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Unitariness And Independence: Solicitor General Control Over Independent Agency Litigation, Neal Devins
Unitariness And Independence: Solicitor General Control Over Independent Agency Litigation, Neal Devins
Neal E. Devins
With a few exceptions, the Solicitor General controls all aspects of independent agency litigation before the Supreme Court. Solicitor General control of Supreme Court litigation creates a tension between independent agency freedom and the Solicitor General's authority. On the one hand, Solicitor General control provides the United States with a unitary voice before the Supreme Court, and provides the Court with a trustworthy litigator to explicate the government's position. On the other hand, such control may undermine the autonomy of independent agency decision making. In this Article, the author argues for a hybrid model of independent agency litigation in the …
The Indefensible Duty To Defend, Neal Devins, Saikrishna B. Prakash
The Indefensible Duty To Defend, Neal Devins, Saikrishna B. Prakash
Neal E. Devins
Modern Justice Department opinions insist that the executive branch must enforce and defend laws. In the first article to systematically examine Department of Justice refusals to defend, we make four points. First, the duties to enforce and defend lack any sound basis in the Constitution. Hence, while President Obama is right to refuse to defend the Defense of Marriage Act, he is wrong to continue to enforce a law he believes is unconstitutional. Second, rather than being grounded in the Constitution, the duties are better explained by the Department of Justice’s (DOJ) desire to enhance its independence and status. By …
Signing Statements And Divided Government, Neal Devins
Signing Statements And Divided Government, Neal Devins
Neal E. Devins
No abstract provided.
How Successfully Can The States' Item Veto Be Transferred To The President?, Louis Fisher, Neal Devins
How Successfully Can The States' Item Veto Be Transferred To The President?, Louis Fisher, Neal Devins
Neal E. Devins
No abstract provided.
The Article Ii Safeguards Of Federal Jurisdiction, Tara Leigh Grove
The Article Ii Safeguards Of Federal Jurisdiction, Tara Leigh Grove
Tara L. Grove
Jurisdiction stripping has long been treated as a battle between Congress and the federal judiciary. Scholars have thus overlooked the important (and surprising) role that the executive branch has played in these jurisdictional struggles. This Article seeks to fill that void. Drawing on two strands of social science research, the Article argues that the executive branch has a strong incentive to use its constitutional authority over the enactment and enforcement of federal law to oppose jurisdiction-stripping measures. Notably, this structural argument has considerable historical support. The executive branch has repeatedly opposed jurisdiction-stripping proposals in Congress. That has been true even …
Congress's (Limited) Power To Represent Itself In Court, Tara Leigh Grove, Neal Devins
Congress's (Limited) Power To Represent Itself In Court, Tara Leigh Grove, Neal Devins
Tara L. Grove
Scholars and jurists have long assumed that, when the executive branch declines to defend a federal statute, Congress may intervene in federal court to defend the law. When invalidating the Defense of Marriage Act, for example, no Supreme Court Justice challenged the authority of the House of Representatives to defend federal laws in at least some circumstances. At the same time, in recent litigation over the Fast and Furious gun-running case, the Department of Justice asserted that the House could not go to court to enforce a subpoena against the executive. In this Article, we seek to challenge both claims. …
In Search Of The Lost Chord: Reflections On The 1996 Item Veto Act, Neal Devins
In Search Of The Lost Chord: Reflections On The 1996 Item Veto Act, Neal Devins
Neal E. Devins
No abstract provided.
Congress's (Limited) Power To Represent Itself In Court, Tara Leigh Grove, Neal Devins
Congress's (Limited) Power To Represent Itself In Court, Tara Leigh Grove, Neal Devins
Neal E. Devins
Scholars and jurists have long assumed that, when the executive branch declines to defend a federal statute, Congress may intervene in federal court to defend the law. When invalidating the Defense of Marriage Act, for example, no Supreme Court Justice challenged the authority of the House of Representatives to defend federal laws in at least some circumstances. At the same time, in recent litigation over the Fast and Furious gun-running case, the Department of Justice asserted that the House could not go to court to enforce a subpoena against the executive. In this Article, we seek to challenge both claims. …
Congress, Civil Liberties, And The War On Terrorism, Neal Devins
Congress, Civil Liberties, And The War On Terrorism, Neal Devins
Neal E. Devins
In exercising his war-making powers, the President has historically pursued war-related initiatives that implicate civil liberties. Meanwhile, the Congress, with little incentive to resist these initiatives, has played a steadily declining role in warmaking. In this Essay, Professor Devins examines this dynamic, and argues that with Congress largely standing on the sidelines as the President leads the nation in war, it is the American public that has become the principal check on the powers of the President in wartime.
Averting Government By Consent Decree: Constitutional Limits On The Enforcement Of Settlements With The Federal Government, Jeremy A. Rabkin, Neal Devins
Averting Government By Consent Decree: Constitutional Limits On The Enforcement Of Settlements With The Federal Government, Jeremy A. Rabkin, Neal Devins
Neal E. Devins
No abstract provided.