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Faculty Scholarship

Bankruptcy

Banking and Finance Law

2014

Articles 1 - 7 of 7

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Debt-Buyer Lawsuits And Inaccurate Data, Peter A. Holland Apr 2014

Debt-Buyer Lawsuits And Inaccurate Data, Peter A. Holland

Faculty Scholarship

Pursuant to secret purchase and sale agreements (also known as forward flow agreements), the accounts that banks sell to debt buyers are often sold “as is,” with explicit and emphatic disclaimers that the debts may not be owed, the amounts claimed may not be accurate, and documentation may be missing. Despite their full knowledge that the accuracy and completeness of the data has been specifically disclaimed by the bank, when they sue consumers, debt buyers tell courts that the information obtained from the bank is inherently reliable and accurate. In order to avoid a fraud on the courts, the contents …


A People’S History Of Collective Action Clauses, Mark C. Weidemaier, Mitu Gulati Jan 2014

A People’S History Of Collective Action Clauses, Mark C. Weidemaier, Mitu Gulati

Faculty Scholarship

For two decades, collective action clauses (CACs) have been part of the official-sector response to sovereign debt crisis, justified by claims that these clauses can help prevent bailouts and shift the burden of restructuring onto the private sector. Reform efforts in the 1990s and 2000s focused on CACs. So do efforts in the Eurozone today. CACs have even been suggested as the cure for the US municipal bond market. But bonds without CACs are still issued in major markets, so reformers feel obliged to explain why they know better. Over time, a narrative has emerged to justify pro-CAC reforms. It …


Clearinghouses As Liquidity Partitioning, Richard Squire Jan 2014

Clearinghouses As Liquidity Partitioning, Richard Squire

Faculty Scholarship

To reduce the risk of another financial crisis, the Dodd-Frank Act requires that trading in certain derivatives be backed by clearinghouses. Critics mount two main objections: a clearinghouse shifts risk instead of reducing it; and a clearinghouse could fail, requiring a bailout. This Article’s observation that clearinghouses engage in liquidity partitioning answers both. Liquidity partitioning means that when one of its member firms becomes bankrupt, a clearinghouse keeps a portion of the firm’s most liquid assets, and a matching portion of its short-term debt, out of the bankruptcy estate. The clearinghouse then applies the first toward immediate repayment of the …


Rollover Risk: Ideating A U.S. Debt Default, Steven L. Schwarcz Jan 2014

Rollover Risk: Ideating A U.S. Debt Default, Steven L. Schwarcz

Faculty Scholarship

This article examines how a U.S. debt default might occur, how it could be avoided, its potential consequences if not avoided, and how those consequences could be mitigated. To that end, the article differentiates defaults caused by insolvency from defaults caused by illiquidity. The latter, which are potentiated by rollover risk (the risk that the government will be temporarily unable to borrow sufficient funds to repay its maturing debt), are not only plausible but have occurred in the past. Moreover, the ongoing controversy over the federal debt ceiling and the rise of the shadow-banking system make these types of defaults …


The Bankruptcy-Law Safe Harbor For Derivatives: A Path-Dependence Analysis, Steven L. Schwarcz, Ori Sharon Jan 2014

The Bankruptcy-Law Safe Harbor For Derivatives: A Path-Dependence Analysis, Steven L. Schwarcz, Ori Sharon

Faculty Scholarship

U.S. bankruptcy law grants special rights and immunities to creditors in derivatives transactions, including virtually unlimited enforcement rights. This article argues that these rights and immunities result from a form of path dependence, a sequence of industry-lobbied legislative steps, each incremental and in turn serving as apparent justification for the next step, without a rigorous and systematic vetting of the consequences. Because the resulting “safe harbor” has not been fully vetted, its significance and utility should not be taken for granted; and thus regulators, legislators, and other policymakers—whether in the United States or abroad—should not automatically assume, based on its …


Derivatives And Collateral: Balancing Remedies And Systemic Risk, Steven L. Schwarcz Jan 2014

Derivatives And Collateral: Balancing Remedies And Systemic Risk, Steven L. Schwarcz

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.


Rolling Back The Repo Safe Harbors, Edward R. Morrison, Mark J. Roe, Christopher S. Sontchi Jan 2014

Rolling Back The Repo Safe Harbors, Edward R. Morrison, Mark J. Roe, Christopher S. Sontchi

Faculty Scholarship

Recent decades have seen substantial expansion in exemptions from the Bankruptcy Code's normal operation for repurchase agreements. These repos, which are equivalent to very short-term (often one-day) secured loans, are exempt from core bankruptcy rules such as the automatic stay that enjoins debt collection, rules against prebankruptcy fraudulent transfers, and rules against eve-of-bankruptcy preferential payment to favored creditors over other creditors. While these exemptions can be justified for United States Treasury securities and similarly liquid obligations backed by the full faith and credit of the United States government, they are not justified for mortgage-backed securities and other securities that could …