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Revisiting Seminole Rock, Jeffrey A. Pojanowski Jan 2018

Revisiting Seminole Rock, Jeffrey A. Pojanowski

Journal Articles

The rule that reviewing courts must defer to agencies’ interpretations of their own regulations has come under scrutiny in recent years. Critics contend that this doctrine, often associated with the 1997 Supreme Court decision Auer v. Robbins, violates the separation of powers, gives agencies perverse regulatory incentives, and undermines the judiciary’s duty to say what the law is.

This essay offers a different argument as to why Auer is literally and prosaically bad law. Auer deference appears to be grounded on a misunderstanding of its originating case, the 1945 decision Bowles v. Seminole Rock. A closer look at Seminole Rock …


Constitutional Economic Justice: Structural Power For "We The People", Martha T. Mccluskey Jan 2017

Constitutional Economic Justice: Structural Power For "We The People", Martha T. Mccluskey

Journal Articles

Toward that goal, this essay proposes a structural principle of collective economic power for “we the people.” This principle is both consistent with longstanding Constitutional ideals and tailored to the current challenges of neoliberal ideology and policy. It develops two premises: first, it rejects the neoliberal economic ideology that defines legitimate power and freedom as individualized “choice” constrained by an existing political economy. Instead, this proposed principle recognizes that meaningful political economic freedom and power fundamentally consist of access to collective organizations with potential to create a “more perfect union” with better and less constrained options. Second, the post-Lochner principle …


Without Deference, Jeffrey Pojanowski Jan 2016

Without Deference, Jeffrey Pojanowski

Journal Articles

This essay explores what judicial review of agency interpretations of law would look like if the Supreme Court abandoned Chevron deference in favor de novo review. It concludes that such an alternative regime has appealing features, but may not bring as much immediate, practical change as many critiques or defenses of Chevron presume. The largest change would come from how we think about law and policy in the administrative state. The theoretical scaffolding that would uphold a regime of non-deferential review is far more classical in cast than the moderate legal realism underwriting Chevron. The more traditional character of this …