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Table Annexed To Article: Delegate Credentialing At The Continental Congress Sampled At The Opening Of Congress On November 3, 1783, Peter J. Aschenbrenner
Table Annexed To Article: Delegate Credentialing At The Continental Congress Sampled At The Opening Of Congress On November 3, 1783, Peter J. Aschenbrenner
Peter J. Aschenbrenner
The Continental Congress opened its sessions in November; Our Constitutional Logic has selected the first opening after the Treaty of Paris (September 3, 1783) which is detailed at 25 Journals of the Continental Congress 795-799 on November 3 1783. Credentials were required to be no less than a year old or if of older vintage, the delegate must have presented them to the convention less than a year earlier. OCL supplies notes and comments to the passages keyed in at the table annexed hereto.
Delegate Credentialing At The Continental Congress Sampled At The Opening Of Congress On November 3, 1783, Peter J. Aschenbrenner
Delegate Credentialing At The Continental Congress Sampled At The Opening Of Congress On November 3, 1783, Peter J. Aschenbrenner
Peter J. Aschenbrenner
The Continental Congress opened its sessions in November; Our Constitutional Logic has selected the first opening after the Treaty of Paris (September 3, 1783) which is detailed at 25 Journals of the Continental Congress 795-799 on November 3 1783. Credentials were required to be no less than a year old or if of older vintage, the delegate must have presented them to the convention less than a year earlier. OCL supplies notes and comments to the passages keyed in at the table annexed hereto.
The Countermajoritarian Difficulty: From Courts To Congress To Constitutional Order, Mark A. Graber
The Countermajoritarian Difficulty: From Courts To Congress To Constitutional Order, Mark A. Graber
Mark Graber
This review documents how scholarly concern with democratic deficits in American constitutionalism has shifted from the courts to electoral institutions. Prominent political scientists are increasingly rejecting the countermajoritarian difficulty as the proper framework for studying and evaluating judicial power. Political scientists, who study Congress and the presidency, however, have recently emphasized countermajoritarian difficulties with electoral institutions. Realistic normative appraisals of American political institutions, this emerging literature on constitutional politics in the United States maintains, should begin by postulating a set of democratic and constitutional goods, determine the extent to which American institutions as a whole are delivering those goods, and …