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Duke Law

Administrative Law

2012

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Understanding Regulatory Capture: An Academic Perspective From The United States, Lawrence G. Baxter Jan 2012

Understanding Regulatory Capture: An Academic Perspective From The United States, Lawrence G. Baxter

Faculty Scholarship

Although it sometimes seems that financial regulatory agencies have been entirely captured by the larger players in the industry they regulate, a closer examination reveals that a variety of factors contribute to policy outcomes in this arena. Agencies have different agendas and stakeholders, and banks often perform quasi-governmental roles that blur the line between the captors and the captured. The real danger is that public policy can be distorted as a result of excessive influence by one set of interests at the expense of others. This danger is best thwarted or at least mitigated through the application of a range …


Capture Nuances In The Contest For Financial Regulation, Lawrence G. Baxter Jan 2012

Capture Nuances In The Contest For Financial Regulation, Lawrence G. Baxter

Faculty Scholarship

Applying capture analysis in the hotly contested arena of financial regulation is difficult. Numerous regulators with widely differing missions and widely diverse stakeholders are involved. Regulators operate under widely differing authorizing legislation. They even function at different levels of government. Agencies are often at odds with each other when it comes to determining optimal public policy. Unlike policy disputes in many other areas of regulation, which can be settled by reference to scientific data, public policy in financial regulation rests profoundly on essentially contested economic ideologies. This makes financial policy doubly difficult: one the one hand, it requires deep expertise—and …