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The Cracked Foundations Of The Right To Secede, Donald L. Horowitz Jan 2003

The Cracked Foundations Of The Right To Secede, Donald L. Horowitz

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.


Legal Transitions: Some Welfarist Remarks, Matthew D. Adler Jan 2003

Legal Transitions: Some Welfarist Remarks, Matthew D. Adler

Faculty Scholarship

This essay offers a sympathetic, utilitarian critique of Louis Kaplow's famous argument for legal retroactivity in his 1986 article, "An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions." The argument, very roughly, is that the prospect of retroactivity is desirable if citizens are rational because it gives them a desirable incentive to anticipate legal change. My central claim is that this argument trades upon a dubious, objective view of probability that assumes rational citizens assign the same probabilities to states as rational governmental officials. But it is subjective, not objective probabilities that bear on rational choice, and the subjective probabilities of rational citizens …


Risk, Death And Harm: The Normative Foundations Of Risk Regulation, Matthew D. Adler Jan 2003

Risk, Death And Harm: The Normative Foundations Of Risk Regulation, Matthew D. Adler

Faculty Scholarship

Is death a harm? Is the risk of death a harm? These questions lie at the foundations of risk regulation. Agencies that regulate threats to human life, such as the EPA, OSHA, the FDA, the CPSC, or NHTSA, invariably assume that premature death is a first-party harm - a welfare setback to the person who dies - and often assume that being at risk of death is a distinct and additional first-party harm. If these assumptions are untrue, the myriad statutes and regulations that govern risky activities should be radically overhauled, since the third-party benefits of preventing premature death and …


Introduction To, Preferences And Rational Choice: New Perspectives And Legal Implications, Matthew D. Adler, Claire Finkelstein, Peter Huang Jan 2003

Introduction To, Preferences And Rational Choice: New Perspectives And Legal Implications, Matthew D. Adler, Claire Finkelstein, Peter Huang

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.


Agenda Power In Brazil’S Camara Dos Deputados, 1989-98, Octavio Amorim Neto, Gary W. Cox, Mathew D. Mccubbins Jan 2003

Agenda Power In Brazil’S Camara Dos Deputados, 1989-98, Octavio Amorim Neto, Gary W. Cox, Mathew D. Mccubbins

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.


The Political (Science) Context Of Judging, Lee Epstein, Jack Knight, Andrew D. Martin Jan 2003

The Political (Science) Context Of Judging, Lee Epstein, Jack Knight, Andrew D. Martin

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.


Racial Identity, Electoral Structures, And The First Amendment Right Of Association, Guy-Uriel Charles Jan 2003

Racial Identity, Electoral Structures, And The First Amendment Right Of Association, Guy-Uriel Charles

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.


Reconstructing Climate Policy: Beyond Kyoto, Jonathan B. Wiener, Richard B. Stewart Jan 2003

Reconstructing Climate Policy: Beyond Kyoto, Jonathan B. Wiener, Richard B. Stewart

Faculty Scholarship

In their comprehensive analysis of the Kyoto Protocol and climate policy, Richard B. Stewart and Jonathan B. Wiener examine the current impasse in climate policy and the potential steps nations can take to reduce greenhouse gases. They summarize the current state of information regarding the extent of global warming that would be caused by increasing uncontrolled greenhouse gas emissions. They explain why participation by all major greenhouse gas-emitting countries is essential to curb future greenhouse gas emissions and also note the significant obstacles to obtaining such participation.

Stewart and Wiener argue it is in the national interest of the United …


The Puzzle Of Ex Ante Efficiency: Does Rational Approvability Have Moral Weight?, Matthew D. Adler Jan 2003

The Puzzle Of Ex Ante Efficiency: Does Rational Approvability Have Moral Weight?, Matthew D. Adler

Faculty Scholarship

A governmental decision is "ex ante efficient" if it maximizes the satisfaction of everyone's preferences ex ante, relative to other possible decisions. Equivalently, each affected person would be rational to approve the decision, given her preferences and beliefs at the time of the choice. Does this matter, morally speaking? Do governmental officials - legislators, judges, regulators - have a moral reason to make decisions that are ex ante efficient? The economist's answer is "yes." "Ex ante efficiency" is widely seen by welfare economists to have moral significance, and often appears within law-and-economics scholarship as a criterion for evaluating legal doctrines. …