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Advancing The Empirical Research On Lobbying, John M. De Figueiredo, Brian Kelleher Richter Jan 2014

Advancing The Empirical Research On Lobbying, John M. De Figueiredo, Brian Kelleher Richter

Faculty Scholarship

This essay identifies the empirical facts about lobbying which are generally agreed upon in the literature. It then discusses challenges to empirical research in lobbying and provides examples of empirical methods that can be employed to overcome these challenges—with an emphasis on statistical measurement, identification, and casual inference. The essay then discusses the advantages, disadvantages, and effective use of the main types of data available for research in lobbying. It closes by discussing a number of open questions for researchers in the field and avenues for future work to advance the empirical research in lobbying.

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Corruption Temptation, Guy-Uriel Charles Jan 2014

Corruption Temptation, Guy-Uriel Charles

Faculty Scholarship

In response to Professor Lawrence Lessig’s Jorde Lecture, I suggest that corruption is not the proper conceptual vehicle for thinking about the problems that Professor Lessig wants us to think about. I argue that Professor Lessig’s real concern is that, for the vast majority of citizens, wealth presents a significant barrier to political participation in the funding of campaigns. Professor Lessig ought to discuss the wealth problem directly. I conclude with three reasons why the corruption temptation ought to be resisted.

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Financing Direct Democracy: Revisiting The Research On Campaign Spending And Citizen Initiatives, John M. De Figueiredo, Chang Ho Ji, Thad Kousser Jan 2011

Financing Direct Democracy: Revisiting The Research On Campaign Spending And Citizen Initiatives, John M. De Figueiredo, Chang Ho Ji, Thad Kousser

Faculty Scholarship

The conventional view in the direct democracy literature is that spending against a measure is more effective than spending in favor of a measure, but the empirical results underlying this conclusion have been questioned by recent research. We argue that the conventional finding is driven by the endogenous nature of campaign spending: initiative proponents spend more when their ballot measure is likely to fail. We address this endogeneity by using an instrumental variables approach to analyze a comprehensive dataset of ballot propositions in California from 1976 to 2004. We find that both support and opposition spending on citizen initiatives have …

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How Much Does Money Matter In A Direct Democracy?, John M. De Figueiredo Jan 2005