Digital Commons Network^™

Cmsi Translations #6: Building A World-Class Navy In A Comprehensive Way: It's Logic In Theory, History, And Practice, Liu Lijiao, Jia Benjia

CMSI Translations

"Building a world-class navy in a comprehensive way" is a vivid embodiment and concrete manifestation of the Chinese Communist Party's goal of building a strong military in the new era, as expressed in the domain of naval building and operations. This is both a major theoretical issue and practical issue. When it comes to realizing the centenary military building goal and creating a new situation via naval modernization, this will have major and far-reaching importance. [We must] deeply understand its internal logic in theory, history, and practice to accelerate naval transformation and development, and elevate at-dea deterrence and combat capabilities.

China Maritime Report No. 41: One Force, Two Force, Red Force, Blue Force: Pla Navy Blue Force Development For Realistic Combat Training, J. Michael Dahm

CMSI China Maritime Reports

Since the mid-2010s, there has been a concerted effort to professionalize a PLAN “blue force” as an opposition force, or OPFOR, in maritime exercises and training. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) routinely refers to its blue forces as metaphorical “whetstones” used to sharpen the PLA for a future fight against enemies of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Efforts to develop a PLAN blue force appear to have accelerated over the past several years in response to Chairman Xi Jinping’s decade-long demand for more realistic combat training.

This report examines recent developments in the PLAN’s blue force. It comprises four …

Cmsi Note #9: On The Plan's "Core Operational Capabilities", Ryan D. Martinson

CMSI Notes

Key Takeaways

• The PLAN is prioritizing the development of what it calls “four core operational capabilities.” These capabilities include 1) integrated near seas operations, 2) far seas mobile operations, 3) strategic deterrence and counterstrike, and 4) amphibious warfare.
• Analysis of Chinese writings suggest the focus of these efforts is on prevailing in a high-end conflict involving the U.S. military.
• The PLAN seeks the ability to dominate the near seas, strike U.S. bases and sea lines of communication in waters east of the first island chain and in the Indian Ocean, achieve “reliable, credible, and effective” deterrence against the U.S. through …

Cmsi Translations #5: Strengthen National Defense Mobilization And Reserve Force Construction, Yu Yunxian, Zhang Pengxuan

CMSI Translations

The report of the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party proposed "strengthening national defense mobilization and reserve force construction." In the face of the Era's requirements for strengthening the country and the military, the serious situation of national security, and the real existence of the risk of war, we must place the construction of national defense mobilization and reserve forces in a more important strategic position, and strive to promote the high-quality development of national defense mobilization and reserve force construction from a new starting point.

Cmsi Note #8: Recent Changes In The Pla Navy's Gulf Of Aden Deployment Pattern, Dennis J. Blasko

CMSI Notes

Key Takeaways

• Since December 2008, the PLAN has deployed 46 counter-piracy escort task forces (TFs) to the Gulf of Aden on a UN-authorized mission.
• Most TFs have included two combatants—a combination of destroyers, frigates, and amphibious transport docks—and a supply ship. Starting with the 33^rd TF, which departed China in August 2019, every TF has comprised one Type 052D destroyer, one Type 054A frigate, and one supply ship.
• One TF generally is on station near the Horn of Africa at all times, while for less than half that time another TF is either on the way to relieve it …

China Maritime Report No. 40: Onboard Political Control - The Ship Political Commissar In Chinese Merchant Shipping, Conor M. Kennedy

CMSI China Maritime Reports

Since the creation of the People’s Republic of China’s merchant fleet, the Chinese Communist Party has implemented a system of political control aboard oceangoing vessels through ship Party branches and ship political commissars. This report focuses on the ship political commissar, a Party representative assigned to oceangoing merchant ships, particularly within state-owned shipping enterprises, to carry out political and administrative work in the management of ship crews. Having peaked in authority and power during the Cultural Revolution, the ship political commissar position has evolved over the decades following economic reforms in the 1980s. Despite years of problematic implementation, the ship …

Cmsi Note #7: Pla Navy Reserve: Out Of The Shadows And Into The Forefront?, Tiffany A. Tat

CMSI Notes

As a part China’s goal to build a fully modernized military by 2035, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is improving its reserve forces through increased defense spending, critical policy changes, and organizational restructuring. Reserve forces (后备力量) encompass the PLA Reserve (预备役部队) and paramilitary forces, such as the militia, which fall under the leadership of the Central Military Commission and can be mobilized by the National Defense Mobilization Department to support combat. The many components that make up China’s fighting force such as active-duty PLA forces, China Coast Guard, and the militia have been studied in depth; however, the PLA Reserve …

Cmsi Note #6: Sharpening The Sword: Chinese Navy Aircraft Carrier Battle Group Defense Zones, Daniel Clayton Rice

CMSI Notes

Perspectives and Key Takeaways

• Chinese state media’s Channel 7 recently released a series of videos that described China’s aircraft carriers and the carrier battle groups, including their history, composition, and operational theory.
• The videos describe the carrier battle group (CVBG) “Outer Defense Zone” (外防区), also called the “Depth Defense Zone” (纵深防区), as 185 km to 400 km away from the aircraft carrier.
• The “Middle Defense Zone” (中防区), or the “Area Defense Zone” (区域防区) is described as 45 km to 185 km away from the aircraft carrier.
• The video details the “Inner Defense Zone” (内防区), otherwise called the “Point Defense Zone” …

China Maritime Report No. 39: A Hundred Men Wielding One Gun - Life, Duty, And Cultural Practices Aboard Plan Submarines, Conor M. Kennedy

CMSI China Maritime Reports

Submarine performance is not just measured in technical terms, but also in how crews operate over time. As the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) increasingly deploys its submarine force beyond the near seas on long-distance combat readiness and training missions, studying the force’s human components benefits a broader understanding its overall effectiveness. This report explores work and living conditions, crew endurance, service culture, political requirements, and approaches to resolving human issues in the submarine force. An inherently dangerous and challenging profession, the submarine force has gradually developed numerous solutions to address various challenges to prevent non-combat attrition among crews. Life …

China, Faits Accomplis And The Contest For East Asia: The Shadow Of Shifting Power, Kevin D. Stringer, Joshua Adam Hastey

Naval War College Review

No abstract provided.

China’S Law Of The Sea: The New Rules Of Maritime Order, Gregory Poling, Isaac B. Kardon

Naval War College Review

No abstract provided.

Plato Goes To China: The Greek Classics And Chinese Nationalism, Charles Horner, Shadi Bartsch

Naval War College Review

No abstract provided.

Vietnam And The Four Nos—How Chinese Actions In The South China Sea Influence Vietnam’S Hedging Strategy, Jeff Zeberlein

Naval War College Review

Vietnam’s policy of nonentanglement called the “Four Nos”—intended to hedge against China’s political, economic, and military strength—is challenged by Beijing’s increasing aggression and maximalist claims in the South China Sea, opening opportunities for U.S. policy in the region.

Cmsi Translations #4: Charging Into Battle—A Deeply Entwined Network: A Profile Of Wang Chengfei, Director Of A Research Office At The Naval Research Academy, Wang Kun, Ye Zhong, Zhou Huaiping

CMSI Translations

Wang Chengfei, Director of a research office and senior engineer at the Naval Research Academy, has presided over the initiation and evaluation of several major comprehensive information system equipment projects. He has compiled a development guide and technical requirements for Navy unmanned intelligent equipment technology systems, filled many specifications gaps, won a second- class Military Science and Technology Progress Award, obtained eight national defense patents, and was once awarded a third-class citation.

Cmsi Translations #3: Discussion On The Requirements And Methods Of Intelligent Decision-Making In Torpedo Attacks By Unmanned Underwater Vehicles, Ma Liang, Guo Liqiang, Zhang Hui, Yang Jing, Liu Jian

CMSI Translations

Autonomous technology in unmanned equipment is currently the most dynamic frontier technology field, and improving the level of intelligent decision-making is an inevitable trend in the development of unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs). Torpedo attack decision-making is an important part of attack-type UUVs' attack missions, and it is also the basis and premise for forming self-organizing cross-domain collaboration, autonomous cluster confrontation, and other operational capabilities. Beginning by sorting through the characteristics of operational use and typical mission styles, this article summarizes the advantages and disadvantages of UUVs compared to manned platforms, analyzes the decision-making content different from traditional torpedo attacks, expounds …

China Maritime Report No. 38: Plan Anti-Submarine Warfare Aircraft - Sensors, Weapons, And Operational Concepts, Eli Tirk, Daniel Salisbury

CMSI China Maritime Reports

The PLA Navy recognizes the importance of a robust anti-submarine warfare (ASW) system to counter adversaries seeking undersea asymmetric advantages, and its aviation component is a key part of that system. This report discusses the PLAN's efforts to improve its airborne ASW platforms and equipment and describes how PLAN-affiliated sources discuss the employment of those assets. The PLAN's significant buildup and growing employment of fixed-wing maritime patrol aircraft in recent years are key indicators of the importance it attaches to the airborne ASW mission set, as is its push to acquire improved sensors on both fixed and rotary wing ASW …

Cmsi Translations #2: Dominating The Battlefield—The Advantages Of Unmanned Intelligent Combat Forces, Zhao Xiangang, Su Yanqin

CMSI Translations

In his report to the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, Xi Jinping emphasized the need to accelerate the development of unmanned intelligent combat forces. Looking at the practice of local wars in recent years, unmanned combat forces as represented by drones have become an important part of the joint operational force system, playing an increasingly prominent role as an effectiveness multiplier. Especially with the advent of artificial intelligence technology and its rapid development and widespread use in the military field, unmanned systems are becoming more intelligent and autonomous, and unmanned intelligent operations are showing advantages and …

Cmsi Translations #1: The “Cans” And “Cannots” Of The Military Application Of Artificial Intelligence, Zhang Long

CMSI Translations

The application of artificial intelligence (AI) in the military field is an important force for promoting improvements in military technology and progress in the revolution of military affairs and is a key driver changing operational patterns and disrupting the form of war. In the upsurge of military applications of AI, we must think carefully about future decisions, deeply understand the technological hub (jishu shuniu) role of AI, dialectically view the functional boundaries of military applications of AI, and accurately grasp what AI "can" and "cannot" do. We must oppose both contemptuous and omnipotent theories of AI military application, …

China Maritime Report No. 37: Re-Engaging With The World: China's Military Diplomacy In 2023, Jie Gao, Kenneth W. Allen

CMSI China Maritime Reports

China’s military diplomacy plays a crucial role in advancing the nation's foreign policy objectives and safeguarding its strategic interests. This report highlights a diverse array of activities within military diplomacy, including senior-level meetings, joint military exercises, naval port calls, UN peacekeeping operations, and academic exchanges. Our findings reveal a significant—but incomplete—recovery in China's military diplomacy activities in 2023, following a period of reduced contacts with foreign militaries during the COVID-19 pandemic. Southeast Asia and Russia remain primary partners for China, with emerging strategic importance also seen in Africa, Oceania, and the Middle East. Overall, China's military diplomacy underscores its efforts …

Cmsi Note #5: Admiral Wang Renhua: Exemplifying Jointness And Oversight For China’S Navy Amid Xi’S Grade-And-Rank Reforms, Andrew S. Erickson

CMSI Notes

CMSI’s Perspectives and Key Takeaways:

• Admiral Wang Renhua’s promotion is the latest indication of efforts to synchronize grade-andrank promotions at the full admiral/general level (three stars in the PLA).
• Wang’s role may be best understood as a military loyalty enforcement boss.
• A key responsibility for Wang may well be to root out and destroy Xi’s enemies within the PLA.
• A potential component of Wang’s portfolio in the navy realm could be to maintain a tight grip on the wardrooms aboard China’s growing fleet of nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs).
• Having Wang serve in the Navy, and currently as head of …

Island-Hopping With Chinese Characteristics—What The Prc Is Doing In The Pacific Islands, Why It Matters, And Why The Time Has Come To “Block And Build”, Cleo Paskal

Naval War College Review

China’s engagement with western Pacific island nations and its pursuit of influence over their affairs are driven by its conception of comprehensive national power and a need for reliable access from which it might challenge the U.S. military and eventually displace it from the region.

Reluctant Retrenchment—America’S Response To The Rise Of China, Robert S. Ross

Naval War College Review

China’s rise augurs a power transition that challenges the preeminent security position of the United States in East Asia and has led to an incoherent retrenchment that both undermines that position and complicates efforts to recapitalize the Navy to face that challenge effectively.

China Maritime Report No. 36: China's T-Agos: The Dongjian Class Ocean Surveillance Ship, Devin Thorne

CMSI China Maritime Reports

Since 2017, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has commissioned a new class of ocean surveillance vessel into its order of battle: the Type 927. Similar in design and function to the U.S. Navy’s Victorious and Impeccable class T-AGOS ships, the Type 927 was introduced to help remedy the PLAN’s longstanding weakness in anti-submarine warfare. The PLAN has likely built six Type 927 ships to date, most based for easy access to the South China Sea. In peacetime, these ships use their towed array sonar to collect acoustic data on foreign submarines and track their movements within and beyond the …

Cmsi Note #4: Deck Cargo Ships: Another Option For A Cross-Strait Invasion, Conor M. Kennedy

CMSI Notes

CMSI Perspectives and Key Take-Aways:

• In addition to RO-RO ferries, the PLA also uses another class of RO-RO ship, the deck cargo ship, in sea transport training exercises.
• Deck cargo ships are widely used in China’s ocean engineering and construction industry, constituting an existing and large-scale volume of lift capacity.
• The simple design and relative ease of construction of deck cargo ships means they can quickly be built in large numbers.
• These vessels may be tasked to bring in large columns of logistics and follow-on forces to consolidate landing areas, possibly in waves not far behind landing assault forces.
• Deck …

China Maritime Report No. 35: Beyond Chinese Ferry Tales: The Rise Of Deck Cargo Ships In China's Military Activities, 2023, J. Michael Dahm

CMSI China Maritime Reports

This report provides a comprehensive assessment of Chinese civilian shipping support to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), examining civil maritime-military activities in 2023. As of 2023 and probably through at least 2030, the PLA’s reserve fleet of civilian ships is probably unable to provide the amphibious landing capabilities or the over-the-shore logistics in austere or challenging environments necessary to support a major cross-strait invasion of Taiwan. However, 2023 activity has demonstrated significant progress toward that end. In addition to the extensive use of civilian ferries, this report identifies the first use of large deck cargo ships to support PLA exercises. …

Cmsi Note #3: “Choose The Right Person, Choose The Right Path”: Taiwan’S Cross-Strait, National Security, And Defense Policies Under A Lai/Hsiao Administration, Julia M. Famularo

CMSI Notes

CMSI’s Perspectives and Key Takeaways:

• The incoming William Lai/Bi-khim Hsiao administration almost certainly intends to continue to execute and deepen President Tsai’s defense reforms. Lai has also stated his support for the implementation of an Indo-Pacific Strategy concept.
• Lai has an opportunity to leverage the national security experience of President Tsai’s outgoing advisors, who may potentially help his administration calibrate Taiwan’s responses to People’s Liberation Army (PLA) military provocations in and around the Taiwan Strait.
• The Lai administration likely would prove receptive to U.S. and partner overtures that contribute to Taiwan’s ability to strengthen its maritime domain awareness and security; …

China Maritime Report No. 34: Plan Submarine Training In The "New Era", Christopher Sharman, Terry Hess

CMSI China Maritime Reports

Since 2018, there have been significant changes to People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) submarine force training, and these changes have been driven by important revisions to strategic guidance and subsequent directives that focused PLA efforts to enhance its capabilities to operate in the maritime domain. While this guidance is applicable to all services, improving PLAN submarine force capabilities appears to have been of particular interest to senior Chinese leadership. This guidance expanded the PLA’s maritime domain requirements, which demanded that China’s submarine force improve its capabilities to operate independently or along with other PLAN assets at greater distances from coast …

Cmsi Note #2: Admiral Dong Jun Engages Friends And Foes: China’S First Naval Defense Minister Brings Joint Operational Experience, Andrew S. Erickson, Christopher Sharman

CMSI Notes

On 29 December 2023, Admiral Dong Jun (董军) was appointed China’s 14th Minister of National Defense (国防部部长) at the seventh meeting of the Standing Committee of the 14th National People’s Congress. He replaced the previously deposed Army General Li Shangfu, ending a four-month leadership gap. Admiral Dong is the first PLA Navy (PLAN) officer to head China’s Ministry of National Defense (MND). Previously the 9th People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) Commander, he was likewise exceptional in achieving this position from a background in theater joint operations.

Cmsi Note #1: Admiral Hu To The Helm: China’S New Navy Commander Brings Operational Expertise, Christopher Sharman, Andrew S. Erickson

CMSI Notes

China’s Navy, the world’s largest by number of ships, has a new leader. On 25 December 2023, Commander-in-Chief Xi Jinping, in his capacity as Central Military Commission (CMC) Chairman, promoted Vice Admiral Hu Zhongming (胡中明) to Admiral and appointed him Commander of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) (海军司令员). 2 Hu’s predecessor Admiral Dong Jun (董军) attended the promotion ceremony, suggesting this is an orderly and expected transition—unlike recent removals of the PLA Defense Minister and the former Commander of China’s Strategic Rocket Forces.

China Maritime Report No. 33: China's Sea-Based Nuclear Deterrent: Organizational, Operational, And Strategic Implications, David C. Logan

CMSI China Maritime Reports

China’s development of a credible sea-based deterrent has important implications for the PLAN, for China’s nuclear strategy, and for U.S.-China strategic stability. For the PLAN, the need to protect the SSBN force may divert resources away from other missions; it may also provide justification for further expansion of the PLAN fleet size. For China’s nuclear strategy and operations, the SSBN force may increase operational and bureaucratic pressures for adopting a more forward-leaning nuclear strategy. For U.S.-China strategic stability, the SSBN force will have complex effects, decreasing risks that Chinese decisionmakers confront use-or-lose escalation pressures, making China less susceptible to U.S. …