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A Tradition At War With Itself: A Reply To Professor Rana's Review Of America's Forgotten Constitutions: Defiant Visions Of Power And Community, Robert L. Tsai

Faculty Scholarship

his essay responds to Professor Aziz Rana's review essay, "The Many American Constitutions," 93 Texas Law Review 1193 (2015).

He contends: (1) my portrayal of American constitutionalism might contain a “hidden” teleological understanding of the development of constitutional law; (2) my notion of "conventional sovereignty" sometimes seems content-free and at other times "interlinked with liberal egalitarianism"; and (3) a focus on failed constitutions "inadvertently tends to compartmentalize the overall tradition."

I answer in the following ways: (1) I reject any sense that constitutional law has moved in an arc of steady progress toward Enlightenment and instead embrace a tradition of …

Unconstitutional Conditions: The Irrelevance Of Consent, Philip A. Hamburger

Faculty Scholarship

Unconstitutional conditions are a conundrum. On the one hand, if government can spend, why can't it place whatever conditions it wants on its spending? On the other hand, if it can place any conditions on spending, won't it be able to impose restrictions that evade much of the Constitution, including most constitutional rights? This enigma is notoriously complex, and unconstitutional conditions therefore are considered a sort of Gordian knot.

The standard solution is to slice through the knot with consent to conclude that consent excuses otherwise unconstitutional restrictions. This solution, however, is problematic, for it concedes that the government can …

The Fifth Freedom: The Constitutional Duty To Provide Public Education, Areto Imoukhuede

Faculty Scholarship

“The fifth freedom is freedom from ignorance. It means that every[one], everywhere, should be free to develop his [or her] talents to their full potential – unhampered by arbitrary barriers of race or birth or income.” Lyndon B. Johnson This article argues that education is a fundamental human right that the U.S. Supreme Court has failed to recognize because of the Court’s bias towards negative, rather than positive rights. Viewed from the limited perspective of rights as liberties, the concern with declaring a fundamental right to education is that education legislation would be strictly scrutinized, thus causing the undesired result …

Developing A State Constitutional Law Strategy In New Mexico Criminal Prosecutions, J. Thomas Sullivan

Faculty Scholarship

This article includes a review of the process by which the New Mexico courts have developed an independent state constitutional jurisprudence reflecting more expansive protections of individual rights than those afforded by the Federal Constitution, as interpreted in the decisions of the United States Supreme Court. It addresses the existing body of state constitutional law and suggests possibilities for further developments, including both the substantive aspects of state constitutional topics and the procedural requirements for asserting state constitutional protections as alternative sources for protection of individual rights. It documents how far New Mexico has come in developing a state constitutional …

Toward A Conceptual Framework For Assessing Police Power Commitment Legislation, Eric S. Janus

Faculty Scholarship

Recent litigation and scholarship have begun to focus on the substantive limits of the state's power to use civil commitment as a social control tool. Courts and commentators describe civil commitment as grounded on two powers of the state: the parens patriae interest and the police power. This Article seeks an analytical framework for defining the boundaries of police power commitments in which justification rests on the interests of the public rather than on the interests of the committed individual.

Review Of Red, White, And Blue: A Critical Analysis Of Constitutional Law By Mark Tushnet, David B. Lyons

Faculty Scholarship

Mark Tushnet's new book offers no such counsel. Mainly a critique of interpretative theories, its conclusions are profoundly skeptical. Tushnet's central claim is that judicial review and constitutional theory cannot possibly perform their assigned functions, and that liberalism is to blame. This review will focus on those facets of the book.