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Constitutional Law

Selected Works

Constitutional Law

Michael R Dimino

Articles 1 - 7 of 7

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It's My Party And I'Ll Do What I Want To: Political Parties, Unconstitutional Conditions, And The Freedom Of Association, Michael R. Dimino Dec 2012

It's My Party And I'Ll Do What I Want To: Political Parties, Unconstitutional Conditions, And The Freedom Of Association, Michael R. Dimino

Michael R Dimino

To this point, cases and commentary have portrayed controversies about regulation of political parties as requiring a choice between the autonomy of parties and the power of the government to regulate elections. Supporters of government regulation have seen such regulation as worth the cost of limiting parties' freedom. Opponents have argued that parties' First Amendment rights entitle them not only to run themselves as they see fit but to receive the assistance of the government in doing so.
This Article has suggested a third way. By permitting government to condition benefits on parties' waiver of First Amendment rights, this new …


The Natural And The Familiar In Politics And Law, Michael R. Dimino Dec 2011

The Natural And The Familiar In Politics And Law, Michael R. Dimino

Michael R Dimino

The most direct influence on my style as a teacher was my experience as a law student. In my last semester, I took the course on the Law of Democracy and was forever smitten with the subject. I had already been interested in politics and constitutional law, so it was not surprising that I would enjoy a subject that combined them. But the class itself—the areas of the law that were covered and the way in which they were covered—showed me how
exciting law could be. Here was a subject that was crucial to every substantive area of law because …


The Non-Political Branch (Reviewing Lee Epstein & Jeffrey A. Segal, Advice And Consent: The Politics Of Judicial Appointments (2005)), Michael R. Dimino Dec 2004

The Non-Political Branch (Reviewing Lee Epstein & Jeffrey A. Segal, Advice And Consent: The Politics Of Judicial Appointments (2005)), Michael R. Dimino

Michael R Dimino

The realization that judicial ideology matters to case outcomes may have driven the judicial selection process to become increasingly ideological and partisan, but to some degree it has brought ideology and partisanship to bear on the selection process from the time of the Founding. As the authors note, “Presidents, senators, and
interest groups alike realize that the judges themselves are political.” Judging may in some ways be different from politics, but politicians’ judgments about judging most certainly are not.


The Futile Quest For A System Of Judicial “Merit” Selection, Michael R. Dimino Dec 2003

The Futile Quest For A System Of Judicial “Merit” Selection, Michael R. Dimino

Michael R Dimino

Others have discussed exhaustively the merits and demerits of merit selection, and I do not intend in this essay to debate the“ success” or “failure,” per se, of merit selection since its introduction in Missouri in 1940. Instead, I wish to discuss the effect merit selection has on squelching public debate about the judiciary. Once that effect is demonstrated, I then wish to assess this antidemocratic tendency against the purported goal of merit selection: maintaining some measure of accountability in a selection system nonetheless designed to make judges confident enough in their independence to render decisions according to the law …


Pay No Attention To That Man Behind The Robe: Judicial Elections, The First Amendment, And Judges As Politicians, Michael R. Dimino Dec 2002

Pay No Attention To That Man Behind The Robe: Judicial Elections, The First Amendment, And Judges As Politicians, Michael R. Dimino

Michael R Dimino

The question this Article seeks to answer is whether the First Amendment can maintain a distinction between the two types of races. Specifically, I discuss whether the governmental interests in maintaining an independent,
impartial judiciary and in protecting the appearance of the judiciary as independent and impartial can provide justification for the suppression of speech, where such suppression would be held impermissible in elections for
other offices. I conclude that it cannot. My recommendation, therefore, is to subject restrictions on legislative, executive, and judicial campaign speech to the same exacting scrutiny.


Yes, Virginia (Tech), Our Government Is One Of Limited Powers, Michael R. Dimino Dec 2000

Yes, Virginia (Tech), Our Government Is One Of Limited Powers, Michael R. Dimino

Michael R Dimino

The Framers of the Constitution designed the national government to be one of limited powers. Distrustful of the
accumulation of power in any single body, the Framers provided for the division of powers both within the national, or general, government, and between the national government and the state governments. The separation of powers among the national government's legislative, executive, and judicial branches requires each branch to secure the acquiescence of the other two for the successful implementation of any policy, while the federalism that divides power between the national and the state governments prevents either from obtaining
totalitarian control over …


D.C. Circuit Revives Nondelegation Doctrine…Or Does It?, Michael R. Dimino Dec 1999

D.C. Circuit Revives Nondelegation Doctrine…Or Does It?, Michael R. Dimino

Michael R Dimino

Article I, Section 1 of the Constitution charges Congress with the ability and the duty to make the law. Courts have always understood, however, that Congress has the capacity to delegate some legislative power to other institutional actors, typically those in the executive branch. Such delegations are justified by the "practical understanding that in our increasingly complex society, Congress simply cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate power under broad general directives." This does not mean that Congress enjoys unlimited authority to delegate. Under the judicially crafted "nondelegation doctrine," Congress delegates too much lawmaking power if it fails …