Digital Commons Network^™

The Role Of Fault In § 1983 Municipal Liability, Michael Wells

Scholarly Works

Under Monell v. Department of Social Services, local governments are not vicariously liable for constitutional violations committed by their employees. Those governments, however, are liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations committed by "policymaking" officials. In the face of these two principles, courts have struggled with cases in which an underling commits a constitutional violation and the claim of municipal liability is based on a policymaker's failure to prevent it. The government can be liable in these "indirect-effect" cases for a policymaker's "deliberate indifference" to safeguarding constitutional rights, a standard that demands an even greater showing of culpability than …

Qualified Immunity And Statutory Interpretation: A Response To William Baude, Hillel Y. Levin, Michael Wells

Scholarly Works

In his article, Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful?, Professor Baude argues that the doctrine of qualified immunity under section 1983 is unlawful because the doctrine did not exist at the time section 1983 was enacted. We disagree. Section 1983 is a common law statute. Consequently, its meaning and application was not fixed at the time of original passage. In this article, we explain why.

Although we are sympathetic to Professor Baude’s implicit policy-based critique of the doctrine of qualified immunity, we believe his analysis is flawed. The better and more likely way to improve the doctrine is through the common law …

Scott V. Harris And The Role Of The Jury In Constitutional Litigation, Michael Wells

Scholarly Works

Suits brought under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 to recover damages for excessive force by the police bear some resemblance to common law tort litigation, since the key Fourth Amendment issue is whether the force was 'unreasonable.' In ordinary negligence law the jury typically decides whether an actor has exercised reasonable care, even when there is no dispute as to the facts. In section 1983 litigation the federal courts are badly split on the allocation of decision making between judge and jury, sometimes even within a particular circuit. The Supreme Court recently faced the judge-jury issue in Scott v. Harris, where …

The "Order-Of-Battle" In Constitutional Litigation, Michael Wells

Scholarly Works

This article examines and defends a procedural rule that figures prominently in constitutional tort litigation, has drawn sharp criticism from the federal judiciary, and seems to have lost the support of at least four sitting Supreme Court Justices. In order to recover damages, plaintiffs must not only prove a constitutional violation but also fend off assertions of official immunity. In ruling on motions to dismiss the complaint and motions for summary judgment, a preliminary question is the sequence in which the two issues should be addressed-a problem the Justices call the "order-of-battle." Morse v. Frederick, the "Bong Hits Jesus" case, …

Constitutional Torts, Common Law Torts, And Due Process Of Law, Michael L. Wells

Scholarly Works

Government officers may harm persons in many ways. When an official inflicts a physical injury, causes emotional distress, publishes defamatory statements, or initiates a malicious prosecution, the victim's traditional recourse is a tort suit brought under common law or statutory principles. But an alternative to ordinary tort may also be available. The growth of damage remedies for constitutional violations in the decades following Monroe v. Pape has encouraged litigants to frame their cases as breaches of the Constitution. These litigants may sue for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when the offender is a state employee, or assert the damages …

Punitive Damages For Constitutional Torts, Michael L. Wells

Scholarly Works

Critics complain that punitive damages often serve no good purpose. Whatever the merit of this charge as a general proposition, it is not universally valid across the range of tort suits. This article examines the issues raised by punitive damages for constitutional torts and takes issue with the general failure of commentators on punitive damages to recognize differences between constitutional tort and common law torts. I shall argue that constitutional tort is one area where punitive damage awards are essential to the effective enforcement of our rights. Constitutional tort is a special domain, in which the policy issues that bear …

Constitutional Torts: Combining Diverse Doctrines And Practicality, Thomas A. Eaton, Michael Wells

Scholarly Works

Constitutional Torts is, in part, a response to our sense that the upper level curriculum could be improved by courses that bring together areas of doctrine that are often studied in isolation. We think there is substantial value in bringing together seemingly disparate areas of doctrine that bear on a common real-world problem. Students benefit from learning how to put together concepts from different substantive areas in order to solve problems they will face in practice.

The Past And Future Of Constitutional Torts: From Statutory Interpretation To Common Law Rules, Michael L. Wells

Scholarly Works

The cause of action for damages to redress violations of constitutional rights is now firmly established in our law. As recently as 1960, such constitutional tort suits were rare and attracted little attention from scholars. Today, they are a major part of the work of the federal courts and the academic literature is constantly growing. This change can be partly attributed to the expansion of constitutional rights in the 1960s and 1970s, and partly to the 1961 case of Monroe v. Pape. In Monroe, the Supreme Court revived a long-neglected, ninety-year-old statute, 42 U.S.C. 1983, making it the …

Affirmative Duty And Constitutional Tort, Michael L. Wells, Thomas A. Eaton

Scholarly Works

The Constitution ordinarily places only negative restrictions on government and does not require affirmative acts to assist individuals. The statutory vehicle for most constitutional tort litigation, 42 U.S.C. section 1983, echoes this constitutional principle. It extends liability to "[e]very person who ... [under color of state law] subjects, or causes to be subjected, any ... person" to the deprivation of federal rights, and makes no provision for a duty on governmental defendants to stop others from harming the plaintiff.

For some courts this principle disposes of affirmative duty claims forthwith. A noteworthy example is the recent seventh circuit case Bowers …