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The Law: Defending Congress’S Interests In Court: How Lawmakers And The President Bargain Over Department Of Justice Representation, Neal Devins
Neal E. Devins
In understanding the willingness of government lawyers to defend the constitutionality of federal statutes, this article will explain why presidents rarely make use of their powers under the Constitution (allowing the president to refuse to defend laws he finds unconstitutional) and under federal law (placing the control of most government litigation with the attorney general). Attention will be paid both to how Department of Justice lawyers enhance their power by defending federal statutes and to how Congress, if need be, can pressure the department to bow to lawmaker preferences. In consequence, when the president refuses to defend a statute, courts …
Where's The Politics?: Introduction To Williams, Eastland, Days, And Rabkin, Neal Devins
Where's The Politics?: Introduction To Williams, Eastland, Days, And Rabkin, Neal Devins
Neal E. Devins
No abstract provided.
Tom Delay: Popular Constitutionalist?, Neal Devins
Tom Delay: Popular Constitutionalist?, Neal Devins
Neal E. Devins
No abstract provided.
The Interactive Constitution: An Essay On Clothing Emperors And Searching For Constitutional Truth, Neal Devins
The Interactive Constitution: An Essay On Clothing Emperors And Searching For Constitutional Truth, Neal Devins
Neal E. Devins
No abstract provided.
The Last Word Debate: How Social And Political Forces Shape Constitutional Values, Neal Devins
The Last Word Debate: How Social And Political Forces Shape Constitutional Values, Neal Devins
Neal E. Devins
No abstract provided.
The Indefensible Duty To Defend, Neal Devins, Saikrishna B. Prakash
The Indefensible Duty To Defend, Neal Devins, Saikrishna B. Prakash
Neal E. Devins
Modern Justice Department opinions insist that the executive branch must enforce and defend laws. In the first article to systematically examine Department of Justice refusals to defend, we make four points. First, the duties to enforce and defend lack any sound basis in the Constitution. Hence, while President Obama is right to refuse to defend the Defense of Marriage Act, he is wrong to continue to enforce a law he believes is unconstitutional. Second, rather than being grounded in the Constitution, the duties are better explained by the Department of Justice’s (DOJ) desire to enhance its independence and status. By …
The Constitution Between Friends, Neal Devins
The Academic Expert Before Congress: Observations And Lessons From Bill Van Alstyne's Testimony, Neal Devins
The Academic Expert Before Congress: Observations And Lessons From Bill Van Alstyne's Testimony, Neal Devins
Neal E. Devins
No abstract provided.
Same-Sex Marriage And The New Judicial Federalism: Why State Courts Should Not Consider Out-Of-State Backlash, Neal Devins
Same-Sex Marriage And The New Judicial Federalism: Why State Courts Should Not Consider Out-Of-State Backlash, Neal Devins
Neal E. Devins
No abstract provided.
How Constitutional Law Casebooks Perpetuate The Myth Of Judicial Supremacy, Neal Devins
How Constitutional Law Casebooks Perpetuate The Myth Of Judicial Supremacy, Neal Devins
Neal E. Devins
No abstract provided.
Congress's (Limited) Power To Represent Itself In Court, Tara Leigh Grove, Neal Devins
Congress's (Limited) Power To Represent Itself In Court, Tara Leigh Grove, Neal Devins
Neal E. Devins
Scholars and jurists have long assumed that, when the executive branch declines to defend a federal statute, Congress may intervene in federal court to defend the law. When invalidating the Defense of Marriage Act, for example, no Supreme Court Justice challenged the authority of the House of Representatives to defend federal laws in at least some circumstances. At the same time, in recent litigation over the Fast and Furious gun-running case, the Department of Justice asserted that the House could not go to court to enforce a subpoena against the executive. In this Article, we seek to challenge both claims. …
Congress, The Court, And The Constitution: Hearing Before The Subcommittee On The Constitution Of The Committee On The Judiciary, House Of Representatives, One Hundred Fifth Congress, Second Session, Charles T. Canady, Robert C. Scott, Louis Fisher, David P. Currie, Neal Devins, Neil Kinkopf, Nadine Strossen, Matthew J. Franck, Robert L. Clinton, Henry J. Hyde, Melvin L. Watt
Congress, The Court, And The Constitution: Hearing Before The Subcommittee On The Constitution Of The Committee On The Judiciary, House Of Representatives, One Hundred Fifth Congress, Second Session, Charles T. Canady, Robert C. Scott, Louis Fisher, David P. Currie, Neal Devins, Neil Kinkopf, Nadine Strossen, Matthew J. Franck, Robert L. Clinton, Henry J. Hyde, Melvin L. Watt
Neal E. Devins
No abstract provided.
Better Lucky Than Good, Neal Devins
Averting Government By Consent Decree: Constitutional Limits On The Enforcement Of Settlements With The Federal Government, Jeremy A. Rabkin, Neal Devins
Averting Government By Consent Decree: Constitutional Limits On The Enforcement Of Settlements With The Federal Government, Jeremy A. Rabkin, Neal Devins
Neal E. Devins
No abstract provided.
Can We Make The Constitution More Democratic?, Ilya Somin, Neal Devins
Can We Make The Constitution More Democratic?, Ilya Somin, Neal Devins
Neal E. Devins
No abstract provided.