Digital Commons Network^™

The Rational Basis Test And Why It Is So Irrational: An Eighty-Year Retrospective, James M. Mcgoldrick Jr.

San Diego Law Review

The Rational Basis test is one of the most common and yet perhaps the most insignificant United States Supreme Court test in the history of the constitution, yet year in year out clients and lawyers will submit another brief hoping against hope that this time there might be a meaningful outcome. There will not be.

This article attempts to explain why the rational basis test is so irrational in its outcome, why basic interests are disregarded in the name of judicial respect for the legislative process, and how easy it would be for there to be a better outcome. The …

Laying Siege To The Ivory Tower: Resource Allocation In Response To The Heckler's Veto On University Campuses, Macklin W. Thornton

San Diego Law Review

High in the towers of academia, the lofty ideals of free speech are tossed around with a deceptive ease. However, as legal minds grapple with heady legal doctrines, free speech has concrete consequences down at the foot of those towers. At this ivory base, the property line between the university and the community blur. Students and nonstudents assemble and deliver conflicting speech that, at times, foments violence. Molotov cocktails, gun shots, broken windows, disgruntled students. All attempts to trigger the dreaded heckler’s veto—an attempt the government has an obligation to prevent. In addition to the public relations disasters grown from …

The Meaning Of Wrongdoing - A Crime Of Disrespecting The Flag: Grounds For Preserving National Unity, Mohammed Saif-Alden Wattad

San Diego International Law Journal

To conclude on this issue, the rights of others, as individuals and as a whole, are formulated as the social protected interest that criminal law seeks to protect through criminal means, and it is with these rights that criminal law theory should be concerned in the first level of scrutiny. However, in the second level of scrutiny, an additional set of rights are brought into play; these are the rights of the individual, namely the actor, to exercise their constitutional rights e.g., free speech, liberty, free exercise of religion. The second level of scrutiny requires balancing those rights with the …

The Need To Attend To Probabilities—For Purposes Of Self-Defense And Other Preemptive Actions, Larry Alexander

San Diego Law Review

I was not certain I was going to write something for this symposium. After all, I had written a lot on the topic of self-defense, so what was there left to say that I had not said before? I have concluded, however, after reading a new generation of literature on self-defense, that most who write on the topic neglect its perhaps most important aspect, namely, that it is a preemptive action. As a preemptive action, self-defense perforce takes place before the attack to which it is a response occurs. This preemptive aspect of self-defense brings with it a nest of …

The Vindication Of Good Over Evil: “Futile” Self-Defense, Douglas Husak

San Diego Law Review

The burgeoning self-defense literature, like that in most areas of moral and legal philosophy, typically begins with and seeks to rationalize our intuitions. I submit that the intuitive judgment of virtually all respondents, at least initially, is that IV is permitted to exercise her right of self-defense, however futile, and scratch WA. This intuition, I believe, is incredibly powerful and robust; I certainly have it myself. Yet quite a few philosophers and legal theorists contend IV is not permitted to employ futile self-defense against WA. Presumably, they believe IV must passively accept her fate without injuring WA. Why hold this …

Self-Defense And Culpability: Fault Forfeits First, Richard J. Arneson

San Diego Law Review

Under what conditions is it morally permissible to kill someone in order to save your own life—or the life of another who is threatened? There seem to be clear cases. Threatened by an assailant who is trying to kill you for no good reason, you may use lethal force if necessary to save yourself from death or serious injury from the assailant’s attack. Threatened with death in the form of an onrushing runaway truck, you may not save yourself by using a bystander or imposing on a bystander in a way that inflicts severe harm on her. In a justly …

Defense And Desert: When Reasons Don’T Share, Kimberly Kessler Ferzan

San Diego Law Review

Assume Culpable Aggressor threatens Innocent Victim with a knife. Victim is stronger than Culpable Aggressor and is able to defend herself by punching Culpable Aggressor in the face, causing him to stumble back and drop the knife. Not only was this action necessary, but also Victim believed it to be so to save her life.

I take it that this is an uncontroversial case of self-defense. My question is whether this is also a case of punishment. Uwe Steinhoff suggests that it might be. Indeed, he states that “nothing hinders an act from being both punitive and defensive. In fact, …

Steinhoff And Self-Defense, Michael S. Moore

San Diego Law Review

I shall first describe what moral combat would be if it existed, separate it into distinct species, and say why it is so undesirable that one should be brought to acknowledge its existence only reluctantly and as a last resort. I will then detail two ways in which rights to do things—often called “action rights” or “active rights”—such as the right to defend oneself, are integrated into standard deontic logic: (1) Hohfeld’s way and (2) the older but still popular Kantian alternative that Hurd and I recently defended. The first of these is compatible with—indeed, inviting of—moral combat, whereas the …

The Nature Of Self-Defense, Samuel C. Rickless

San Diego Law Review

What is self-defense? Most theorists of self-defense are mainly interested in explaining why and when we are morally justified in defending ourselves from a threat posed by another. The moral questions here are important, not just because self-defense represents an interesting moral conundrum, but because morality, at least in this case, is, or should be, a reliable guide to the law. So theorists of self-defense often start with paradigm cases—the culpable aggressor, the justified aggressor, the innocent aggressor, the innocent threat, and so on—and try to explain moral intuitions about them with the help of moral theory, whether Hohfeldian, utilitarian, …

The Right To Cause Harm As An Alternative To Being Sacrificed For Others: An Exploration Of Agent-Rights With A Special Focus On Intervening Agency, Alec Walen

San Diego Law Review

My strategy for defending the right of non-sacrifice and the connected agent–patient inference is to move through a series of cases, starting with easy cases—clearly permissible acts of non-sacrifice—and moving to more controversial ones. The controversial cases are those in which intervening agency is central to explaining why an agent should have the right of non-sacrifice. My argument will not simply be an attempt to explain intuitions. I take the intuitions on the easy cases to be reliable, but once we move to controversial cases, I think moral intuitions become unreliable. My argument fundamentally trades on two thoughts: (1) there …

Self-Defense, Necessity, And The Duty To Compensate, In Law And Morality, Kenneth W. Simons

San Diego Law Review

What is the proper scope of the right to self-defense in law and morality? How does this right compare to the privilege of necessity? Professor Uwe Steinhoff’s manuscript offers a distinctive and wide-ranging perspective on the controversial questions these privileges raise. This essay engages with a number of his arguments, particularly focusing on legal and moral duties of compensation.

First, this essay examines how Anglo-American tort law would likely address the defender’s liability in a variety of scenarios, including disproportionate, excessive, and unnecessary force; unreasonable and reasonable mistakes; and use of force against innocent aggressors. It next considers whether private …

Culture Wars On Campus: Academic Freedom, The First Amendment, And Partisan Outrage In Polarized Times, Jason M. Shepard, Kathleen B. Culver

San Diego Law Review

After a California community college professor called the election of President Donald Trump an “act of terrorism” in her classroom the week after the vote, a student-recorded viral video sparked a national conservative media firestorm. Critics said the professor should be fired for outrageous liberal bias, while supporters defended her comments as being protected by academic freedom and the First Amendment. The student, meanwhile, was suspended for his unauthorized recording while defenders decried his punishment as evidence of anti-conservative discrimination and harassment. By examining tensions between faculty and student speech rights, the use of technologies to take ideological disagreements viral …

In Defense Of A Little Judiciary: A Textual And Constitutional Foundation For Chevron, Terence J. Mccarrick Jr.

San Diego Law Review

This Article hopes to help fill that “important gap in the administrative law literature.” And it proceeds in three parts. Part II offers a brief history of the Chevron doctrine and its discontents. It traces the doctrine’s origin and scope and ends by articulating the textualist and originalist critique of Chevron described above. Part III grapples with that criticism and offers a textualist and originalist defense of Chevron. Section III.A describes the textual footing for Chevron in the APA and argues that Chevron—if not commanded by the APA—does not upset the role it envisions for courts. Section III.B describes the …

Punitive Preemption And The First Amendment, Rachel Proctor May

San Diego Law Review

In recent years, state legislators have begun passing a new breed of “punitive” preemption laws–those that impose fines, civil and criminal sanctions, and other sanctions on local governments and their officials as a consequence of passing laws or enacting policies that are inconsistent with state laws. This represents a significant change from traditional preemption, under which a local government could enact laws based on its view of preempting state statutes and applicable state constitutional provisions and, if necessary, defend its interpretation in court. When punitive preemption prevents a local lawmaking process from taking place, the state forecloses a unique form …