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Articles 1 - 18 of 18
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When The Emperor Has No Clothes Iii: Personnel Policies And Conflicts Of Interest In Prosecutors’ Offices, Carrie Leonetti
When The Emperor Has No Clothes Iii: Personnel Policies And Conflicts Of Interest In Prosecutors’ Offices, Carrie Leonetti
Carrie Leonetti
This Article examines and evaluates an alternate cause of overcharging, one that has not received much attention from courts or in the scholarly literature: the extent to which internal personnel policies in prosecutors’ offices create incentives to overcharge. The number and seriousness of convictions and the amount of punishment are the basic standards by which the success of prosecutors is measured. In order to curb overcharging and other forms of prosecutorial misconduct, courts should disqualify prosecutors whose offices explicitly or implicitly determine their job status, compensation, or advancement on the basis of their conviction or sentencing record on the ground …
When The Emperor Has No Clothes Iii: Personnel Policies And Conflicts Of Interest In Prosecutors’ Offices, Carrie Leonetti
When The Emperor Has No Clothes Iii: Personnel Policies And Conflicts Of Interest In Prosecutors’ Offices, Carrie Leonetti
Carrie Leonetti
This Article examines and evaluates an alternate cause of overcharging, one that has not received much attention from courts or in the scholarly literature: the extent to which internal personnel policies in prosecutors’ offices create incentives to overcharge. The number and seriousness of convictions and the amount of punishment are the basic standards by which the success of prosecutors is measured. In order to curb overcharging and other forms of prosecutorial misconduct, courts should disqualify prosecutors whose offices explicitly or implicitly determine their job status, compensation, or advancement on the basis of their conviction or sentencing record on the ground …
When The Emperor Has No Clothes Iii: Personnel Policies And Conflicts Of Interest In Prosecutors’ Offices, Carrie Leonetti
When The Emperor Has No Clothes Iii: Personnel Policies And Conflicts Of Interest In Prosecutors’ Offices, Carrie Leonetti
Carrie Leonetti
This Article examines and evaluates an alternate cause of overcharging, one that has not received much attention from courts or in the scholarly literature: the extent to which internal personnel policies in prosecutors’ offices create incentives to overcharge. The number and seriousness of convictions and the amount of punishment are the basic standards by which the success of prosecutors is measured. In order to curb overcharging and other forms of prosecutorial misconduct, courts should disqualify prosecutors whose offices explicitly or implicitly determine their job status, compensation, or advancement on the basis of their conviction or sentencing record on the ground …
When The Emperor Has No Clothes Iii: Personnel Policies And Conflicts Of Interest In Prosecutors’ Offices, Carrie Leonetti
When The Emperor Has No Clothes Iii: Personnel Policies And Conflicts Of Interest In Prosecutors’ Offices, Carrie Leonetti
Carrie Leonetti
This Article examines and evaluates an alternate cause of overcharging, one that has not received much attention from courts or in the scholarly literature: the extent to which internal personnel policies in prosecutors’ offices create incentives to overcharge. The number and seriousness of convictions and the amount of punishment are the basic standards by which the success of prosecutors is measured. In order to curb overcharging and other forms of prosecutorial misconduct, courts should disqualify prosecutors whose offices explicitly or implicitly determine their job status, compensation, or advancement on the basis of their conviction or sentencing record on the ground …
When The Emperor Has No Clothes Iii: Personnel Policies And Conflicts Of Interest In American Prosecutors’ Offices, Carrie Leonetti
When The Emperor Has No Clothes Iii: Personnel Policies And Conflicts Of Interest In American Prosecutors’ Offices, Carrie Leonetti
Carrie Leonetti
This Article examines and evaluates an alternate cause of overcharging in the United States, one that has not received much attention from courts or in the scholarly comparative criminal-procedure literature: the extent to which internal personnel policies in American prosecutors’ offices create incentives to overcharge that do not exist in their counterparts overseas. The number and seriousness of convictions and the amount of punishment are the basic standards by which the success of American prosecutors is measured. In order to curb overcharging and other forms of prosecutorial misconduct in the United States, courts should disqualify prosecutors whose offices explicitly or …
When The Emperor Has No Clothes Iii: Personnel Policies And Conflicts Of Interest In American Prosecutors’ Offices, Carrie Leonetti
When The Emperor Has No Clothes Iii: Personnel Policies And Conflicts Of Interest In American Prosecutors’ Offices, Carrie Leonetti
Carrie Leonetti
This Article examines and evaluates an alternate cause of overcharging in the United States, one that has not received much attention from courts or in the scholarly comparative criminal-procedure literature: the extent to which internal personnel policies in American prosecutors’ offices create incentives to overcharge that do not exist in their counterparts overseas. The number and seriousness of convictions and the amount of punishment are the basic standards by which the success of American prosecutors is measured. In order to curb overcharging and other forms of prosecutorial misconduct in the United States, courts should disqualify prosecutors whose offices explicitly or …
When The Emperor Has No Clothes Iii: Personnel Policies And Conflicts Of Interest In Prosecutors’ Offices, Carrie Leonetti
When The Emperor Has No Clothes Iii: Personnel Policies And Conflicts Of Interest In Prosecutors’ Offices, Carrie Leonetti
Carrie Leonetti
This Article examines and evaluates an alternate cause of overcharging, one that has not received much attention from courts or in the scholarly literature: the extent to which internal personnel policies in prosecutors’ offices create incentives to overcharge. The number and seriousness of convictions and the amount of punishment are the basic standards by which the success of prosecutors is measured. In order to curb overcharging and other forms of prosecutorial misconduct, courts should disqualify prosecutors whose offices explicitly or implicitly determine their job status, compensation, or advancement on the basis of their conviction or sentencing record on the ground …
When The Emperor Has No Clothes Iii: Personnel Policies And Conflicts Of Interest In Prosecutors’ Offices, Carrie Leonetti
When The Emperor Has No Clothes Iii: Personnel Policies And Conflicts Of Interest In Prosecutors’ Offices, Carrie Leonetti
Carrie Leonetti
This Article examines and evaluates an alternate cause of overcharging in the United States, one that has not received much attention from courts or in the scholarly comparative criminal-procedure literature: the extent to which internal personnel policies in American prosecutors’ offices create incentives to overcharge that do not exist in their counterparts overseas. The number and seriousness of convictions and the amount of punishment are the basic standards by which the success of American prosecutors is measured. In order to curb overcharging and other forms of prosecutorial misconduct in the United States, courts should disqualify prosecutors whose offices explicitly or …
When The Emperor Has No Clothes Iii: Personnel Policies And Conflicts Of Interest In Prosecutors’ Offices, Carrie Leonetti
When The Emperor Has No Clothes Iii: Personnel Policies And Conflicts Of Interest In Prosecutors’ Offices, Carrie Leonetti
Carrie Leonetti
This Article examines and evaluates an alternate cause of overcharging, one that has not received much attention from courts or in the scholarly literature: the extent to which internal personnel policies in prosecutors’ offices create incentives to overcharge. The number and seriousness of convictions and the amount of punishment are the basic standards by which the success of prosecutors is measured. In order to curb overcharging and other forms of prosecutorial misconduct, courts should disqualify prosecutors whose offices explicitly or implicitly determine their job status, compensation, or advancement on the basis of their conviction or sentencing record on the ground …
When The Emperor Has No Clothes Iii: Personnel Policies And Conflicts Of Interest In Prosecutors’ Offices, Carrie Leonetti
When The Emperor Has No Clothes Iii: Personnel Policies And Conflicts Of Interest In Prosecutors’ Offices, Carrie Leonetti
Carrie Leonetti
This Article examines and evaluates an alternate cause of overcharging, one that has not received much attention from courts or in the scholarly literature: the extent to which internal personnel policies in prosecutors’ offices create incentives to overcharge. The number and seriousness of convictions and the amount of punishment are the basic standards by which the success of prosecutors is measured. In order to curb overcharging and other forms of prosecutorial misconduct, courts should disqualify prosecutors whose offices explicitly or implicitly determine their job status, compensation, or advancement on the basis of their conviction or sentencing record on the ground …
When The Emperor Has No Clothes Iii: Personnel Policies And Conflicts Of Interest In Prosecutors’ Offices, Carrie Leonetti
When The Emperor Has No Clothes Iii: Personnel Policies And Conflicts Of Interest In Prosecutors’ Offices, Carrie Leonetti
Carrie Leonetti
This Article examines and evaluates an alternate cause of overcharging, one that has not received much attention from courts or in the scholarly literature: the extent to which internal personnel policies in prosecutors’ offices create incentives to overcharge. The number and seriousness of convictions and the amount of punishment are the basic standards by which the success of prosecutors is measured. In order to curb overcharging and other forms of prosecutorial misconduct, courts should disqualify prosecutors whose offices explicitly or implicitly determine their job status, compensation, or advancement on the basis of their conviction or sentencing record on the ground …
When The Emperor Has No Clothes Iii: Personnel Policies And Conflicts Of Interest In Prosecutors’ Offices, Carrie Leonetti
When The Emperor Has No Clothes Iii: Personnel Policies And Conflicts Of Interest In Prosecutors’ Offices, Carrie Leonetti
Carrie Leonetti
This Article examines and evaluates an alternate cause of overcharging, one that has not received much attention from courts or in the scholarly literature: the extent to which internal personnel policies in prosecutors’ offices create incentives to overcharge. The number and seriousness of convictions and the amount of punishment are the basic standards by which the success of prosecutors is measured. In order to curb overcharging and other forms of prosecutorial misconduct, courts should disqualify prosecutors whose offices explicitly or implicitly determine their job status, compensation, or advancement on the basis of their conviction or sentencing record on the ground …
When The Emperor Has No Clothes Iii: Personnel Policies And Conflicts Of Interest In Prosecutors’ Offices, Carrie Leonetti
When The Emperor Has No Clothes Iii: Personnel Policies And Conflicts Of Interest In Prosecutors’ Offices, Carrie Leonetti
Carrie Leonetti
This Article examines and evaluates an alternate cause of overcharging, one that has not received much attention from courts or in the scholarly literature: the extent to which internal personnel policies in prosecutors’ offices create incentives to overcharge. The number and seriousness of convictions and the amount of punishment are the basic standards by which the success of prosecutors is measured. In order to curb overcharging and other forms of prosecutorial misconduct, courts should disqualify prosecutors whose offices explicitly or implicitly determine their job status, compensation, or advancement on the basis of their conviction or sentencing record on the ground …
When The Emperor Has No Clothes Iii: Personnel Policies And Conflicts Of Interest In Prosecutors’ Offices, Carrie Leonetti
When The Emperor Has No Clothes Iii: Personnel Policies And Conflicts Of Interest In Prosecutors’ Offices, Carrie Leonetti
Carrie Leonetti
This Article examines and evaluates an alternate cause of overcharging, one that has not received much attention from courts or in the scholarly literature: the extent to which internal personnel policies in prosecutors’ offices create incentives to overcharge. The number and seriousness of convictions and the amount of punishment are the basic standards by which the success of prosecutors is measured. In order to curb overcharging and other forms of prosecutorial misconduct, courts should disqualify prosecutors whose offices explicitly or implicitly determine their job status, compensation, or advancement on the basis of their conviction or sentencing record on the ground …
When The Emperor Has No Clothes Iii: Personnel Policies And Conflicts Of Interest In Prosecutors’ Offices, Carrie Leonetti
When The Emperor Has No Clothes Iii: Personnel Policies And Conflicts Of Interest In Prosecutors’ Offices, Carrie Leonetti
Carrie Leonetti
This Article examines and evaluates an alternate cause of overcharging, one that has not received much attention from courts or in the scholarly literature: the extent to which internal personnel policies in prosecutors’ offices create incentives to overcharge. The number and seriousness of convictions and the amount of punishment are the basic standards by which the success of prosecutors is measured. In order to curb overcharging and other forms of prosecutorial misconduct, courts should disqualify prosecutors whose offices explicitly or implicitly determine their job status, compensation, or advancement on the basis of their conviction or sentencing record on the ground …
When The Emperor Has No Clothes Iii: Personnel Policies And Conflicts Of Interest In Prosecutors’ Offices, Carrie Leonetti
When The Emperor Has No Clothes Iii: Personnel Policies And Conflicts Of Interest In Prosecutors’ Offices, Carrie Leonetti
Carrie Leonetti
This Article examines and evaluates an alternate cause of overcharging, one that has not received much attention from courts or in the scholarly literature: the extent to which internal personnel policies in prosecutors’ offices create incentives to overcharge. The number and seriousness of convictions and the amount of punishment are the basic standards by which the success of prosecutors is measured. In order to curb overcharging and other forms of prosecutorial misconduct, courts should disqualify prosecutors whose offices explicitly or implicitly determine their job status, compensation, or advancement on the basis of their conviction or sentencing record on the ground …
When The Emperor Has No Clothes Ii: A Proposal For A More Serious Look At “The Weight Of The Evidence”, Carrie Leonetti
When The Emperor Has No Clothes Ii: A Proposal For A More Serious Look At “The Weight Of The Evidence”, Carrie Leonetti
Carrie Leonetti
While the Bail Reform Act and state statutes modeled after it command courts to consider the weight of the evidence in making pretrial release/detention decisions, as a practical matter, courts do not do so – at least not when the weight-of-the-evidence factor cuts in favor of release – and they should. In particular, courts should accord substantially more weight to the “weight of the evidence” factor in making or reviewing pretrial-detention determinations when one or more jury has already refused unanimously to convict the defendant of the crime(s) charged. Unless the prosecution has obtained significant, material new evidence between the …
When The Emperor Has No Clothes Ii: A Proposal For A More Serious Look At “The Weight Of The Evidence”, Carrie Leonetti
When The Emperor Has No Clothes Ii: A Proposal For A More Serious Look At “The Weight Of The Evidence”, Carrie Leonetti
Carrie Leonetti
While the Bail Reform Act and state statutes modeled after it command courts to consider the weight of the evidence in making pretrial release/detention decisions, as a practical matter, courts do not do so – at least not when the weight-of-the-evidence factor cuts in favor of release – and they should. In particular, courts should accord substantially more weight to the “weight of the evidence” factor in making or reviewing pretrial-detention determinations when one or more jury has already refused unanimously to convict the defendant of the crime(s) charged. Unless the prosecution has obtained significant, material new evidence between the …