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“Government By Injunction,” Legal Elites, And The Making Of The Modern Federal Courts, Kristin Collins
“Government By Injunction,” Legal Elites, And The Making Of The Modern Federal Courts, Kristin Collins
Faculty Scholarship
The tendency of legal discourse to obscure the processes by which social and political forces shape the law’s development is well known, but the field of federal courts in American constitutional law may provide a particularly clear example of this phenomenon. According to conventional accounts, Congress’s authority to regulate the lower federal courts’ “jurisdiction”—generally understood to include their power to issue injunctions— has been a durable feature of American constitutional law since the founding. By contrast, the story I tell in this essay is one of change. During the nineteenth century and into the twentieth, many jurists considered the federal …
The Judicial Role In Constraining Presidential Non-Enforcement Discretion: The Virtues Of An Apa Approach, Daniel E. Walters
The Judicial Role In Constraining Presidential Non-Enforcement Discretion: The Virtues Of An Apa Approach, Daniel E. Walters
Faculty Scholarship
Scholars, lawyers, and, indeed, the public at large increasingly worry about what purposive presidential inaction in enforcing statutory programs means for the rule of law and how such discretionary inaction can fit within a constitutional structure that compels Presidents to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed." Yet those who have recognized the problem have been hesitant to assign a role for the court in policing the constitutional limits they articulate, mostly because of the strain on judicial capacity that any formulation of Take Care Clause review would cause. In this Article, I argue that courts still can and …
Agenda-Setting In The Regulatory State: Theory And Evidence, Cary Coglianese, Daniel E. Walters
Agenda-Setting In The Regulatory State: Theory And Evidence, Cary Coglianese, Daniel E. Walters
Faculty Scholarship
Government officials who run administrative agencies must make countless decisions every day about what issues and work to prioritize. These agenda-setting decisions hold enormous implications for the shape of law and public policy, but they have received remarkably little attention by either administrative law scholars or social scientists who study the bureaucracy. Existing research offers few insights about the institutions, norms, and inputs that shape and constrain agency discretion over their agendas or about the strategies that officials employ in choosing to elevate certain issues while putting others on the back burner. In this article, we advance the study of …