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Not A King: President Trump And The Case For Presidential Subpoena Reform, Robert J. Denault Mar 2021

Not A King: President Trump And The Case For Presidential Subpoena Reform, Robert J. Denault

Duke Journal of Constitutional Law & Public Policy Sidebar

In Trump v. Vance and Trump v. Mazars, the Supreme Court heard two expansive claims of presidential immunity from grand jury and Congressional subpoenas for the personal papers of the president. In both cases, the Court rejected the President’s claims. Despite winning both cases, the grand jury and Congress did not receive evidence relevant to potential misconduct by the President until after he left office—a remarkable feat for a President who did not win a single case or appeal in his effort to block either subpoena.

This Note argues for significant reforms in response to President Trump’s unprecedented success …


Litigating War: The Justiciability Of Executive War Power, Chris Smith May 2019

Litigating War: The Justiciability Of Executive War Power, Chris Smith

Duke Journal of Constitutional Law & Public Policy Sidebar

Courts frequently dismiss claims against the Executive’s use of the war power as being non-justiciable political questions. This lack of a judicial check has created a situation in which meaningful checks and balances on the war power are found only in the Executive Branch itself. But the Constitution places the bulk of war powers in the hands of Congress. Executive usurpation of Congress’s constitutional prerogative to initiate hostilities has significantly weakened the separation of powers. In the aftermath of the Vietnam War, Congress sought to reassert its constitutional authority over war-making decisions by passing the War Powers Resolution. The Resolution …


Presidential Control Over International Law, Curtis A. Bradley, Jack L. Goldsmith Jan 2018

Presidential Control Over International Law, Curtis A. Bradley, Jack L. Goldsmith

Faculty Scholarship

Presidents have come to dominate the making, interpretation, and termination of international law for the United States. Often without specific congressional concurrence, and sometimes even when it is likely that Congress would disagree, the President has developed the authority to:

(a) make a vast array of international obligations for the United States, through both written agreements and the development of customary international law;

(b) make increasingly consequential political commitments for the United States on practically any topic;

(c) interpret these obligations and commitments; and

(d) terminate or withdraw from these obligations and commitments.

While others have examined pieces of this …


Whose Lands? Which Public?: The Shape Of Public-Lands Law And Trump's National Monument Proclamations, Jedediah Britton-Purdy Jan 2018

Whose Lands? Which Public?: The Shape Of Public-Lands Law And Trump's National Monument Proclamations, Jedediah Britton-Purdy

Faculty Scholarship

President Trump issued a proclamation in December 2017 purporting to remove two million acres in southern Utah from national monument status, radically shrinking the Grand-Staircase Escalante National Monument and splitting the Bears Ears National Monument into two residual protected areas. Whether the President has the power to revise or revoke existing monuments under the Antiquities Act, which creates the national monument system, is a new question of law for a 112-year-old statute that has been used by Presidents from Theodore Roosevelt to Barack Obama to protect roughly fifteen million acres of federal land and hundreds of millions of marine acres. …


Presidential War Powers As A Two-Level Dynamic: International Law, Domestic Law, And Practice-Based Legal Change, Curtis A. Bradley, Jean Galbraith Jan 2016

Presidential War Powers As A Two-Level Dynamic: International Law, Domestic Law, And Practice-Based Legal Change, Curtis A. Bradley, Jean Galbraith

Faculty Scholarship

There is a rich literature on the circumstances under which the United Nations Charter or specific Security Council resolutions authorize nations to use force abroad, and there is a rich literature on the circumstances under which the U.S. Constitution and statutory law allows the President to use force abroad. These are largely separate areas of scholarship, addressing what are generally perceived to be two distinct levels of legal doctrine. This Article, by contrast, considers these two levels of doctrine together as they relate to the United States. In doing so, it makes three main contributions. First, it demonstrates striking parallels …


Agora: Reflections On Zivotofsky V. Kerry : Historical Gloss, The Recognition Power, And Judicial Review, Curtis A. Bradley Jan 2015

Agora: Reflections On Zivotofsky V. Kerry : Historical Gloss, The Recognition Power, And Judicial Review, Curtis A. Bradley

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.


Introduction To Agora: Reflections On Zivotofsky V. Kerry, Curtis A. Bradley, Carlos M. Vazquez Jan 2015

Introduction To Agora: Reflections On Zivotofsky V. Kerry, Curtis A. Bradley, Carlos M. Vazquez

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.


The National Security State: The End Of Separation Of Powers, Michael E. Tigar Jan 2014

The National Security State: The End Of Separation Of Powers, Michael E. Tigar

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.


Presidential Power, Historical Practice, And Legal Constraint, Curtis A. Bradley, Trevor W. Morrison Jan 2013

Presidential Power, Historical Practice, And Legal Constraint, Curtis A. Bradley, Trevor W. Morrison

Faculty Scholarship

The scope of the President’s legal authority is determined in part by historical practice. This Essay aims to better understand how such practice-based law might operate as a constraint on the presidency. Some scholars have suggested that presidential authority has become “unbounded” by law, and is now governed only or primarily by politics. At the same time, there has been growing skepticism about the ability of the familiar political checks on presidential power to work in any systematic or reliable fashion. Skepticism about law’s potential to constrain in this context is heightened by the customary nature of much of what …


Constitutional Backdrops, Stephen E. Sachs Jan 2012

Constitutional Backdrops, Stephen E. Sachs

Faculty Scholarship

The Constitution is often said to leave important questions unanswered. These include, for example, the existence of a congressional contempt power or an executive removal power, the role of stare decisis, and the scope of state sovereign immunity. Bereft of clear text, many scholars have sought answers to such questions in Founding-era history. But why should the historical answers be valid today, if they were never codified in the Constitution's text?

This Article describes a category of legal rules that weren't adopted in the text, expressly or implicitly, but which nonetheless have continuing legal force under the written Constitution. These …


Clear Statement Rules And Executive War Powers, Curtis A. Bradley Jan 2010

Clear Statement Rules And Executive War Powers, Curtis A. Bradley

Faculty Scholarship

This article is based on a presentation at the Annual Federalist Society National Student Symposium on Law and Public Policy that explored the theme of separation of powers in American constitutionalism.

The scope of the President’s independent war powers is notoriously unclear, and courts are understandably reluctant to issue constitutional rulings that might deprive the federal government as a whole of the flexibility needed to respond to crises. As a result, courts often look for signs that Congress has either supported or opposed the President’s actions and rest their decisions on statutory grounds. There have been both liberal and conservative …


The Executive And The Avoidance Canon, H. Jefferson Powell Jan 2006

The Executive And The Avoidance Canon, H. Jefferson Powell

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.


Presidential Signing Statements And Executive Power, Curtis A. Bradley, Eric A. Posner Jan 2006

Presidential Signing Statements And Executive Power, Curtis A. Bradley, Eric A. Posner

Faculty Scholarship

A recent debate about the Bush administration's use of presidential signing statements has raised questions about their function, legality, and value. We argue that presidential signing statements are legal and that they provide a useful way for the president to disclose his views about the meaning and constitutionality of legislation. In addition, basic tenets of positive political theory suggest that signing statements do not undermine the separation of powers or the legislative process and that, under certain circumstances, they can provide relevant evidence of statutory meaning. Although President Bush has raised many more constitutional challenges within his signing statements than …


Military Commissions And Terrorist Enemy Combatants, Curtis A. Bradley Jan 2006

Military Commissions And Terrorist Enemy Combatants, Curtis A. Bradley

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.


Parsing The Commander In Chief Power: Three Distinctions, Curtis A. Bradley Jan 2006

Parsing The Commander In Chief Power: Three Distinctions, Curtis A. Bradley

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.


Congressional Authorization And The War On Terrorism, Curtis A. Bradley, Jack L. Goldsmith Jan 2005

Congressional Authorization And The War On Terrorism, Curtis A. Bradley, Jack L. Goldsmith

Faculty Scholarship

This Article presents a framework for interpreting Congress's September 18, 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), the central statutory enactment related to the war on terrorism. Although both constitutional theory and constitutional practice suggest that the validity of presidential wartime actions depends to a significant degree on their relationship to congressional authorization, the meaning and implications of the AUMF have received little attention in the academic debates over the war on terrorism. The framework presented in this Article builds on the analysis in the Supreme Court's plurality opinion in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, which devoted significant attention to the …


Principles To Guide The Office Of Legal Counsel, Walter E. Dellinger Iii, Christopher H. Schroeder, Dawn Johnsen, Randolph Moss, Joseph Guerra, Beth Nolan, Todd Peterson, Cornelia Pillar Jan 2004

Principles To Guide The Office Of Legal Counsel, Walter E. Dellinger Iii, Christopher H. Schroeder, Dawn Johnsen, Randolph Moss, Joseph Guerra, Beth Nolan, Todd Peterson, Cornelia Pillar

Faculty Scholarship

Former members of Office of Legal Counsel ("OLC") in the Department of Justice offer guidance for their successors. Among the document's recommendations are suggestions that the OLC "provide an accurate and honest appraisal of applicable law, even if that advice will constrain the administration’s pursuit of desired policies;" and "publicly disclose its written legal opinions in a timely manner, absent strong reasons for delay or nondisclosure."


A Political And Constitutional Review Of United States V. Nixon, William W. Van Alstyne Jan 1974

A Political And Constitutional Review Of United States V. Nixon, William W. Van Alstyne

Faculty Scholarship

This comparison of United States v. Nixon and the Pentagon Papers case finds the greatest similarity and significance shared by the two cases was the anti-climactic nature of their conclusions. While both cases concerned constitutional questions of the highest order, centered around the scope of the executive power, both cases were drawn on such narrow grounds that there was hardly any effect on constitutional law doctrine.


President Nixon: Toughing It Out With The Law, William W. Van Alstyne Jan 1973

President Nixon: Toughing It Out With The Law, William W. Van Alstyne

Faculty Scholarship

This paper examines President Nixon's handling of the Watergate scandal, arguing that Nixon's stance of "toughing it out with the law" was a common ploy used during his administration to extend the breadth of the issue in question. This expansion deflected attention away from the issue of the Constitutional limits on a president's power and was used to justify a broad spectrum of powers Nixon exercised during his presidency.