Digital Commons Network^™

Astroturf Campaigns: Transparency In Telecom Merger Review, Victoria Peng

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

Large telecommunications companies looking to merge spend millions of dollars in their lobbying efforts to clear regulatory hurdles and obtain approval for their proposed mergers. Corporations such as AT&T, Comcast, and Time Warner use public participation processes as vehicles to influence regulatory decision-making. In the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) merger review context, the notice- and-comment process and public hearings have become fertile breeding grounds for hidden corporate influence. Corporations spend millions on corporate social responsibility programs and call upon nonprofit organizations that receive their largesse to represent their corporate interests as grassroots interests when the FCC seeks public comment. This …

Technology Convergence And Federalism: Who Should Decide The Future Of Telecommunications Regulation?, Daniel A. Lyons

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

This Article critically examines the division of regulatory jurisdiction over telecommunications issues between the federal government and the states. Currently, the line between federal and state jurisdiction varies depending on the service at issue. This compartmentalization might have made sense fifteen years ago, but the advent of technology convergence has largely rendered this model obsolete. Yesterday's telephone and cable companies now compete head-to-head to offer consumers the vaunted "triple play" of voice, video, and internet services. But these telecommunications companies are finding it increasingly difficult to fit new operations into arcane, rigid regulatory compartments. Moreover, services that consumers view as …

Out Of Thin Air: Using First Amendment Public Forum Analysis To Redeem American Broadcasting Regulation, Anthony E. Varona

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

American television and radio broadcasters are uniquely privileged among Federal Communications Commission (FCC) licensees. Exalted as public trustees by the 1934 Communications Act, broadcasters pay virtually nothing for the use of their channels of public radiofrequency spectrum, unlike many other FCC licensees who have paid billions of dollars for similar digital spectrum. Congress envisioned a social contract of sorts between broadcast licensees and the communities they served. In exchange for their free licenses, broadcast stations were charged with providing a platform for a "free marketplace of ideas" that would cultivate a democratically engaged and enlightened citizenry through the broadcasting of …

Life After Adarand: What Happened To The Metro Broadcasting Diversity Rationale For Affirmative Action In Telecommunications Ownership?, Leonard M. Baynes

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

The United States Supreme Court severely restricted affirmative action policies in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena. In this opinion, a majority of the Court held that all state or federally mandated affirmative action programs are to be analyzed under strict scrutiny. This test requires affirmative action programs to meet a compelling governmental interest and be narrowly tailored.

Adarand raised issues concerning the validity of the Federal Communications Commission's affirmative action ownership policies. Previously, the Court in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC found the FCC minority ownership policies constitutional under a lower (intermediate) standard of review. In Adarand, the Court …

Reforming Fcc Regulation Of Dominant Telephone Carriers: Putting Some Teeth Into The Test For Predation, Thomas K. Gump

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

This Note examines the ineffective protections against predatory pricing by AT&T contained in the price cap scheme. Part I outlines price cap regulation and explains how the FCC hopes that a test based on the average variable cost standard will detect predatory pricing. Part II argues that the FCC erred in adopting an average variable cost standard as the test for telecommunications predation because that standard ignores the high fixed costs common to all firms in the industry. Part II demonstrates that AT&T could engage in predatory pricing despite the protections contained in the regulatory scheme. Part II then examines …

Regulation Of Indecency In Political Broadcasting, Jonathan Golomb

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

The article considers both the constitutional and statutory aspects of the regulation of indecency in political broadcasting. The discussion is limited to considering "indecency," a term excluding obscenity or incitement to violence, because the government's power to regulate these types of speech is well established. Indecent speech would be protected if used in the print media, since it does not fall within the established First Amendment exceptions. The basic constitutional question, therefore, is whether the broadcast media are inherently different from the print media, so as to justify different treatment of indecent political speech. This article will contend that they …

Political Broadcasting After The Aspen Ruling: Legislative Reform Of Section 315(A) Of The Communications Act Of 1934, Stuart N. Brotman

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

The FCC's new interpretation of section 315(a) in the Aspen ruling greatly reduced its inhibitory effect on broadcasters. The ruling, however, has created further interpretive problems regarding the broadcast debate format, and has not completely resolved the more general problem of giving the electorate greater and more direct exposure to candidates during campaigns through programming that forces candidates to confront each other on the major issues. This article will discuss the. background of section 315(a), then explain each of its exemptions. Finally, it will propose possible reforms in the area of political broadcasting in light of the Aspen ruling.