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Interactive Scenario Analysis Of Exhaustible Resource Problems, Arthur J. Caplan, John Gilbert
Interactive Scenario Analysis Of Exhaustible Resource Problems, Arthur J. Caplan, John Gilbert
Applied Economics Faculty Publications
We provide several interactive models that can be used in an intermediate- or graduate-level, natural-resource economics course to numerically solve a host of exhaustible-resource problems, and thereby help to verify the intuition and symbolic solutions typically provided in textbooks. Examples are drawn from Tietenberg (2006).
Interactive Geometry For Surplus Sharing In Cooperative Games, Arthur J. Caplan, Yuya Sasaki
Interactive Geometry For Surplus Sharing In Cooperative Games, Arthur J. Caplan, Yuya Sasaki
Applied Economics Faculty Publications
The need to understand surplus-sharing rules in cooperative game theory occurs at both the undergraduate and graduate levels. The rules are generally depicted as mathematical problems that entail the calculation of a vector of allocations. This Web page provides a downloadable program that enables users to interactively generate geometrical depictions of the rules for an unlimited number of three-player games. The program (1) demonstrates graphically how the simplex (i.e., area of potential cooperation) is shrunk to its corresponding core on the basis of the game’s characteristic function (i.e., the specification of the payoffs for each of the seven possible coalitions, …
A Comparison Of Emissions Taxes And Permit Markets For Controlling Correlated Externalities, Arthur J. Caplan
A Comparison Of Emissions Taxes And Permit Markets For Controlling Correlated Externalities, Arthur J. Caplan
Applied Economics Faculty Publications
This paper provides an answer to the question, are emission taxes an efficient and self-enforcing mechanism to control correlated externality problems? By “correlated externalities” we mean multiple pollutants that are jointly produced by a single source but which cause differentiated regional and global externalities. By “self-enforcing” we mean a mechanism that accounts for the endogeneity that exists between competing jurisdictions in the setting of environmental policy within a federation of regions. This mechanism incorporates sequential decision making among the jurisdictions and therefore determines an equilibrium based on the concept of subgame perfection. We find that, unlike joint domestic and international …
Curbside Recycling: Waste Resource Or Waste Of Resources?, David M. Aadland, Arthur J. Caplan
Curbside Recycling: Waste Resource Or Waste Of Resources?, David M. Aadland, Arthur J. Caplan
Applied Economics Faculty Publications
In this paper, we address the often contentious debate over state and local recycling policy by carefully estimating the social net benefit of curbside recycling. Benefits are estimated using household survey data from over 4,000 households across 40 western U.S. cities. We calibrate household willingness-to-pay for hypothetical bias using an innovative experimental design that contrasts stated and revealed preferences. Cost estimates are compiled from previous studies by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and the Institute for Local Self Reliance, and from in-depth interviews with recycling coordinators in our sampled cities. Across our sample of cities, we find that the estimated …
Cheap Talk Reconsidered: New Evidence From Cvm, David M. Aadland, Arthur J. Caplan
Cheap Talk Reconsidered: New Evidence From Cvm, David M. Aadland, Arthur J. Caplan
Applied Economics Faculty Publications
Two recent studies have shown that “cheap talk” is an effective means of eliminating positive hypothetical bias in experimental and field-auction settings. We further investigate the ability of cheap talk to mitigate positive hypothetical bias in a contingent-valuation phone survey administered to over 4,000 households. Positive hypothetical bias is detected in our data by contrasting revealed and stated preference information. However, a short, neutral cheap-talk script appears to exacerbate rather than mitigate the bias. Based on this and mixed evidence from earlier studies, we suggest caution in using cheap talk as an ex ante control for hypothetical bias.