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Articles 1 - 10 of 10
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Against The Intentional Definition Of Argument, G. C. Goddu
Against The Intentional Definition Of Argument, G. C. Goddu
Philosophy Faculty Publications
Intentional definitions of argument, i.e. the conclusion being intended to follow from the premises, abound. Yet, there are numerous problem cases in which we appear to have arguments, but no intention. One way to try to avoid these problem cases is to appeal to acts, in which case one has to give up on the repeatability of arguments. One can keep repeatability and intentions if one resorts to act types, but then it appears that the problem cases re-emerge.
Why We Still Do Not Know What A “Real” Argument Is, G. C. Goddu
Why We Still Do Not Know What A “Real” Argument Is, G. C. Goddu
Philosophy Faculty Publications
In his recent paper, “What a Real Argument is,” Ben Hamby attempts to provide an adequate theoretical account of “real” arguments. In this paper I present and evaluate both Hamby’s motivation for distinguishing “real” from non-“real” arguments and his articulation of the distinction. I argue that neither is adequate to ground a theoretically significant class of “real” arguments, for the articulation fails to pick out a stable proper subclass of all arguments that is simultaneously both theoretically relevant and a proper subclass of all arguments.
Logic, Truth And Inquiry (Book Review), G. C. Goddu
Logic, Truth And Inquiry (Book Review), G. C. Goddu
Philosophy Faculty Publications
Mark Weinstein’s, Logic, Truth and Inquiry is an ambitious and provocative case for a theory of truth and warrant strength that will undergird an “account of argument in the broad sense of current argumentation theory” (p. 12). I begin with a very schematic synopsis of Weinstein’s rich discussion through his six chapters. Weinstein himself notes that his arguments are “frequently presented in broad outline” (p. 1), so my quick sketch will be even broader. I conclude with some brief observations about both what the book leaves unresolved and the merits of Weinstein’s intriguing book.
What Is A “Real” Argument?, G. C. Goddu
What Is A “Real” Argument?, G. C. Goddu
Philosophy Faculty Publications
Numerous informal logicians and argumentation theorists restrict their theorizing to what they call “real” arguments. But is there a clear distinction to be made between “real” and “non-real” arguments? Here I explore four possible accounts of the alleged distinction and argue that none can serve the theoretical uses to which the distinction is most often put.
A Theory Of Argument (Book Review), G. C. Goddu
A Theory Of Argument (Book Review), G. C. Goddu
Philosophy Faculty Publications
A Theory of Argument is an advanced textbook “written for upper-level undergraduate students who have completed at least one prior course in argumentation theory, critical thinking, informal logic, formal logic, or some other related discipline” (ix). This puts Vorobej’s book in a unique position since, to my knowledge, there are no other second course undergraduate textbooks with a nonsymbolic focus. (Second course symbolic logic textbooks written for undergraduates, rather than primarily for graduate students, were relatively rare until recently; the past decade has seen a proliferation in such texts.)
Walton On Argument Structure, G. C. Goddu
Walton On Argument Structure, G. C. Goddu
Philosophy Faculty Publications
In previous work I argued against (i) the likelihood of finding a theoretically sound foundation for the linked/convergent distinction and (ii) the utility of the distinction even if a sound theoretical basis could be found. Here I subject Douglas Walton’s comprehensive discussion of the linked/convergent distinction found in Argument Structure: A Pragmatic Theory to careful scrutiny and argue that at best Walton’s theory remains incomplete and that attempts to fill out the details will run afoul of at least one of the problems adduced above—i.e., result in either a theoretically unsound distinction or a theoretically sound, but unnecessary distinction.
The Reach Of Abduction: Insight And Trial (Book Review), G. C. Goddu
The Reach Of Abduction: Insight And Trial (Book Review), G. C. Goddu
Philosophy Faculty Publications
The Reach of Abduction is the second volume in a planned three-volume set - A Practical Logic of Cognitive Systems - spanning relevance, abduction, and fallacious reasoning. Despite this fact, Gabbay and Woods write in the preface that "we have written the individual volumes with a view to their being read either as stand-alone works or as linked and somewhat overlapping items in the series" (p. xvii). The aim of The Reach of Abduction is to embed abduction "within a practical logic of cognitive systems" and in so doing, provide "an adequate stand-alone characterization of abduction itself' (p. 9). At …
Against The "Ordinary Summing" Test For Convergence, G. C. Goddu
Against The "Ordinary Summing" Test For Convergence, G. C. Goddu
Philosophy Faculty Publications
One popular test for distinguishing linked and convergent argument structures is Robert Yanal's Ordinary Summing Test. Douglas Walton, in his comprehensive survey of possible candidates for the linked/convergent distinction, advocates a particular version of Yanal's test. In a recent article, Alexander Tyaglo proposes to generalize and verify Yanal's algorithm for convergent arguments, the basis for Yanal's Ordinary Summing Test. In this paper I will argue that Yanal's ordinary summing equation does not demarcate convergence and so his Ordinary Summing Test fails. Hence, despite Walton's recommendation or Tyaglo's generalization, the Ordinary Summing Test should not be used for distinguishing linked argument …
The 'Most Important And Fundamental' Distinction In Logic, G. C. Goddu
The 'Most Important And Fundamental' Distinction In Logic, G. C. Goddu
Philosophy Faculty Publications
In this paper I argue that the debate over the purported distinction between deductive and inductive arguments can be bypassed because making the distinction is unnecessary for successfully evaluating arguments. I provide a foundation for doing logic that makes no appeal to the distinction and still performs all the relevant tasks required of an analysis of arguments. I also reply to objections to the view that we can dispense with the distinction. Finally, I conclude that the distinction between inductive and deductive arguments is not one of the most important and fundamental ideas in logic, but rather is unnecessary.
Critical Thinking By Alec Fisher (Book Review), G. C. Goddu
Critical Thinking By Alec Fisher (Book Review), G. C. Goddu
Philosophy Faculty Publications
The aim of Critical Thinking is to explicitly and directly teach critical thinking skills and to facilitate the use of these skills to subjects and contexts beyond critical thinking (v, 1). Though the book is primarily intended as an introductory textbook for the teaching of critical thinking, Fisher maintains that the "material is presented in such a way that it can be worked through on a self-study basis"(vi).