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Crafting Naval Strategy: Observations And Recommendations For The Development Of Future Strategies, Bruce B. Stubbs, Sam J. Tangredi
Crafting Naval Strategy: Observations And Recommendations For The Development Of Future Strategies, Bruce B. Stubbs, Sam J. Tangredi
Leidos Chair of Future Warfare Studies Black Books
The “great captains” of military history have described the contradictions between rigorous, formal, institutionalized planning and the commonly chaotic results and necessary readjustments through a series of pithy aphorisms that by now have become clichés. The Prussian field marshal Helmuth von Moltke the Elder is cited—routinely, exhaustingly, almost annoyingly—as having said, “No plan survives contact with the enemy.” Yet perhaps Moltke captured the challenge more succinctly in a lesser-known but more apt quote: “Strategy is a system of expedients; it is more than a mere scholarly discipline.”
Research & Debate: Prediction, Wayne P. Hughes Jr.
Research & Debate: Prediction, Wayne P. Hughes Jr.
Naval War College Review
The predictive power of experts, operations analysis, and the value of information are interwoven subjects that are hard to winnow down to an essence. Prediction is a big subject, so I have limited this article to what I know best: the operational and tactical domains of conventional warfare.
Neptune’S Oracle: Admiral Harry E. Yarnell’S Wartime Planning, 1918–20 And 1943–44, Frank A. Blazich Jr.
Neptune’S Oracle: Admiral Harry E. Yarnell’S Wartime Planning, 1918–20 And 1943–44, Frank A. Blazich Jr.
Naval War College Review
Admiral Yarnell’s training at the Naval War College combined with his planning experiences of 1918–20 and 1943–44 to instill ideas and methodologies that he applied throughout his career. His study of military history and his half century of service equipped him admirably to provide Navy leadership with sound foundations for further planning efforts. Yarnell’s strategic vision profoundly influenced the interwar Navy and the force that entered the Cold War era.
Logistical Planning For War, Robert B. Carney
Logistical Planning For War, Robert B. Carney
Naval War College Review
Elsewhere, you will read or hear competent discussions on the various specialized aspects of logistical planning; so, today, I shall content myself with acquainting you with some of the broad problems which constitute a challenge to those who must shape logistical policies in the national military establishment.
Emergency Planning, Ralph E. Spear
Emergency Planning, Ralph E. Spear
Naval War College Review
The activities of the Office of Emergency Planning cover virtually every segment of our society, ranging from the federal structure in Washington, D.C. down to the smallest, but perhaps strongest, element of the American matrix-the individual family.
Naval Command Course: The U.S. Navy Planning And Budget Process, Parker C. Cooper
Naval Command Course: The U.S. Navy Planning And Budget Process, Parker C. Cooper
Naval War College Review
Gentlemen, I am privileged to speak to you today on the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting processes in the United States Navy. My objective this morning is to explain the procedures we use in our Navy, and show how these support our International Commitments.
Officer Promotion Planning, James K. Martin
Officer Promotion Planning, James K. Martin
Naval War College Review
What is my promotion opportunity? This a question that all officers ask periodically from the time of commissioning until departure from the naval service. While this may seem a simple query, it, in fact demands a rather complicated response.
The Department Of The Navy And The Dod Planning Programming, And Budgeting System (Ppbs), Charles F. Rushing
The Department Of The Navy And The Dod Planning Programming, And Budgeting System (Ppbs), Charles F. Rushing
Naval War College Review
Of the thousands of military officers on active duty, only those who have served in Washington, D.C., since 1961 have had the opportunity for direct involvement in the Department of Defense (DOD) Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS), And of these only a relatively few have become intimately associated with all aspects of the multifaceted system that manages DOD's resources, Today PPBS serves as the raison d'etre justifying the bulk of the military billets in the Washington D.C., area.
Without End: American Planning For The Next Vietnams, James J. Kirschke
Without End: American Planning For The Next Vietnams, James J. Kirschke
Naval War College Review
No abstract provided.
Manpower Planning & Resource Allocation In Defense, Rolf H. Clark, Robert A. Comerford
Manpower Planning & Resource Allocation In Defense, Rolf H. Clark, Robert A. Comerford
Naval War College Review
The Department of Defense, in seeking the best level of national security, has tried to efficiently invest its annually budgeted resources in weapon systems that provide maximum security over time. Unfortunately, while past investment policy has properly included dollar constraints, it has apparently ignored manpower limitations. This paper seeks to examine this oversight by investigating four related aspects presented as four hypotheses. They are analyzed by describing the impact of each upon an objective of efficient resource allocation; included is some discussion of available quantitative techniques whose implementation could prevent misallocations.
The Psychological Dimension In National Security Planning, Robert F. Delaney
The Psychological Dimension In National Security Planning, Robert F. Delaney
Naval War College Review
Few aspects of modern warfare and statecraft are as alien to American thinking as psychological warfare and psychological operations (PSYOPS). Confusion surrounding the concept of psychological operations in this country begins with the terminology itself inasmuch as we as a nation have dealt with propaganda, information (and its uncomfortable ally-culture), political warfare, psychological warfare, and psychological operations without really thinking of each as interrelated and dependent for its -success upon a coordinated whole.
Strategic Nuclear Planning After Start, Douglas J. Hanson
Strategic Nuclear Planning After Start, Douglas J. Hanson
Naval War College Review
Discussion of American-Soviet relations in recent months has focused increasingly on arms control. The Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) agreement, for example, has been heralded as a milestone in superpower cooperation and has paved the way for extensive reductions in strategic nuclear weapons. Such reductions arc politically popular and the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) negotiations have received a great deal of attention in the press.
Doctrine For Naval Planning: The Once And Future Thing, Arthur A. Adkins
Doctrine For Naval Planning: The Once And Future Thing, Arthur A. Adkins
Naval War College Review
Navy and Marine Corps officers do not look at planning in the same way. Marines approach it from the point of view of good, honest staff' work-and as something. like any other job, that if they do well enough someone may notice and keep them in mind for some future command selection board. Naval officers see billets in which they are expected to perform planning duties as "holding patterns," places to mark time until they can go to a ship or squadron and do something worthwhile, like command it.
The Legacy Of The White Oak Laboratory,, Frank C. Mahncke
The Legacy Of The White Oak Laboratory,, Frank C. Mahncke
Naval War College Review
The Navy has had a remarkable and pro- ductive group of in-house research and development laboratories. Sadly, with the drawdowns of the post–Cold War era, many have been closed, among them the “White Oak Laboratory”—the Naval Ordnance Laboratory at White Oak, Maryland. WOL, as it was popularly known, gave the Navy a tremendous leg- acy of technology, weapons, and people. Fortunately, that legacy has been pre- served by William Anspacher, Betty Gay, Donald Marlowe, Paul Morgan, and Samuel Raff in this richly detailed ac- count of the laboratory’s history.
Dog Boats At War: Royal Navy D Class Mtbs And Mgbs, 1939–1945,, Carl Otis Schuster
Dog Boats At War: Royal Navy D Class Mtbs And Mgbs, 1939–1945,, Carl Otis Schuster
Naval War College Review
There are few untold stories left from World War II, but the actions of the Royal Navy’s Coastal Forces can be de- scribed as little known and unappreci- ated. Serving in small plywood craft much like the more famous American PT boats, the Coastal Forces wreaked havoc with Axis forces in British and foreign waters. Operating from small harbors and primitive forward bases, theirs was a war of small, close-knit crews and close action with the enemy. They did it all, from convoy escort to shipping interdic- tion, clandestine landings to reconnais- sance operations, and finally, distant screening for invasion …
Decoding History: The Battle Of The Atlantic And Ultra,, Christopher Bell
Decoding History: The Battle Of The Atlantic And Ultra,, Christopher Bell
Naval War College Review
For thirty years after the Second World War, historians said very little about the role of signals intelligence in the Battle of the Atlantic—because either they did not know about the Allies’ remarkable code-breaking successes, or they could not write about what they did know. That changed in 1974, when revelations about ULTRA exposed the full extent of the Allied penetration of Germany’s sig- nals. Unfortunately, in the subsequent rush to rewrite the history books to in- clude ULTRA, its significance was fre- quently inflated.
American Airpower Strategy In Korea, 1950–1953, Wilfred F. Brown
American Airpower Strategy In Korea, 1950–1953, Wilfred F. Brown
Naval War College Review
Conrad Crane is a research professor for military strategy at the Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, and formerly a professor of military history at the U.S. Military Academy. Crane previ- ously wrote Bombs, Cities, and Civilians: American Airpower Strategy in World War II (1993), which is widely respected for its rich and adroit analysis. American Airpower Strategy in Korea, 1950–1953 is a comprehensive, thoroughly researched treatment of the many issues that the newly constituted U.S. Air Force faced as a result of having to fight its first war as an independent service—a war that it was not doctrinally …
Norstad: Cold War Nato Supreme Commander—Airman, Strategist, Diplomat,, Douglas Kinnard
Norstad: Cold War Nato Supreme Commander—Airman, Strategist, Diplomat,, Douglas Kinnard
Naval War College Review
Lauris Norstad was a major Air Force leader during the defining years of the Cold War, and except for Dwight Eisen- hower, he was the most prominent of all the Supreme Allied Commanders Europe (SACEUR) since that position was estab- lished in early 1951. Surprisingly, up to now, nothing definitive had been written on his role as SACEUR. Robert Jordan, a professor at the University of New Or- leans and an authority on Nato, has filled that gap.
How Effective Is Strategic Bombing?Lessons Learned From World War Ii To Kosovo,, Phillip S. Meilinger
How Effective Is Strategic Bombing?Lessons Learned From World War Ii To Kosovo,, Phillip S. Meilinger
Naval War College Review
The issue of strategic bombing’s effec- tiveness is vitally important to political and military leaders. U.S. Air Force doc- trine has argued for decades that airpower’s ability to operate directly and immediately at the strategic level of war is its unique and defining characteris- tic—a characteristic that must be ex- ploited. Many disagree, so the debates have been long and heated. Gian Gentile, a serving Army officer, now adds to the literature on this important subject. Unfortunately, he never really comes to grips with the key issue of effec- tiveness implied by the title of his book. Rather, he has …
Flying Black Ponies,, William M. Calhoun
Flying Black Ponies,, William M. Calhoun
Naval War College Review
Flying Black Ponies is an effective combi- nation of combat narrative, squadron history, and personal memoir, telling the story of Light Attack Squadron 4 (VAL 4, or the “Black Ponies”), a naval aviation squadron stationed in the Mekong Delta during the Vietnam War. During most of the war, the U.S. Navy made an intense effort with its Mobile Riverine Force to interdict enemy arms and supplies that flowed, primarily from Cambodia, across the Mekong Delta into the area sur- rounding Saigon. Kit Lavell’s book is a readable account of the Black Ponies’ im- portant role in this hazardous interdic- tion …
Japan’S Navy: Politics And Paradox, 1971–2000, Robert Morabito.
Japan’S Navy: Politics And Paradox, 1971–2000, Robert Morabito.
Naval War College Review
In 1971 James Auer published The Post- war Rearmament of Japanese Maritime Forces, 1945–1971, “a book that [was] meant to challenge certain assumptions surrounding post–World War II Japan and its military, in particular its maritime forces.” Thirty years later, in post–Cold War Japan, some of those same supposi- tions persist. Of particular note, beliefs that Japanese rearmament is an Ameri- can initiative, that Japan seeks only to provide for its own internal security while the United States is responsible for all external threats, and that militarism is returning to Japan, result in conflicts within Japan and among its Asian neighbors.
Interpreting China’S Grand Strategy: Past, Present, And Future,, Carmel Davis
Interpreting China’S Grand Strategy: Past, Present, And Future,, Carmel Davis
Naval War College Review
Michael Swaine, author of the outstanding The Military & Political Succession in China (1992), and his fellow RAND analyst Ashley Tellis have written a very good book about Chinese security in both historical and fu- ture perspective. It will certainly be of inter- est to the policy community, as it should be to all who work on Asian security. Swaine and Tellis define grand strategy as a country’s “basic approach to political- military security.” China’s grand strategy seeks to preserve domestic order, defend against external threats, and eventually attain “geopolitical influence as a major,
Identifying Potential Ethnic Conflict,, Pauletta Otis
Identifying Potential Ethnic Conflict,, Pauletta Otis
Naval War College Review
Since 1989, the U.S. military has been in- volved in a number of intrastate conflicts integrally related to ethnicity. These eth- nic conflicts have been devastating to those involved; the conflicts contributed to regional destabilization; and they have been assumed to breed international ter- rorism. Most saliently, they have virtually destroyed the hope of peace benefits that were predicted to accrue at the end of the Cold War.
The Changing Role Of Information In Warfare,, Eric J. Dahl
The Changing Role Of Information In Warfare,, Eric J. Dahl
Naval War College Review
Is there need for yet another book on the role of the military in the information age? To judge by this volume, a collection of essays published under RAND’s Project Air Force, the answer is yes—but this may be twice the book we need. In this case, more than enough is not necessarily better. The Changing Role of Information in War- fare is part of RAND’s Strategic Appraisal series, and it primarily addresses the ef- fects of information technology on American military planning and operations. The fifteen chapters provide a useful review of the dangers and oppor- tunities that information …
Chemical-Biological Defense: U.S. Military Policies Anddecisions In The Gulf War,, Pietro D. Marghella
Chemical-Biological Defense: U.S. Military Policies Anddecisions In The Gulf War,, Pietro D. Marghella
Naval War College Review
Although we lived with the dangerous specter of nuclear attack for more than fifty years during the Cold War, concerns about the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) have virtually exploded into our consciousness in the past decade. Since the demise of the for- mer Soviet Union—once referred to as our “malefactor partner in the concept of mutually assured destruction”—our fears seem to focus far less on the threat of nu- clear holocaust, and more on the threat of attack by chemical or biological agents. The logical point of departure for this shift in focus seems to be the …
Planning The Unthinkable: How New Powers Will Use Nuclear, Biological,And Chemical Weapons,, K. A. Beyoghlow
Planning The Unthinkable: How New Powers Will Use Nuclear, Biological,And Chemical Weapons,, K. A. Beyoghlow
Naval War College Review
The title says it all. This book is a compi- lation of empirical and analytical data on the strategic evolution of nuclear, biolog- ical, and chemical (NBC) agents and weapons in the twenty-first century. A central theme of the book is how new re- gional players (states and nonstate ac- tors) are likely to convert prevalent conventional military doctrine and train- ing into nonconventional means of war- fare. The book is very ambitious in its scope; it attempts—overall, success- fully—to address systematically concep- tual problems in the integration of such weapons into the military infrastructure, delivery systems, command and control …
The Coming Crisis: Nuclear Proliferation, U.S. Interests, And World Order,, Jon Greene
The Coming Crisis: Nuclear Proliferation, U.S. Interests, And World Order,, Jon Greene
Naval War College Review
The Coming Crisis is a series of essays by noted scholars in the field of national se- curity affairs examining the effects of continued nuclear weapons proliferation and the potential for regional nuclear cri- ses. While one can argue that use of nu- clear weapons by a rogue state today is more likely than it was during the Cold War, discussion of what the United States could and should do if deterrence fails has been noticeably absent in recent years. The authors revive this discussion and, in doing so, contribute significantly to the study of proliferation.
Book Reviews, The U.S. Naval War College
Book Reviews, The U.S. Naval War College
Naval War College Review
No abstract provided.
The Tyranny Of Forward Presence, Daniel Gouré
The Tyranny Of Forward Presence, Daniel Gouré
Naval War College Review
A cardinal principle of Navy strategic planning is that “shaping” the international environment is a necessary and appropriate mission. However, the ever-increasing scope of forward presence exerts a tyrannical hold on the future of the Navy, a hold that threatens—in an era of constrained defense budgets and rapidly changing threats—to break the force.