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The “Ethical” Surplus Of The War On Illegal Immigration, Francis J. Mootz Iii, Leticia M. Saucedo

Scholarly Works

The Aristotelian philosopher, Gene Garver, suggests that rhetorical claims have an "ethical surplus" that extends beyond the specific claim being advanced at the moment. This follows from the fact that rhetoric includes not only logos, but also pathos and ethos. We adopt the thesis of "ethical surplus," but in a negative context. The "war on illegal immigration" has generated an ethical surplus that leads its promoters beyond the specific claim of securing borders against unlawful entry. After demonstrating that there is an express rhetoric of "war" used in connection with Arizona's adoption of recent anti-immigrant legislation, we explore …

After Natural Law: A Hermeneutic Response To Law’S Quandary, Francis J. Mootz Iii

Scholarly Works

Law is a practice that claims to be aligning itself with objective truth: "The Law." Natural law theories justified this state of affairs for centuries, but in the wake of the collapse of traditional natural law theories there appears to be no ontological account of law that does credit to the depth of the practice. In particular, legal positivism has failed to fulfill its promise to provide guidance after the eclipse of natural law.

Using Steven Smith's, "Law's Quandary," as a touchstone, I will account for the ontology of law in a naturalistic manner, but without relapsing to traditional natural …

Book Review Symposium: Introduction, Francis J. Mootz Iii

Scholarly Works

A foreword to a symposium held to discuss Gene Garver’s book, For the Sake of Argument: Practical Reasoning, Character and the Ethics of Belief (University of Chicago Press, 2004).

Argument, Political Friendship And Rhetorical Knowledge: A Review Of Garver's "For The Sake Of Argument", Francis J. Mootz Iii

Scholarly Works

Gene Garver's recent book, "For the Sake of Argument: Practical Reasoning, Character and the Ethics of Belief" (U. Chicago Press, 2004), responds to the dilemma at the core of contemporary legal theory. Garver incisively describes why legal reasoning is viewed either as impotent or dangerous. Reason appears impotent in the legal context to the extent that we maintain its rigor by limiting its scope to dialectical demonstration; it appears dangerous to the extent that we free reason from having to provide definitive answers. Garver looks to Aristotle for a solution. To deal with the inadequacies of the accounts of practical …

A Future Foretold: Neo-Aristotelian Praise Of Postmodern Legal Theory, Francis J. Mootz Iii

Scholarly Works

Postmodern thinking puts severe stress on the project of legal theory. The philosophical critique of grand narratives, coupled with the radically pragmatic return to localized practices, has rendered theorizing suspect. Theory appears to be a quaint vestige of previous "bad faith" refusals to accept the finitude of human existence. But the postmodern position is even more complex, because postmodern anti-theorists tend to employ perplexing jargon and wield sophisticated and obscure concepts in their work. The postmodern puzzle is whether one can challenge theory without theorizing. Is theory defined by its practical effects, or by its refusal to become complicit in …