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Criminal Procedure, Justice, Ethics, And Zeal, Darryl K. Brown
Criminal Procedure, Justice, Ethics, And Zeal, Darryl K. Brown
Michigan Law Review
William Stuntz's recent article, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice, offers a series of thoughtful observations on the reasons that criminal procedure doctrines designed to protect defendants have done so little to improve the criminal justice system. Stuntz's article describes the unintended effects of attempts by the United States Supreme Court to improve criminal justice by closely regulating criminal procedure. That procedural focus has had perverse effects because, in a dynamic criminal justice system, other institutional players have responded to procedural rules in ways that undermine appellate courts' goals. Specifically, legislatures have reacted by expanding substantive criminal …
Race, Rights, And Remedies In Criminal Adjudication, Pamela S. Karlan
Race, Rights, And Remedies In Criminal Adjudication, Pamela S. Karlan
Michigan Law Review
Once upon a time, back before the Warren Court, criminal procedure and racial justice were adjacent hinterlands in constitutional law's empire. In 1954, the fifth edition of Dowling's constitutional law casebook contained one chapter on "procedural due process" in which six of the eight cases were about criminal justice, and three of those - Powell v. Alabama, Moore v. Dempsey, and Bailey v. Alabama - were as much about race as they were about crime. A few pages later, two slender chapters on the "national protection of civil rights" and "equal protection of the laws" contained seven and nine decisions, …
Process, The Constitution, And Substantive Criminal Law, Louis D. Bilionis
Process, The Constitution, And Substantive Criminal Law, Louis D. Bilionis
Michigan Law Review
Criminal law scholars have pined for a substantive constitutional criminal law ever since Henry Hart and Herbert Packer first embraced the notion in the late 1950s and early 1960s. To this day, scholars continue to search for a theory fhat giv:es content to, in Hart's words, "the unmistakable indications that the Constitution means something definite and spμiething serious when it speaks of 'crime.'" To their dismay, the Supreme Court has - with two exceptions - seemingly resisted the notion. The two exceptions are familiar. First came the 1957 case of Lambert v. California, in which the Court came as close …