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Double Jeopardy And Federal Prosecution After State Jury Acquittal, Michigan Law Review
Double Jeopardy And Federal Prosecution After State Jury Acquittal, Michigan Law Review
Michigan Law Review
This Note argues that the rationale of the Supreme Court's post-conviction cases cannot be extended to cases involving jury acquittal and that federal reprosecution after state jury acquittal violates the double jeopardy clause. One can give meaning to the clause, Part Iexplains, only by reference to its underlying constitutional values.Part II suggests that these values, while possibly compatible with federal prosecution after a state conviction, cannot countenance reprosecution after a jury acquittal. Part III proposes that courts determine whether such reprosecution is appropriate by applying the Blockhurger same offense standard: Two offenses are the same unless each requires proof of …
A Critique Of John Hart Ely's Quest For The Ultimate Constitutional Interpretivism Of Representative Democracy, James E. Fleming
A Critique Of John Hart Ely's Quest For The Ultimate Constitutional Interpretivism Of Representative Democracy, James E. Fleming
Michigan Law Review
A Review of Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review by John Hart Ely
The Straight And Narrow Path, Gerald T. Dunne
The Straight And Narrow Path, Gerald T. Dunne
Michigan Law Review
A Review of Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review by John Hart Ely
A Critique Of John Hart Ely's Quest For The Ultimate Constitutional Interpretivism Of Representative Democracy, James E. Fleming
A Critique Of John Hart Ely's Quest For The Ultimate Constitutional Interpretivism Of Representative Democracy, James E. Fleming
Faculty Scholarship
Contemporary constitutional theory, John Hart Ely argues in Democracy and Distrust, is dominated by a false dichotomy between "clause-bound interpretivism" and "noninterpretivism." Clausebound interpretivists, such as the late Justice Hugo Black, believe that "judges deciding constitutional issues should confine themselves to enforcing norms that are stated or clearly implicit in the written Constitution" (p. 1). Noninterpretivists, such as the Supreme Court that produced the majority opinion in Roe v. Wade,2 contend that "courts should go beyond that set of references and enforce [substantive] norms that cannot be discovered within the four comers of the document" (p. 1). The genius of …