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The Transition From Relational To Legal Contract Enforcement, Fali Huang
The Transition From Relational To Legal Contract Enforcement, Fali Huang
Research Collection School Of Economics
This paper studies the transition of contract enforcement institutions. The prevalence of relational contracts, low legal quality, strong cultural preference for personalistic relationships, low social mobility, and highly unequal endowment form a cluster of mutually reinforcing institutions that hinder economic development. The cultural element per se does not necessarily reduce social welfare though it may slow down the legal development, while the real problem lies in endowment inequality and low social mobility. Thus a more equal distribution of resources may be the ultimate key to unravel the above interlocking institutions. These results are generally consistent with the empirical evidence.
Does Governance Matter? Yes, No Or Maybe Some Evidence From Developing Asia, M. G. Quibria
Does Governance Matter? Yes, No Or Maybe Some Evidence From Developing Asia, M. G. Quibria
Research Collection School Of Economics
This paper seeks to explore the relationship between economic growth and governance performance in Asian developing economies. This exploration yields some interesting conclusions. First, notwithstanding its tremendous economic achievements, the state of governance in Asia is not stellar by international comparison. Indeed, a majority of these countries seem to suffer from a governance deficit. Second, contrary to our expectation, data do not suggest any strong positive link between governance and growth: paradoxically, countries that exhibit surpluses in governance on average grew much slower than those with deficits. The paper ends with some conjecture about this apparent paradox.