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Democracy, Deference, And Compromise: Understanding And Reforming Campaign Finance Jurisprudence, Scott P. Bloomberg

Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review

In Citizens United, the Supreme Court interpreted the government’s interest in preventing corruption as being limited to preventing quid pro quo— cash-for-votes—corruption. This narrow interpretation drastically circumscribed legislatures’ abilities to regulate the financing of elections, in turn prompting scholars to propose a number of reforms for broadening the government interest in campaign finance cases. These reforms include urging the Court to recognize a new government interest such as political equality, to adopt a broader understanding of corruption, and to be more deferential to legislatures in defining corruption.

Building upon that body of scholarship, this Article begins with a descriptive …

Let Them Eat Cake: Why Public Proprietors Of Wedding Goods And Services Must Equally Serve All People, Labdhi Sheth, Molly Christ

Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review

No abstract provided.

Social Media And The Government: Why It May Be Unconstitutional For Government Officials To Moderate Their Social Media, Alex Hadjian

Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review

No abstract provided.

Diy Solutions To The Hobby Lobby Problem, Kristin Haule

Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review

No abstract provided.

Balancing Disclosure And Privacy Interests In Campaign Finance, Sarah Harding

Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review

The law of campaign finance pits two important First Amendment interests against each other: disclosure and privacy. The Supreme Court has recognized the need to balance these two interests to allow for effective elections and to safeguard individual rights. However, through the years the Court has failed to balance these interests equally, resulting in vacillating decisions that unfairly sacrifice one for the other. From Burroughs v. United States in 1934 to Citizens United v. FEC in 2010, the Court has failed to provide a workable roadmap for legislatures in the creation of campaign finance disclosure laws and for lower courts …

Election Law—Introduction, Jessica A. Levinson

Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review

No abstract provided.

When Rhetoric Obscures Reality: The Definition Of Corruption And Its Shortcomings, Jessica Medina

Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review

Due to public scorn after the unraveling of the Watergate scandal, the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of the Federal Election Campaign Act’s restrictions on political contributions and expenditures. Buckley v. Valeo established that no legitimate government interest existed to justify restrictions on campaign expenditures, and only the prevention of corruption or the appearance of corruption could justify restrictions on campaign contributions. Since then, the Court has struggled to articulate a definition of corruption that balances First Amendment protections with the potential for improper influence. This Article argues that the Court’s current definition of corruption is too narrow, and proposes …

"The Only Thing We Have To Fear Is Fear Itself": The Constitutional Infirmities With Felon Disenfranchisement And Citing Fear As The Rationale For Depriving Felons Of Their Right To Vote, Erika Stern

Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review

Felon disenfranchisement, a mechanism by which felons and former felons are deprived of their right to vote, is a widespread practice that has been challenged on many grounds. However, felon disenfranchisement has not yet been properly challenged under the First Amendment. This Article argues that states implicate felons’ First Amendment rights through felon disenfranchisement without citing adequate or compelling rationales to justify this severe intrusion. In fact, at least one rationale, a rationale based on the fear of the way felons might vote, is itself inconsistent with First Amendment principles. Disenfranchising felons based on a fear of the way that …