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Articles 1 - 10 of 10
Full-Text Articles in Entire DC Network
Elections, Ideology, And Turnover In The U.S. Federal Government, Alexander D. Bolton, John De Figueiredo, David E. Lewis
Elections, Ideology, And Turnover In The U.S. Federal Government, Alexander D. Bolton, John De Figueiredo, David E. Lewis
Faculty Scholarship
A defining feature of public sector employment is the regular change in elected leadership. Yet, we know little about how elections influence public sector careers. We describe how elections alter policy outputs and disrupt the influence of civil servants over agency decisions. These changes shape the career choices of employees motivated by policy, influence, and wages. Using new Office of Personnel Management data on the careers of millions of federal employees between 1988 and 2011, we evaluate how elections influence employee turnover decisions. We find that presidential elections increase departure rates of career senior employees, particularly in agencies with divergent …
Quitting In Protest: A Theory Of Presidential Policy Making And Agency Response, Charles M. Cameron, John M. De Figueiredo, David E. Lewis
Quitting In Protest: A Theory Of Presidential Policy Making And Agency Response, Charles M. Cameron, John M. De Figueiredo, David E. Lewis
Faculty Scholarship
This paper examines the effects of centralized presidential policy-making, implemented through unilateral executive action, on the willingness of bureaucrats to exert effort and stay in the government. Extending models in organizational economics, we show that policy initiative by the president is a substitute for initiative by civil servants. Yet, total effort is enhanced when both work. Presidential centralization of policy often impels policy-oriented bureaucrats ("zealots") to quit rather than implement presidential policies they dislike. Those most likely to quit are a range of moderate bureaucrats. More extreme bureaucrats may be willing to wait out an opposition president in the hope …
The Dual Path Initiative Framework, Elizabeth Garrett, Mathew D. Mccubbins
The Dual Path Initiative Framework, Elizabeth Garrett, Mathew D. Mccubbins
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Conditions For Judicial Independence, Mathew D. Mccubbins, Roger Noll, Barry R. Weingast
Conditions For Judicial Independence, Mathew D. Mccubbins, Roger Noll, Barry R. Weingast
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Courts, Congress, And Public Policy, Part Ii: The Impact Of The Reapportionment Revolution On Congress And State Legislatures, Jeffrey R. Lax, Mathew D. Mccubbins
Courts, Congress, And Public Policy, Part Ii: The Impact Of The Reapportionment Revolution On Congress And State Legislatures, Jeffrey R. Lax, Mathew D. Mccubbins
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Social Choice, Crypto-Initiaives, And Policymaking By Direct Democracy, Thad Kousser, Mathew D. Mccubbins
Social Choice, Crypto-Initiaives, And Policymaking By Direct Democracy, Thad Kousser, Mathew D. Mccubbins
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
When Does Government Limit The Impact Of Voter Initiatives?, Elisabeth R. Gerber
When Does Government Limit The Impact Of Voter Initiatives?, Elisabeth R. Gerber
Faculty Scholarship
Citizens use the initiative process to make new laws. Many winning initiatives, however, are altered or ignored after Election Day. We examine why this is, paying particular attention to several widely-ignored properties of the post-election phase of the initiative process. One such property is the fact that initiative implementation can require numerous governmental actors to comply with an initiative’s policy instructions. Knowing such properties, the question then becomes: When do governmental actors comply with winning initiatives? We clarify when compliance is full, partial, or not at all. Our findings provide a template for scholars and observers to better distinguish cases …
Politcs And The Courts: A Positive Theory Of Judicial Doctrine And The Rule Of Law, Mathew D. Mccubbins, Roger G. Noll, Barry R. Weingast
Politcs And The Courts: A Positive Theory Of Judicial Doctrine And The Rule Of Law, Mathew D. Mccubbins, Roger G. Noll, Barry R. Weingast
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Bonding, Structure And The Stability Of Political Parties: Party Government In The House, Gary W. Cox, Mathew D. Mccubbins
Bonding, Structure And The Stability Of Political Parties: Party Government In The House, Gary W. Cox, Mathew D. Mccubbins
Faculty Scholarship
The public policy benefits that parties-deliver are allocated by democratic procedures that devolve ultimately to majority rule. Majority-rule decision making, however, does not lead to consistent policy choices; it is "unstable." In this paper, we argue that institutions - and thereby policy coalitions -- can be stabilized by extra-legislative organization. The rules of the Democratic Caucus in the U.S. House of Representatives dictate that a requirement for continued membership is support on the floor of Caucus decisions for a variety of key structural matters. Because membership in the majority party’s caucus is valuable, it constitutes a bond, the posting of …
A Theory Of Political Control And Agency Discretion, Randall L. Calvert, Mathew D. Mccubbins, Barry R. Weingast
A Theory Of Political Control And Agency Discretion, Randall L. Calvert, Mathew D. Mccubbins, Barry R. Weingast
Faculty Scholarship
A major issue in the study of American politics is the extent to which electoral discipline also constrains bureaucrats. In practice, executive agencies operate with considerable independence from elected officials. However,the entire process of policy execution is a game among legislators.the chief executive. and bureaucratic agents. It includes the initial delegation of authority, the choice of policy alternatives,and opportunities for oversight and control. A simple model of this process demonstrates an important distinction between bureaucratic authority and bureaucratic discretion. Indeed.in its simplest form, the model predicts a world in which bureaucrats are the sole active participants in policymaking, but in …