Digital Commons Network^™

Death Penalty Law, Therese M. Day

Mercer Law Review

This Article provides a survey of death penalty case law in Georgia from June 1, 2006 through May 31, 2007. The cases include those that were heard by the Georgia Supreme Court on interim appeal and direct appeal,1 and discussion is limited to claims which present new issues of law, refine existing law, or are otherwise instructive. This Article does not discuss holdings in capital cases that are common to all criminal appeals because these are discussed elsewhere in this Survey.

Administrative Law, Martin M. Wilson, Jennifer A. Blackburn

Mercer Law Review

This Article surveys administrative law developments in appellate cases from June 1, 2006 through May 31, 2007. Only cases from the Georgia Supreme Court and the Georgia Court of Appeals have been reviewed. As compared to prior years, the number of cases in which administrative law principles played a significant role showed no upward spike. There are many other topics that concern elements of administrative law, but this Article does not address cases containing those specific subject matter topics. There is likely some duplication of cases among the subject matter topics, but only the administrative law elements are emphasized in …

Evidence, Marc T. Treadwell

Mercer Law Review

The most significant news during the current survey period continued to be the judiciary's efforts to come to terms with the "tort reform" legislation enacted by the General Assembly in 2005, particularly Official Code of Georgia Annotated ("O.C.G.A.") section 24-9-67.1, which purports to adopt, more or less, the United States Supreme Court's decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.

As discussed below, it is beginning to appear that Georgia courts will follow a somewhat different course than that followed by federal courts in their interpretation of Daubert and Daubert's codification in Federal Rule of Evidence 702. As discussed …

Kansas V. Marsh: A Thumb On The Scale Of Death?, Elizabeth Brandenburg

Mercer Law Review

In Kansas v. Marsh, the United States Supreme Court held that it is not unconstitutional for a state's death penalty statute to require a death sentence when a sentencing jury finds aggravating and mitigating factors to be in equipoise. Extending its previous decision in Walton v. Arizona, the Court explicitly determined that this type of sentencing met the requirements of Furman v. Georgia and Gregg v. Georgia, holding that no other constraint is imposed by the Constitution. While the repercussions of this decision may not be widely felt, they do indicate the direction the Court is heading …

Testimonial? What The Heck Does That Mean?: Davis V. Washington, Lindsay Brewer

Mercer Law Review

The 2004 United States Supreme Court decision in Crawford v. Washington reformulated the standard for determining when the admission of hearsay' statements in criminal cases is permitted under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The majority held that the Confrontation Clause operates to exclude out-of-court statements that are "testimonial" in nature, unless the person making the statement is unavailable to testify and the defendant has had an opportunity for cross-examination. Chief Justice Rehnquist, who concurred in the judgment, expressed concerns that the decision would lead to uncertainty in future criminal trials because the Court …

Hush, Little Baby, Don't Say A Word: How Seeking The "Best Interests Of The Child" Fostered A Lack Of Accountability In Georgia's Juvenile Courts, Sarah Gerwig-Moore, Leigh S. Schrope

Mercer Law Review

Since 1899, when America's first juvenile court opened its doors to the lost children of Chicago, two primary assumptions have governed the administration of the juvenile justice system: that it should operate in parens patriae for the "best interests of the child"' and that it should be given flexibility and leeway in doing so. Georgia's juvenile courts, established in 1908, function squarely within that framework: "[a] petition alleging delinquency, deprivation, or unruliness of a child shall not be filed unless the court or a person authorized by the court has determined and endorsed upon the petition that the filing of …

Lawyers And Prophetic Justice, Timothy Floyd

Mercer Law Review

The statue of Lady Justice, a blindfold over her eyes, holding scales in one hand and a sword in the other, is our traditional visual image of justice. The scales convey the idea of neutrality and the weighing of competing interests; they emphasize rationality and the application of neutral principles in decision making. The blindfold emphasizes equality before the law, that the law is dispassionate and objective, and that decision making is untainted by bias. The statue also implies the stability and permanence of the justice system.

In my experience with lawyers, justice is not a regular topic in our …

Definitely Not Harmless: The Supreme Court Holds That The Erroneous Disqualification Of Retained Counsel Warrants Automatic Reversal In United States V. Gonzalez-Lopez, James A. Robson

Mercer Law Review

In United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, the United States Supreme Court held that the erroneous disqualification of a criminal defendant's retained choice of counsel violates the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and must result in the automatic reversal of the defendant's conviction. In reaching this conclusion, the Court rejected the Government's argument that a defendant who is denied his choice of counsel must prove prejudice by showing the defendant's substitute counsel was ineffective within the meaning of Strickland v. Washington. Instead, the Court concluded that because a complete violation of the Sixth Amendment's Counsel Clause occurs when …

Hey Officer, Didn't Someone Teach You To Knock? The Supreme Court Says No Exclusion Of Evidence For Knock-And- Announce Violations In Hudson V. Michigan, David Carn

Mercer Law Review

In Hudson v. Michigan, the United States Supreme Court held in a 5-4 decision that evidence discovered by police after a knock-and-announce violation will not necessarily be excluded in court. The majority opinion, written by Justice Scalia, stated that exclusion is only appropriate where the interests protected by the knock-and-announce requirement are implicated and that hiding evidence from the government is not one of those interests. The Court further held that the substantial social costs of excluding evidence discovered upon knock-and-announce violations outweigh the deterrent effects of the exclusionary rule against police misconduct and, therefore, the application of the …