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Articles 1 - 5 of 5
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Democratic Rulemaking, John M. De Figueiredo, Edward H. Stiglitz
Democratic Rulemaking, John M. De Figueiredo, Edward H. Stiglitz
Faculty Scholarship
This paper examines to what extent agency rulemaking is democratic. It reviews theories of administrative rulemaking in light of two normative benchmarks: a “democratic” benchmark based on voter preferences, and a “republican” benchmark based on the preferences of elected representatives. It then evaluates how the empirical evidence lines up in light of these two approaches. The paper concludes with a discussion of avenues for future research.
Quitting In Protest: A Theory Of Presidential Policy Making And Agency Response, Charles M. Cameron, John M. De Figueiredo, David E. Lewis
Quitting In Protest: A Theory Of Presidential Policy Making And Agency Response, Charles M. Cameron, John M. De Figueiredo, David E. Lewis
Faculty Scholarship
This paper examines the effects of centralized presidential policy-making, implemented through unilateral executive action, on the willingness of bureaucrats to exert effort and stay in the government. Extending models in organizational economics, we show that policy initiative by the president is a substitute for initiative by civil servants. Yet, total effort is enhanced when both work. Presidential centralization of policy often impels policy-oriented bureaucrats ("zealots") to quit rather than implement presidential policies they dislike. Those most likely to quit are a range of moderate bureaucrats. More extreme bureaucrats may be willing to wait out an opposition president in the hope …
Regulatory Exit, J.B. Ruhl, James Salzman
Regulatory Exit, J.B. Ruhl, James Salzman
Faculty Scholarship
Exit is a ubiquitous feature of life, whether breaking up in a marriage, dropping a college course, or pulling out of a venture capital investment. In fact, our exit options often determine whether and how we enter in the first place. While legal scholarship is replete with studies of exit strategies for businesses and individuals, the topic of exit has barely been touched in administrative law scholarship. Yet exit plays just as central a role in the regulatory state as elsewhere – welfare support ends; government steps out of rate-setting. In this article, we argue that exit is a fundamental …
Does The U.S. Patent And Trademark Office Grant Too Many Bad Patents?: Evidence From A Quasi-Experiment, Michael D. Frakes, Melissa F. Wasserman
Does The U.S. Patent And Trademark Office Grant Too Many Bad Patents?: Evidence From A Quasi-Experiment, Michael D. Frakes, Melissa F. Wasserman
Faculty Scholarship
Many believe the root cause of the patent system’s dysfunction is that the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO or Agency) is issuing too many invalid patents that unnecessarily drain consumer welfare. Concerns regarding the Agency’s overgranting tendencies have recently spurred the Supreme Court to take a renewed interest in substantive patent law and have driven Congress to enact the first major patent reform act in over sixty years. Policymakers, however, have been modifying the system in an effort to increase patent quality in the dark. As there exists little to no compelling empirical evidence the PTO is actually overgranting …
The Volcker Rule: A Brief Political History, Kimberly D. Krawiec, Guangya Liu
The Volcker Rule: A Brief Political History, Kimberly D. Krawiec, Guangya Liu
Faculty Scholarship
Today, more than five years after Dodd-Frank was first signed into law, uncertainty surrounds many aspects of the Volcker Rule’s application and ultimate impact on financial markets and bank stability. Many more years will likely pass before that uncertainty is resolved. We demonstrate through a quantitative and qualitative analysis that these difficulties were presaged by the Volcker Rule’s political history. The Volcker Rule -- originally rejected by Congressional lawmakers and economists within the Obama administration as unworkable -- arose as a political concession designed to quiet critics who contended that Dodd-Frank did not do enough to control risky bank activity. …