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Caremark'S Butterfly Effect, Angela N. Aneiros, Karen E. Woody

Scholarly Articles

In 1996, the Delaware Court of Chancery detailed the minimum standard for corporate boards of directors (“board”) with regard to corporate compliance programs and monitoring protocols. The landmark Caremark decision held that directors would not face liability for a breach of fiduciary duties unless they failed to implement a system of controls and compliance, or knowingly failed to monitor that system. In order to bring a successful Caremark claim, plaintiffs must prove that the board operated in bad faith by failing to exercise oversight in a sustained or systemic way. The Delaware Court of Chancery opinion noted that the theory …

Is The Corporate Director's Duty Of Care A 'Fiduciary' Duty? Does It Matter?, Christopher M. Bruner

Scholarly Articles

While reference to "fiduciary duties" (plural) is routinely employed in the United States as a convenient short-hand for a corporate director's duties of care and loyalty, other common-law countries generally treat loyalty as the sole "fiduciary duty." This contrast prompts some important questions about the doctrinal structure for duty of care analysis adopted in Delaware, the principal jurisdiction of incorporation for U.S. public companies. Specifically, has the evolution of Delaware's convoluted and problematic framework for evaluating disinterested board conduct been facilitated by styling care a "fiduciary" duty? If so, then how should Delaware lawmakers and judges respond moving forward?

In …

Corporate Officers And The Business Judgment Rule, Lyman P.Q. Johnson

Scholarly Articles

This article argues that the business judgment rule - a cornerstone concept in corporate law - does not and should not extend to corporate officers in the same broad manner in which it is applied to directors. The argument proceeds along both descriptive and normative lines. After first reviewing judicial decisions, the article concludes that, notwithstanding frequent, broad assertions to the contrary, application of the rule to corporate officers is not firmly established in case law. The article next examines the policy case by assessing three conventional rationales for applying the rule to directors and concluding, on balance, that the …

The Modest Business Judgment Rule, Lyman P.Q. Johnson

Scholarly Articles

This article argues that Delaware mis-formulates and mis-uses the business judgment rule. Properly understood, the business judgment rule's function in corporate law is quite modest. It is a narrowly-drawn judicial policy of nonreview which, in duty of care cases, shields the merits of board decisions from judicial scrutiny. The article contends that the business judgment rule, therefore, should be de-emphasized as an analytical construct in the law of director fiduciary duties and should be sharply differentiated from the broader-gauged duty of due care. Doing so will pave the way for Delaware courts to rethink the importance of articulating a robust, …

Rethinking Judicial Review Of Director Care, Lyman P.Q. Johnson

Scholarly Articles

This article offers an extended critique of the Delaware Supreme Court's unprecedented use of an entire fairness test in a breach of due care setting, as first articulated in Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc. 634 A.2d 345 (Del. 1993) and Cinerama, Inc. v. Technocolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156 (Del. 1995). The article then argues for a generalized reasonableness standard for director conduct and for judicially reviewing care claims, thereby providing Delaware law with something it has lacked historically ? a pervasive (yet still streamlined) duty of due care.