

Michigan Law Review

I have just set down the March 1997 Harvard Law Review, with its centennial celebration of Oliver Wendell Holmes' The Path of the Law. The Path of the Law is a grand thing, in my view Holmes' best thing. But just the same, I find myself surprised that on this occasion none of its celebrants raised what has always seemed to me a weakness of the piece, and of Holmes' much earlier book, The Common Law. This is a weakness that is at once a reflection and a forecast of the failure of its author. Writers today do seem to …

Section 1: Overview Of The Supreme Court, Institute Of Bill Of Rights Law, William & Mary Law School

Supreme Court Preview

No abstract provided.

What Is Law? A Search For Legal Meaning And Good Judging Under A Textualist Lens, Roger Colinvaux

Indiana Law Journal

No abstract provided.

Ignorance Of Law Is An Excuse - But Only For The Virtuous, Dan M. Kahan

Michigan Law Review

It's axiomatic that "ignorance of the law is no excuse." My aim in this essay is to examine what the "mistake of law doctrine" reveals about the relationship between criminal law and morality in general and about the law's understanding of moral responsibility in particular. The conventional understanding of the mistake of law doctrine rests on two premises, which are encapsulated in the Holmesian epigrams with which I've started this essay. The first is liberal positivism. As a descriptive claim, liberal positivism holds that the content of the law can be identified without reference to morality: one needn't be a …

Extending The Due Process Clause To Prevent A Previously Recused Judge From Later Attempting To Affect The Case From Which He Was Recused, S. Matthew Cook

BYU Law Review

No abstract provided.

Notre Dame Lawyer - Spring 1997, Notre Dame Law School

Notre Dame Lawyer

Judge Friendly And The Law Of Securities Regulation: The Creation Of A Judicial Reputation, Margaret V. Sachs

Scholarly Works

Few judges are more revered than the late Henry J. Friendly, a member of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit from 1959 to 1986. Leading jurists and scholars have described him as "one of our wisest judges," "a legend in his own time," "the most remarkable legal mind of his generation," "the pre-eminent appellate judge of his era," and "the most distinguished judge in this country during his years on the bench."

Are great judicial reputations-like great literary and scientific reputations- also shaped by contingencies? Or does the legal profession for some reason stand apart? This …

Standing Committee On Discipline V. Yagman: Missing The Point Of Ethical Restrictions On Attorney Criticism Of The Judiciary?, Caprice L. Roberts

Washington and Lee Law Review

No abstract provided.

Review Of The Selling Of Supreme Court Nominees, By J. A. Maltese, Richard D. Friedman

Reviews

John Anthony Maltese has written a genial book on a subject of enormous importance and enduring interest-presidential selection and senatorial consideration of Supreme Court nominees. Readers new to this field will find The Selling of Supreme Court Nominees a helpful introduction to it. Those more familiar with it will not find much that is surprising.

Freedom And Interdependence In Twentieth-Century Contract Law: Traynor And Hand And Promissory Estoppel, Alfred S. Konefsky

Journal Articles

No abstract provided.

Judicial Interference With Effective Advocacy By The Defense, Bennett L. Gershman

Elisabeth Haub School of Law Faculty Publications

A fundamental premise of the American criminal justice system is defense counsel's zealous professional advocacy. Representation of a criminal defendant to be effective must be vigorous. In administering a trial, judges have a duty to ensure a fair and orderly proceeding. On occasion, however, judges overstep the line and impede defense counsel's advocacy functions unfairly. This article describes some of the ways that trial judges may violate legal and ethical standards by improperly interfering with defense counsel's courtroom functions.

Justice George Sutherland And Economic Liberty: Constitutional Conservatism And The Problem Of Factions, 6 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 1 (1997), Samuel R. Olken

UIC Law Open Access Faculty Scholarship

Most scholars have viewed Justice George Sutherland as a conservative jurist who opposed government regulation because of his adherence to laissez-faire economics and Social Darwinism, or because of his devotion to natural rights. In this Article, Professor Olken analyzes these widely held misperceptions of Justice Sutherland's economic liberty jurisprudence, which was based not on socio-economic theory, but on historical experience and common law. Justice Sutherland, consistent with the judicial conservatism of the Lochner era, wanted to protect individual rights from the whims of political factions and changing democratic majorities. The Lochner era differentiation between government regulations enacted for the public …

The Civil Opinions Of Judge Phyllis A. Kravitch: A Tribute, Stephen Wermiel

Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals

No abstract provided.

Things Judges Do: State Statutory Interpretation, Judith S. Kaye

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

Personal Reflections On Creation Of The Third Circuit Task Force On Equal Treatment In The Courts, Dolores K. Sloviter

Villanova Law Review

No abstract provided.

Utilitarianism Left And Right: A Response To Professor Armour, Robert F. Nagel

Publications

No abstract provided.

Judicial Restraint In The Administrative State: Beyond The Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Matthew D. Adler

Faculty Scholarship

Arguments for judicial restraint point to some kind of judicial deficit (such as a democratic or an epistemic deficit) as grounds for limiting judicial review. ("Judicial review" is used in this Article to mean, essentially, the judicial invalidation of statutes, rules, orders and actions in virtue of the Bill of Rights, or similar unwritten criteria.). The most influential argument for judicial restraint has been the Countermajoritarian Difficulty. This is a legislature-centered argument: one that points to features of *legislatures*, as grounds for courts to refrain from invalidating *statutes*. This Article seeks to recast scholarly debate about judicial restraint, and to …

Book Review —The Federal Courts: Challenge And Reform, Roger J. Miner '56

Book Reviews

No abstract provided.

Brown V. State Of New York: Judge Simons Says New York State Can Be Held Liable For Money Damages, Eric J. Stockel

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

Report Of The Third Circuit Task Force On Equal Treatment In The Courts, Various Editors

Villanova Law Review

No abstract provided.

Dear President Clinton, Carl W. Tobias

Law Faculty Publications

Professor Tobias offers advice on judicial selection philosophy for the newly reelected President Bill Clinton.

Magistrate Judges In The Montana Federal District, Carl W. Tobias

Law Faculty Publications

Over the last three decades, growing caseloads and finite resources have fostered expansion of the jurisdiction, responsibilities, prestige and compensation of United States Magistrate Judges. Passage of the Civil Justice Reform Act (CJRA) of 1990, which required local experimentation with procedures for reducing expense and delay in civil litigation, propelled this development in many of the ninety-four federal districts across the country. The United States District Court for the District of Montana has quite strongly evidenced these phenomena. Perhaps most important, the CJRA expense and delay reduction plan that the district prescribed in 1991 included an opt-out procedure which it …

Right To Talk: Has Justice Antonin Scalia Compromised His Objectivity With A Public Remark?, Lloyd B. Snyder

Law Faculty Articles and Essays

With two assisted suicide cases scheduled for argument before the Supreme Court this term, Justice Antonin Scalia already has publicly staked out his position on the issue. While sentiments he expressed in 1990 in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, 497 U.S. 261, are well-known, Scalia told an audience at Catholic University late last year that it is "absolutely plain there is no [constitutional] right to die." Is it proper for sitting judges to make such statements? While no one would deny Scalia his First Amendment right to say what he pleases, that hardly quells concerns about the advisability …

Writing In The Margins: Brennan, Marshall, And The Inherent Weaknesses Of Liberal Judicial Decision-Making (Essay), Donna F. Coltharp

Faculty Articles

No abstract provided.

Chief Justice Hughes' Letter On Court-Packing, Richard D. Friedman

Articles

After one of the great landslides in American presidential history, Franklin D. Roosevelt took the oath of office for the second time on January 20, 1937. As he had four years before, Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes, like Roosevelt a former governor of New York, administered the oath. Torrents of rain drenched the inauguration, and Hughes’ damp whiskers waved in the biting wind. When the skullcapped Chief Justice reached the promise to defend the Constitution, he “spoke slowly and with special emphasis.” The President responded in kind, though he felt like saying, as he later told his aide Sam Rosenman: …

Who's Afraid Of Humpty Dumpty: Deconstructionist References In Judicial Opinions, Madeleine Plasencia

Seattle University Law Review

The question of why judges are concerned with justifying or defending their decisions from the followers of Derrida?, is posed in this Article both generally, as a matter of legal interpretation, and specifically, within the context of the issue(s) presented in the examined cases. By examining the concerns articulated by the judges in these cases and then referring back to the writings of Derrida, this Article describes the likely outcome if Derrida's views of (legal) interpretation are in fact applied in judicial opinion-making. In Parts II and III, this Article introduces the reader to important concepts in Derridean deconstruction. These …

A Tribute To The Honorable Phyllis A. Kravitch, Joseph L. Hoffmann

Articles by Maurer Faculty

No abstract provided.

Of Labor Law And Dissonance Colloquy, James J. Brudney

Faculty Scholarship

What accounts for the dissonance between the meaning of our national labor law, as decreed primarily by federal judges, and the social and economic realities of workplace relationships addressed by that law? In his darkly eloquent commentary, Professor Getman acknowledges that such dissonance is not unique to the law governing labor-management relations. Yet the courts' often mistrustful approach toward employee rights under the National Labor Relations Act ( NLRA" or "Act") has had a special impact. The NLRA emerged at a time of social turbulence, and was based on a recognized need to redress the fundamental inequality of bargaining power …

Chief Justice John Marshall In Historical Perspective, 31 J. Marshall L. Rev. 137 (1997), Samuel R. Olken

UIC Law Review

No abstract provided.

"Doubts About Our Processes": Richard D. Simons And The Jurisprudence Of Restraint In State Constitutional Analysis, David E. Mccraw

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.