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A Bargaining Model Of Holdouts And Takings, Thomas J. Miceli, Kathleen Segerson
A Bargaining Model Of Holdouts And Takings, Thomas J. Miceli, Kathleen Segerson
Economics Working Papers
The holdout problem is commonly cited as the justification for eminent domain, but the nature of the problem is not well understood. This paper models the holdout problem in a bargaining framework, where a developer seeks to acquire several parcels of land for a large-scale development. We show that in the absence of eminent domain, holdouts are inevitable, threatening costly delay. However, if the developer has the power to use eminent domain to acquire the land from holdouts, all sellers will bargain, thus avoiding delay. An offsetting cost is that owners may negotiate prices below their true value, possibly resulting …
Pricing And Policy Problems In The Northeast Fluid Milk Industry, Ronald W. Cotterill
Pricing And Policy Problems In The Northeast Fluid Milk Industry, Ronald W. Cotterill
Research Reports
This article documents the need for reform of milk pricing in the Northeast. The New York price gouging law can be recast as a fair share law. This new milk policy “kills two birds with one stone.” It corrects regional inequities in raw milk pricing by reforming the pricing of milk at retail by limiting and redistributing excessive retail margins to farmers and consumers. The fair share policy relieves allocative price inefficiency, improves the performance of the federal milk market order pool, and the general performance of the Northeast dairy farming and fluid milk industries.