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The Not-So-Standard Model: Reconsidering Agency-Head Review Of Administrative Adjudication Decisions, Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Nina A. Mendelson
The Not-So-Standard Model: Reconsidering Agency-Head Review Of Administrative Adjudication Decisions, Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Nina A. Mendelson
Articles
The Supreme Court has invalidated multiple legislative design choices for independent agency structures in recent years, citing Article II and the need for political accountability through presidential control of agencies. In United States v. Arthrex, Inc., the Court turned to administrative adjudication, finding an Appointments Clause violation in the assignment of certain final patent adjudication decisions to appellate panels of unconfirmed administrative patent judges. As a remedy, a different majority declared unenforceable a statutory provision that had insulated Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) administrative adjudication decisions from political review for almost a century. The Court thereby enabled the politically appointed …
Congress's Anti-Removal Power, Christopher J. Walker, Aaron Nielson
Congress's Anti-Removal Power, Christopher J. Walker, Aaron Nielson
Articles
Statutory restrictions on presidential removal of agency leadership enable agencies to act independently from the White House. Yet since 2020, the U.S. Supreme Court has held two times that such restrictions are unconstitutional precisely because they prevent the President from controlling policymaking within the executive branch. Recognizing that a supermajority of the Justices now appears to reject or at least limit the principle from Humphrey’s Executor that Congress may prevent the President from removing agency officials based on policy disagreement, scholars increasingly predict that the Court will soon further weaken agency independence if not jettison it altogether.
This Article challenges …