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When The Emperor Has No Clothes Iii: Personnel Policies And Conflicts Of Interest In Prosecutors’ Offices, Carrie Leonetti Feb 2012

When The Emperor Has No Clothes Iii: Personnel Policies And Conflicts Of Interest In Prosecutors’ Offices, Carrie Leonetti

Carrie Leonetti

This Article examines and evaluates an alternate cause of overcharging, one that has not received much attention from courts or in the scholarly literature: the extent to which internal personnel policies in prosecutors’ offices create incentives to overcharge. The number and seriousness of convictions and the amount of punishment are the basic standards by which the success of prosecutors is measured. In order to curb overcharging and other forms of prosecutorial misconduct, courts should disqualify prosecutors whose offices explicitly or implicitly determine their job status, compensation, or advancement on the basis of their conviction or sentencing record on the ground …


When The Emperor Has No Clothes Iii: Personnel Policies And Conflicts Of Interest In Prosecutors’ Offices, Carrie Leonetti Feb 2012

When The Emperor Has No Clothes Iii: Personnel Policies And Conflicts Of Interest In Prosecutors’ Offices, Carrie Leonetti

Carrie Leonetti

This Article examines and evaluates an alternate cause of overcharging, one that has not received much attention from courts or in the scholarly literature: the extent to which internal personnel policies in prosecutors’ offices create incentives to overcharge. The number and seriousness of convictions and the amount of punishment are the basic standards by which the success of prosecutors is measured. In order to curb overcharging and other forms of prosecutorial misconduct, courts should disqualify prosecutors whose offices explicitly or implicitly determine their job status, compensation, or advancement on the basis of their conviction or sentencing record on the ground …


When The Emperor Has No Clothes Iii: Personnel Policies And Conflicts Of Interest In Prosecutors’ Offices, Carrie Leonetti Feb 2012

When The Emperor Has No Clothes Iii: Personnel Policies And Conflicts Of Interest In Prosecutors’ Offices, Carrie Leonetti

Carrie Leonetti

This Article examines and evaluates an alternate cause of overcharging, one that has not received much attention from courts or in the scholarly literature: the extent to which internal personnel policies in prosecutors’ offices create incentives to overcharge. The number and seriousness of convictions and the amount of punishment are the basic standards by which the success of prosecutors is measured. In order to curb overcharging and other forms of prosecutorial misconduct, courts should disqualify prosecutors whose offices explicitly or implicitly determine their job status, compensation, or advancement on the basis of their conviction or sentencing record on the ground …


When The Emperor Has No Clothes Iii: Personnel Policies And Conflicts Of Interest In Prosecutors’ Offices, Carrie Leonetti Feb 2012

When The Emperor Has No Clothes Iii: Personnel Policies And Conflicts Of Interest In Prosecutors’ Offices, Carrie Leonetti

Carrie Leonetti

This Article examines and evaluates an alternate cause of overcharging, one that has not received much attention from courts or in the scholarly literature: the extent to which internal personnel policies in prosecutors’ offices create incentives to overcharge. The number and seriousness of convictions and the amount of punishment are the basic standards by which the success of prosecutors is measured. In order to curb overcharging and other forms of prosecutorial misconduct, courts should disqualify prosecutors whose offices explicitly or implicitly determine their job status, compensation, or advancement on the basis of their conviction or sentencing record on the ground …


When The Emperor Has No Clothes Iii: Personnel Policies And Conflicts Of Interest In American Prosecutors’ Offices, Carrie Leonetti Feb 2012

When The Emperor Has No Clothes Iii: Personnel Policies And Conflicts Of Interest In American Prosecutors’ Offices, Carrie Leonetti

Carrie Leonetti

This Article examines and evaluates an alternate cause of overcharging in the United States, one that has not received much attention from courts or in the scholarly comparative criminal-procedure literature: the extent to which internal personnel policies in American prosecutors’ offices create incentives to overcharge that do not exist in their counterparts overseas. The number and seriousness of convictions and the amount of punishment are the basic standards by which the success of American prosecutors is measured. In order to curb overcharging and other forms of prosecutorial misconduct in the United States, courts should disqualify prosecutors whose offices explicitly or …


When The Emperor Has No Clothes Iii: Personnel Policies And Conflicts Of Interest In American Prosecutors’ Offices, Carrie Leonetti Feb 2012

When The Emperor Has No Clothes Iii: Personnel Policies And Conflicts Of Interest In American Prosecutors’ Offices, Carrie Leonetti

Carrie Leonetti

This Article examines and evaluates an alternate cause of overcharging in the United States, one that has not received much attention from courts or in the scholarly comparative criminal-procedure literature: the extent to which internal personnel policies in American prosecutors’ offices create incentives to overcharge that do not exist in their counterparts overseas. The number and seriousness of convictions and the amount of punishment are the basic standards by which the success of American prosecutors is measured. In order to curb overcharging and other forms of prosecutorial misconduct in the United States, courts should disqualify prosecutors whose offices explicitly or …


When The Emperor Has No Clothes Iii: Personnel Policies And Conflicts Of Interest In Prosecutors’ Offices, Carrie Leonetti Feb 2012

When The Emperor Has No Clothes Iii: Personnel Policies And Conflicts Of Interest In Prosecutors’ Offices, Carrie Leonetti

Carrie Leonetti

This Article examines and evaluates an alternate cause of overcharging, one that has not received much attention from courts or in the scholarly literature: the extent to which internal personnel policies in prosecutors’ offices create incentives to overcharge. The number and seriousness of convictions and the amount of punishment are the basic standards by which the success of prosecutors is measured. In order to curb overcharging and other forms of prosecutorial misconduct, courts should disqualify prosecutors whose offices explicitly or implicitly determine their job status, compensation, or advancement on the basis of their conviction or sentencing record on the ground …


When The Emperor Has No Clothes Iii: Personnel Policies And Conflicts Of Interest In Prosecutors’ Offices, Carrie Leonetti Feb 2012

When The Emperor Has No Clothes Iii: Personnel Policies And Conflicts Of Interest In Prosecutors’ Offices, Carrie Leonetti

Carrie Leonetti

This Article examines and evaluates an alternate cause of overcharging in the United States, one that has not received much attention from courts or in the scholarly comparative criminal-procedure literature: the extent to which internal personnel policies in American prosecutors’ offices create incentives to overcharge that do not exist in their counterparts overseas. The number and seriousness of convictions and the amount of punishment are the basic standards by which the success of American prosecutors is measured. In order to curb overcharging and other forms of prosecutorial misconduct in the United States, courts should disqualify prosecutors whose offices explicitly or …


When The Emperor Has No Clothes Iii: Personnel Policies And Conflicts Of Interest In Prosecutors’ Offices, Carrie Leonetti Feb 2012

When The Emperor Has No Clothes Iii: Personnel Policies And Conflicts Of Interest In Prosecutors’ Offices, Carrie Leonetti

Carrie Leonetti

This Article examines and evaluates an alternate cause of overcharging, one that has not received much attention from courts or in the scholarly literature: the extent to which internal personnel policies in prosecutors’ offices create incentives to overcharge. The number and seriousness of convictions and the amount of punishment are the basic standards by which the success of prosecutors is measured. In order to curb overcharging and other forms of prosecutorial misconduct, courts should disqualify prosecutors whose offices explicitly or implicitly determine their job status, compensation, or advancement on the basis of their conviction or sentencing record on the ground …


When The Emperor Has No Clothes Iii: Personnel Policies And Conflicts Of Interest In Prosecutors’ Offices, Carrie Leonetti Feb 2012

When The Emperor Has No Clothes Iii: Personnel Policies And Conflicts Of Interest In Prosecutors’ Offices, Carrie Leonetti

Carrie Leonetti

This Article examines and evaluates an alternate cause of overcharging, one that has not received much attention from courts or in the scholarly literature: the extent to which internal personnel policies in prosecutors’ offices create incentives to overcharge. The number and seriousness of convictions and the amount of punishment are the basic standards by which the success of prosecutors is measured. In order to curb overcharging and other forms of prosecutorial misconduct, courts should disqualify prosecutors whose offices explicitly or implicitly determine their job status, compensation, or advancement on the basis of their conviction or sentencing record on the ground …


When The Emperor Has No Clothes Iii: Personnel Policies And Conflicts Of Interest In Prosecutors’ Offices, Carrie Leonetti Feb 2012

When The Emperor Has No Clothes Iii: Personnel Policies And Conflicts Of Interest In Prosecutors’ Offices, Carrie Leonetti

Carrie Leonetti

This Article examines and evaluates an alternate cause of overcharging, one that has not received much attention from courts or in the scholarly literature: the extent to which internal personnel policies in prosecutors’ offices create incentives to overcharge. The number and seriousness of convictions and the amount of punishment are the basic standards by which the success of prosecutors is measured. In order to curb overcharging and other forms of prosecutorial misconduct, courts should disqualify prosecutors whose offices explicitly or implicitly determine their job status, compensation, or advancement on the basis of their conviction or sentencing record on the ground …


When The Emperor Has No Clothes Iii: Personnel Policies And Conflicts Of Interest In Prosecutors’ Offices, Carrie Leonetti Feb 2012

When The Emperor Has No Clothes Iii: Personnel Policies And Conflicts Of Interest In Prosecutors’ Offices, Carrie Leonetti

Carrie Leonetti

This Article examines and evaluates an alternate cause of overcharging, one that has not received much attention from courts or in the scholarly literature: the extent to which internal personnel policies in prosecutors’ offices create incentives to overcharge. The number and seriousness of convictions and the amount of punishment are the basic standards by which the success of prosecutors is measured. In order to curb overcharging and other forms of prosecutorial misconduct, courts should disqualify prosecutors whose offices explicitly or implicitly determine their job status, compensation, or advancement on the basis of their conviction or sentencing record on the ground …


When The Emperor Has No Clothes Iii: Personnel Policies And Conflicts Of Interest In Prosecutors’ Offices, Carrie Leonetti Feb 2012

When The Emperor Has No Clothes Iii: Personnel Policies And Conflicts Of Interest In Prosecutors’ Offices, Carrie Leonetti

Carrie Leonetti

This Article examines and evaluates an alternate cause of overcharging, one that has not received much attention from courts or in the scholarly literature: the extent to which internal personnel policies in prosecutors’ offices create incentives to overcharge. The number and seriousness of convictions and the amount of punishment are the basic standards by which the success of prosecutors is measured. In order to curb overcharging and other forms of prosecutorial misconduct, courts should disqualify prosecutors whose offices explicitly or implicitly determine their job status, compensation, or advancement on the basis of their conviction or sentencing record on the ground …


When The Emperor Has No Clothes Iii: Personnel Policies And Conflicts Of Interest In Prosecutors’ Offices, Carrie Leonetti Feb 2012

When The Emperor Has No Clothes Iii: Personnel Policies And Conflicts Of Interest In Prosecutors’ Offices, Carrie Leonetti

Carrie Leonetti

This Article examines and evaluates an alternate cause of overcharging, one that has not received much attention from courts or in the scholarly literature: the extent to which internal personnel policies in prosecutors’ offices create incentives to overcharge. The number and seriousness of convictions and the amount of punishment are the basic standards by which the success of prosecutors is measured. In order to curb overcharging and other forms of prosecutorial misconduct, courts should disqualify prosecutors whose offices explicitly or implicitly determine their job status, compensation, or advancement on the basis of their conviction or sentencing record on the ground …


When The Emperor Has No Clothes Iii: Personnel Policies And Conflicts Of Interest In Prosecutors’ Offices, Carrie Leonetti Feb 2012

When The Emperor Has No Clothes Iii: Personnel Policies And Conflicts Of Interest In Prosecutors’ Offices, Carrie Leonetti

Carrie Leonetti

This Article examines and evaluates an alternate cause of overcharging, one that has not received much attention from courts or in the scholarly literature: the extent to which internal personnel policies in prosecutors’ offices create incentives to overcharge. The number and seriousness of convictions and the amount of punishment are the basic standards by which the success of prosecutors is measured. In order to curb overcharging and other forms of prosecutorial misconduct, courts should disqualify prosecutors whose offices explicitly or implicitly determine their job status, compensation, or advancement on the basis of their conviction or sentencing record on the ground …


When The Emperor Has No Clothes Iii: Personnel Policies And Conflicts Of Interest In Prosecutors’ Offices, Carrie Leonetti Feb 2012

When The Emperor Has No Clothes Iii: Personnel Policies And Conflicts Of Interest In Prosecutors’ Offices, Carrie Leonetti

Carrie Leonetti

This Article examines and evaluates an alternate cause of overcharging, one that has not received much attention from courts or in the scholarly literature: the extent to which internal personnel policies in prosecutors’ offices create incentives to overcharge. The number and seriousness of convictions and the amount of punishment are the basic standards by which the success of prosecutors is measured. In order to curb overcharging and other forms of prosecutorial misconduct, courts should disqualify prosecutors whose offices explicitly or implicitly determine their job status, compensation, or advancement on the basis of their conviction or sentencing record on the ground …


Funding Gideon's Promise By Viewing Excessive Caseloads As Conflicts Of Interests, Heidi R. Anderson Aug 2011

Funding Gideon's Promise By Viewing Excessive Caseloads As Conflicts Of Interests, Heidi R. Anderson

Heidi R Anderson

Some states recently have attempted to legislate around a defendant’s constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel via a novel two-step method. Step one is to allocate insufficient funds for public defense, which results in excessive caseloads for public defenders. Sadly, that step is nothing new. Step two—the one that has slipped by without sufficient notice or criticism—is to bar a public defender from withdrawing from representation based on his excessive caseload. Ultimately, this statutory two-step further entrenches the systematic deprivation of defendants’ Sixth Amendment rights to effective assistance.

In this article, I urge courts to “constitutionalize” the excessive caseload …