Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Digital Commons Network

Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

PDF

Constitutional Law

Constitution

Selected Works

Stephen M. Feldman

Institution
Publication Year

Articles 1 - 3 of 3

Full-Text Articles in Entire DC Network

A Plea For Constitutional Balance, Stephen M. Feldman Aug 2016

A Plea For Constitutional Balance, Stephen M. Feldman

Stephen M. Feldman

The fundamentalist approach of the conservative bloc of Justices on the U.S. Supreme Court in regards to corporate spending on political campaigns skews government processes and generates unintended consequences.  This paper discusses the historical approach of the Framers to invigorate the new republican democratic government while protecting individual liberties by separating these into public and private spheres of activity.


Supreme Court Alchemy: Turning Law And Politics Into Mayonnaise, Stephen Feldman Jan 2014

Supreme Court Alchemy: Turning Law And Politics Into Mayonnaise, Stephen Feldman

Stephen M. Feldman

How do law and politics intertwine in Supreme Court adjudication? Traditionally, in law schools and political science departments, scholars refused to mix law and politics. Law professors insisted that legal texts and doctrines controlled Supreme Court decision making, while political scientists maintained that political ideologies dictated the justices' votes. In the late twentieth century, some scholars in both disciplines sought to combine law and politics but still conceived of the two as distinct. They attempted to stir law and politics together, but ended with an oil-and-water type of mix; law and politics settled apart. The best approach, as presented in …


The Interpretation Of Constitutional History, Or Charles Beard Becomes A Fortuneteller (With An Emphasis On Free Expression), Stephen M. Feldman Dec 2013

The Interpretation Of Constitutional History, Or Charles Beard Becomes A Fortuneteller (With An Emphasis On Free Expression), Stephen M. Feldman

Stephen M. Feldman

In "An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States", Charles A. Beard argued that the framers advocated for and defended the Constitution because of their personal economic interest, that the pursuit of common good was not so much a motive as a veneer. The current historical consensus is that Beard's thrust is incorrect. In this essay, I largely agree with this assessment, but his economic approach can add an important element to the discussion of constitutional history. And though his economic depiction does not closely fit the framing of the Constitution, it uncannily fits the Roberts Court's current …