Digital Commons Network^™

January 6, Ambiguously Inciting Speech, And The Overt-Acts Rule, Alan Z. Rozenshtein, Jed Handelsman Shugerman

Faculty Scholarship

A prosecution of Donald Trump for his role in the January 6 attack on the Capitol would have to address whether the First Amendment protects the inflammatory remarks he made at the “Stop the Steal” rally. A prosecution based solely on the content of Trump’s speech—whether for incitement, insurrection, or obstruction—would face serious constitutional difficulties under Brandenburg v. Ohio’s dual requirements of intent and likely imminence. But a prosecution need not rely solely on the content of Trump’s speech. It can also look to Trump’s actions: his order to the remove the magnetometers from the entrances to the rally and …

Against Political Speech, John M. Kang

Faculty Scholarship

The Supreme Court has dedicated itself to the proposition that political speech, more than any other category of speech, is deserving of the highest protection. A succession of cases amply supports this proposition. In Virginia v. Black, the Court announced that "lawful political speech [is] at the core of what the First Amendment is designed to protect." The Court similarly declared in Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy that the First Amendment "has its fullest and most urgent application" to political speech. In McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, the Court held that "handing out leaflets in the advocacy of …

Nobody's Business: A Novel Theory Of The Anonymous First Amendment, Jordan Wallace-Wolf

Faculty Scholarship

Namelessness is a double-edged sword. It can be a way of avoiding prejudice and focusing attention on one's ideas, but it can also be a license to defame and misinform. These points have been widely discussed. Still, the breadth of these discussions has left some of the depths unplumbed, because rarely is the question explicitly faced: what is the normative significance of namelessness itself, as opposed to its effects under different conditions? My answer is that anonymity is an evasion of responsibility for one's conduct. Persons should ordinarily be held responsible for what they do, but in some cases, where …

Lawyers And The Lies They Tell, Bruce A. Green, Rebecca Roiphe

Faculty Scholarship

The law holds lawyers to a more demanding standard of conduct than others when it comes to aspects of their fiduciary relationships with courts and clients. For instance, states can sanction lawyers for some speech inside a courtroom that would be protected if uttered by a non-lawyer. This Article explores whether lawyers’ free speech rights should also be different from those of other speakers when lawyers, acting on their own behalf, participate in political discourse. Applying the current First Amendment framework, the authors question the bar’s assumption that, simply because lawyers are subject to rules of professional conduct, courts can …

Show Me The Money The Applicability Of Contract Laws Ratification And Tenderback Doctrines To Title Vii Releases, Rachel E. Deming

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Disinformation And The First Amendment: Fraud On The Public, Wes Henricksen

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Fourth Amendment Privacy In Public: A Fundamental Theory With Application To Location Tracking, Jordan Wallace-Wolf

Faculty Scholarship

When we walk out our front door, we are in public and other people may look at us. But intuitively, we don’t open ourselves up to unlimited scrutiny just by going outside. We retain some privacy, even in public. What is the source of this residual public-privacy, and how should the law recognize it without degrading the open character of public space?

The answer given by commentators, and most recently by the Supreme Court in Carpenter v. U.S., comes in the form of two related claims. The first is the chilling theory of the Fourth Amendment. According to this idea, …

Four Privacy Stories And Two Hard Cases, Jessica Silbey

Faculty Scholarship

In the context of reviewing Scott Skinner's book "Privacy at the Margins" (Cambridge University Press, 2021), this article discusses four "privacy stories" (justifications for and explanation of the application of privacy law) that need substantiation and reinterpretation for the 21st century and for what I call "fourth generation" privacy law and scholarship. The article then considers these stories (and Skinner's analysis of them) in light of two "hard" cases, one he discusses in his book and one recently decided by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, both concerning privacy in taking and dissemination of photographs.